Alfred Jodl 2

From Jodl's IMT testimony: The Führer's order of 30 May which I have already explained, assuming that it ever came to this action, left no other choice than to attack on a previously decided date. This could only follow as the result of an incident because, without provocation, the operation was out of the question; and it was not to be attempted if too long a time had passed.

The Army, in order to be ready for such a surprise break-through of the Czech fortifications, required 4 days of preparation. If nothing happened after those 4 days, the military preparations could no longer be kept secret and the surprise element would disappear. Therefore, nothing else remained but, either a spontaneous incident in Czechoslovakia, which would then 4 days later have resulted in military action, or a date which had to be decided on previously. In that case, an incident had to happen during those 4 days that the Army required for deployment.

The Fuehrer's demands could, in fact, not be solved in any other way, from the point of view of the General Staff. My letter to Major Schmundt was meant to explain that difficult situation to the Führer.

At that time, incidents occurred every day. May I remind you that, since the first partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia, the Sudeten Germans liable to be called for military service had mostly evaded the order. They escaped over the border into Germany, and the Czechoslovakian border police shot at them. Bullets were shot over daily into Germany. Altogether, more than 200,000 Sudeten Germans crossed the border in that manner.

From that point of view, the conception of an incident was not so mean and criminal as it might have been, for instance, if peaceful Switzerland had been involved. If I said, therefore, how keenly interested we would be in such an incident, that was meant to express that, if one resorted to military action at all--all this is, of course, purely theoretical—one might use just such an incident as a [casus belli] . . . .

I had too much knowledge of European military history not to know that the question of the first shot—the apparent cause of war, not the inner cause of war--has played an important part in each war and on each side.

The responsibility for the outbreak of war is always attributed to the enemy; it is not characteristic of Germany alone, but of all European nations who have ever been at war with one another. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the deeper cause of the war was quite apparent. I need not describe the condition in which 3 1/2 million Germans found themselves who were supposed to fight against their own people. I myself was able to watch that tragedy in my own house. In this case, the deeper cause of the war was firmly established, and Lord Runciman, who came on that mission from London, left no doubt about it whatsoever. In such a situation, I certainly had no moral scruples about exaggerating one of these incidents and, by means of a counteraction in vigorous reply to the Czech doings and activities, extending and enlarging such an incident in order that if the political situation allowed it, and England and France did not interfere--as the Fuehrer believed--we might find a really obvious reason for taking action . . . .

The example that the Fuehrer allegedly mentioned in his talks with Field Marshal Keitel, that the German Ambassador had been murdered by the people of Prague, was not even known to me. General Keitel did not tell me; I only heard of it here. Apart from that, I think it is useless to go on discussing it as we did exactly the opposite. We gave the order to General Toussaint to protect the German Embassy in Prague, and to protect the lives of the people in it because, in fact, at one stage it had been seriously threatened.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: No, there was neither a preparation for the incident, nor was it necessary. Incidents kept multiplying day after day, and the solution was a political one, and entirely different. It was merely work on paper, an idea, which was not really necessary at all. But it has already been made clear that as soon as the political discussions started, I made continuous efforts to prevent the provocations, apparently desired on the part of the Czechs, from leading to any military measures on our part . . . .

The Prosecution gave me the distinct impression that [the signatory powers in Munich did not know of Germany's military preparations by the end of September, but that] … it was unknown in the autumn of 1938 at Munich. But that is quite impossible. The entire world knew of the calling up of the eight age groups in Czechoslovakia in September. The whole world knew of the total mobilization on 23 September. A political correspondent of The Times wrote an article on 28 September against this Czechoslovakian mobilization. Nobody was surprised that immediately after the signing of the Munich Pact, on 1 October, we marched...

From Jodl's IMT testimony: I was certainly convinced of that [that the conflict might be localized], because I could not imagine that the Führer, in the position we were in, would start a conflict with France and Britain which had to lead to our immediate collapse.

In my diary on 8 September, there is reference to a conversation with General Stuelpnagel. According to that, Stulpnagel was at the moment very worried lest the Führer should depart from his oft-defined attitude, and allow himself to be dragged into military action, in spite of the danger of France's intervention.

According to the entry in my diary I replied that actually at the moment I shared his worries to some extent. It was out of the question with five fighting divisions and seven reserve divisions in the western fortifications, which were nothing but a large construction site, to hold out against 100 French divisions. That was militarily impossible.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: On 13 or 14 September the eight age groups were called up in Czechoslovakia. We used the strengthened frontier guard, so that the many escaping Sudeten Germans could be taken over.

On 17 September, the Führer formed the Freikorps Henlein, contrary to the previous agreement, and without telling us beforehand. Previously it had been agreed that these Sudeten Germans of military age were to join the Reserve Army. Around that time, the political discussions started. The first one at the Berghof had already taken place. Benes ordered mobilization in Czechoslovakia on 23 September and, only now, and in accordance with the political discussions, did the military deployment against Czechoslovakia commence. I had no doubt that it was going to be used in the event of Czechoslovakia not submitting to any agreement we had made with the Western Powers, for the Fuehrer had clearly stated that he would negotiate, only if France and England did not intervene politically or militarily.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: Already before the solution brought about by the Munich Pact, I, on my own initiative, drew up a secret operational plan for the protection of all the German borders. It was so arranged that the borders only were to be protected, while the bulk of the Army was to be kept in reserve in the center of Germany. That complete plan was available here during my interrogation. The reason was that, once the necessity for an operation against Czechoslovakia had become superfluous, through the problem being solved in some way, we would no longer have had any deployment plan at all. And as no other intention of the Führer was known to me, I, on my own initiative, drew up a plan for this operation, which would be suitable for any eventuality . . . .

I had no idea ... that [the Führer, after the Munich Agreement, intended to go even further and occupy Bohemia and Moravia]. I knew of his speech of 26 September where he said: "Now we are facing the last problem to be solved." I believed in that assurance, and this is proved by the fact that during those days—it was about 10 or 11 September—I suggested to Field Marshal Keitel, then General Keitel, that he should ask the British Delegation, whose arrival had been announced, to come to Iglau in Moravia, because many Germans who were living there had been threatened by armed Czechoslovakian Communists. This, of course, was a suggestion that I would never have made, if I had had any idea that the Führer nourished any further intentions concerning Bohemia and Moravia.

As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day. The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615. It also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which, however, would not alarm the entire Czech front. Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria . . . .

Thus it is proposed: Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the air force—at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front. The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.

From the IMT testimony of General Horst Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels: Perhaps I may state ... that during the years 1937 to 1939 quite a number of General Staff officers came to see Lieutenant Colonel von Zielberg and me, as personnel administrators of the General Staff officers, and talked to us. The majority of these officers were chiefs of army corps, army, and army group general staffs; and they were, therefore, the confidential and responsible advisers of the commanding generals and commanders. These officers, just like their commanding generals, had fought in the First World War; and the opinion they always expressed to us was only that the German nation should be spared a second war. In spite of every positive attitude to the Führer's successes, there was a certain anxiety about his policy and particularly about the rapid rearmament of the forces, which made careful work difficult. After the Munich negotiations, confidence increased a great deal and it was the general opinion of the officers that the Führer would continue to be successful in maintaining peace . . . .

After the Munich Agreement I concluded from my talks with General Staff officers that there was a general conviction among them that, thanks to his policy, the Führer would continue to preserve peace. I remember that as late as 25 or 26 August I saw the Führer, at headquarters in Zossen, having a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel von Zielberg and several other officers. At that time these officers were still of the opinion that a war would not occur and that, to render the Führer's political aims feasible, it was only necessary to keep the troops firmly under control, so that no political catastrophe should be produced by the laying down of arms.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: I do not think this document [above] is so remarkable after all. It was compiled at the end of September 1938, shortly before the Munich Conference. As I, in my department, did not know for certain whether we would have an armed conflict or not, and as at that time the stipulations of international law were not clear to us, I wanted, by taking various examples, to find out from the experts on international law what the present attitude was towards such infractions. Every officer in my division then racked his brain to find an example, and we tried to cover every branch of international law through some specific instance. I consider it worthy of note that, even then, we concerned ourselves with the conception of international law. There can be no doubt whatsoever that I alone carry responsibility for having thought out these examples. But if one were to take exception to the reply to these examples, that is to the judgment on the lines of international law, or to justification according to the rules of warfare, I can only say that this did not come from me; it emanated from the office of Canaris. Apart from that, it shows a very careful and noteworthy attitude toward international law, especially concerning air warfare. At any rate, it was on a much higher level than what took place in actual practice . . . .

Not at all [was it the intention to commit these infractions of international law], but as one conversant with the history of warfare, I knew that there has never yet been in this world a war, in which infractions of international law did not occur.

If, perhaps, objection should be raised that quite at the end of the paragraph there appears: "Explanation by the Propaganda Ministry," I should like to say that that comes at the end, after the justification according to the laws of war and the judgment from the standpoint of international law. Admiral Burckner, who gave the reply, himself referred to it—that propaganda could be put into practice only after the aspects of international law had been clarified. Moreover the whole answer was only a preliminary one, as first the Foreign Office and the various branch chiefs of the Wehrmacht would have had to be heard on the subject . . . .

I recognized and valued international law with which I was well acquainted, as a prerequisite for the decent and humane conduct of war. Copies of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare, and the Geneva Convention were always lying on my desk. I believe that, by my attitude toward the Commissar Order, toward lynching, and toward the intention to repudiate the Geneva Convention—bluntly rejected by all Commanders-in-Chief and all branches of the Wehrmacht, and by the Foreign Office—I have proved that I tried, as far as it was possible for me, to observe international law.

Of course, there is a wealth of positive proof available. The pertinent documents will probably be submitted by my defense counsel. I will refer only to the behavior of the German Wehrmacht in Norway, a matter in which I collaborated. I refer to the partisan regulations.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: No, I did not know about it [the above directive]. I did not see it. I only saw it here in this courtroom during my preliminary interrogation.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: From 1932 to 1935 I was in the division which was later called the Operations Division of the Army. From the middle of 1935 until October 1938 I was Chief of the Department for National Defense in the Wehrmachtsamt, which was later called the OKW. From October 1938 until shortly before the Polish campaign I was artillery commander at Vienna; and at Brunn, in Moravia. On 27 August 1939 I took over the office and the tasks of Chief of the General Staff. At that time, there were no preparations in the Operations Division, except for combat directives for the improvised Grenzschutz 0st (frontier guard East). This was a militia-like organization, and preparations were made to evacuate the whole German border in case of enemy occupation. That was all . . . .

In this position I had to work out the operational strategic directives according to the instructions of my chiefs, Keitel and Blomberg. I had to study and to clarify the problem of the leadership of the Wehrmacht, [and] to prepare studies and exercises for the big Wehrmacht maneuvers in 1937. I had to supervise the Wehrmacht Academy; I had to work out drafts for laws in connection with the general conscription order, and with the unified preparation for mobilization in the civilian sector, that is, of state and people. The so-called Secretariat of the Reich Defense Committee came under me . . . .

I expected an easing of the political tension and a period of peace. I can certainly say that. As I knew of no other plans, I transferred my home to Vienna taking all my furniture with me. Naturally I would never have done that if I had had the faintest idea that war was pending, because I knew that in the event of war I was to become the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and so would have to return to Berlin. I asked General Keitel to help me to become the Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in Reichenhall, from 1 October 1939, a request which again it would never have entered my mind to make, if I had any idea of what was going to come. I had no connections with the OKW. I received no military documents from the OKW during all that period. During that time, I knew no more about what was going on, or what was intended, than any lieutenant in my artillery.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: From the autumn of 1938 on, the picture became much more favorable because the preparations in the armament industry were now producing results, and plenty of equipment was being delivered for the divisions; also, because from this time on, the trained age groups were beginning to come in. Therefore, in the late autumn of 1938, we were in a position to set up approximately 55 divisions—including reserve divisions—even though some of them may have been only poorly equipped. In 1939—as I said before, according to my recollection—there were between 73 and 75 divisions ... these 55 divisions, or rather these 75, were still very short of equipment, in the same way as the small number in the spring of 1938, or in April 1938, which I mentioned. But the fact that from that time on armament went much faster was due—as I have said—to the very nature of things.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: It was through the orders of my divisional staff that I heard of that operation in March of 1939, some 2 or 3 days beforehand. It had no longer anything to do with [Case Green]. There were completely different troop units, and not even half of the troops provided for in 1938 were actually used for the march into Czechoslovakia in 1939.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: With great persistence, it has been said again and again, that General Warlimont took part in the conference as the representative of Jodl, or even, it was once said, as his assistant. There is no question of that. He was my successor, but not my representative. And even if it is repeated again and again, it still does not make it true. He was my successor ... I had completely left the OKW. The fact that, quite accidentally, Warlimont became my deputy later on, has nothing whatsoever to do with the events of May 1939. [I first heard of this meeting] here in Nuremberg in 1946.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: I received one letter from General Keitel. It was, I think, at the end of July 1939. He personally gave me the good news that, quite probably, I would become Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in Reichenhall on 1 October, and that General Von Sodenstern would become Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, now on peacetime footing, on 1 October . . . .

During this occupation [of Czechoslovakia] I remained in Vienna for the time being, and temporarily became Chief of Staff of the 18th Army Corps at Vienna. Then, later on, I was transferred to Brunn in Czechoslovakia together with the entire 44th Division.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: I do not know what the Fuehrer actually said in his conference on the 22d of August. I did not even know that a discussion had taken place, for I was in Vienna. I only know what is ostensibly in documents that have been submitted here.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: For that summer I already had tickets for a cruise in the eastern Mediterranean on 23 September 1939. The voyage was to start at Hamburg; I had already paid for the tickets. I bought them about the second half of July. I am not absolutely certain about the exact date [I returned to Berlin], but I imagine that it was on 23 or 24 August—according to a telegram which reached me unexpectedly in Brunn. In case of a general mobilization, I would have had to go to Berlin anyway. I did not report to [Hitler], either. I only reported, of course, to General Keitel and to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the Air Force and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy . . . . The Führer was not responsible for my being called back. I do not know whether he knew about it at all. I do not believe so . . . .

Because of the significance of the activity, one can certainly say that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was one of the most important departments of the OKW. In the majority of cases, I was the deputy [for Keitel] only in operational matters. As for war ministerial questions, it was the senior chief, as a rule, Admiral Canaris, who [was] deputized. When Keitel was not at headquarters, then, as a matter of course, whenever the Führer had anything to say to the OKW, he talked first with me, as I was the next officer by seniority. In individual cases, when the Field Marshal was not there, and in unimportant things [I was the acting deputy]; but when it came to important things, I could reach him by telephone at any time, and so it hardly ever happened that I [was] deputized. He was never ill, and was never away on leave. When he was away, he was in Berlin at headquarters.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: I found a completely incomprehensible state of affairs in Berlin—at least it was incomprehensible to me. Nobody knew what was really true, or what was bluff. The pact with Russia sustained all our hopes for the preservation of peace, hopes that were immensely increased and strengthened by the surprise cancellation of the attack ordered for 26 August. None of the soldiers to whom I spoke expected a war with the Western Powers at that time. Nothing had been prepared except the operations for the attack on Poland.

[On the West Wall], there was only a defensive deployment of troops. The forces stationed there were so weak that we could not even man all the pillboxes. The actual efforts for the preservation of peace, however, efforts I have heard about here from the Reich Marshal, the name of Dahlerus, all these negotiations, remained unknown to me insofar as they were not published in the press. But there is one thing I can say in conclusion. When the declaration of war was received from England and France, it was like a blow from a cudgel for us soldiers who had fought in the First World War And I heard in confidence from General Stapf—today, the matter is no longer confidential--that the Reich Marshal reacted in exactly the same way . . . .

[When Poland mobilized] I cannot say. I only know that, at the moment when I arrived in Berlin, and was being informed by General Von Stuelpnagel for the very first time about the situation and our own strength, a Polish deployment was already in progress along the frontier, as well as the German one . . . . Not by a single stroke of the pen, did I participate in the preparations for the Polish war. The plan of attack was [already] completely worked out.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: When, on the 25th, to our great surprise we received the order, "The attack fixed for the 26th will not take place," I telephoned to the then Major Schmundt—Field Marshal Keitel was not there—and asked him what was the matter. He told me that, shortly before, the Reich Foreign Minister had reported to the Führer that Britain had concluded a pact—a mutual assistance pact—with Poland, and for that reason he could expect British intervention in the war with Poland. For this reason the Führer had withdrawn the order for attack. That is what I learned at that time.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: I had to deal with the entire general staff work concerning the strategic operational conduct of the war. Then, subordinate to me, was the military propaganda department, whose duty it was to co-operate with the press; and thirdly, I was head of an office which, speaking broadly, had to distribute means of communication to the various branches of the Wehrmacht. The whole of this sphere of work took up my time to such an extent that, as a rule, I worked night after night, until 3 o'clock in the morning. I had no time at all to concern myself with other things. I already had to delegate to my personal adjutant almost all my work with the press, which had to receive daily information . . . .

[The idea that I was Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Keitel] is not correct as has already been shown by the organization which was explained here during Field Marshal Keitel's case. There is a great difference. As Chief of Staff, I would have been Field Marshal Keitel's assistant, concerned with all of his duties. I was, however, only the chief of one of the many departments subordinate to Field Marshal Keitel. Beginning with the year 1941, it became the practice for me and my operational branch to report to the Führer direct on all matters concerned with strategies, while Field Marshal Keitel, using my quartermaster department as a sort of personal working staff, took over all other tasks . . . .

[I had no authority to issue orders] or rather only through my working staff. I was subordinate to Field Marshal Keitel, and even Keitel himself was not a commander, but only the chief of a staff. But in the course of this war I naturally decided many operational details myself, and signed them myself. There was no disagreement of any sort in these matters with the commanders-in-chief, for I had their confidence, and I worked on the best possible terms with them . . . .

One must differentiate [as to the orders I signed in different ways—sometimes with my full name, sometimes with a "J"] as follows: The decrees which the Führer himself signed, if they were of an operational nature, bear my initial at the end, on the lower right; and that means that I at least assisted in the formulation of that order. Then there were orders which also came from the Führer, though they were not signed by him personally, but were signed "by order, Jodl"; but they always had at the beginning the sentence, "The Führer has decreed," or that sentence was found somewhere in the course of the order. There would be a preamble, usually giving reasons for the order, and then, it would read: "The Führer has therefore decreed." . . . . The difference was merely that the orders signed by me were of less importance . . . .

These orders were as a rule signed: "The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl" These were orders which emanated from me, that is, my staff or I formulated them. The Führer himself, and Field Marshal Keitel, had perhaps been informed of these orders, but not in every case. Then there were other orders, which bear my initial on the first page, in the upper right-hand corner. Those were orders issued by other departments. My initial "J" on the first page was merely an office notation to show that the order had been submitted to me. But it did not mean that I had read it for if, on perusing the first page, I saw that the decree dealt with a matter not connected with my sphere of work, then I initialed it and put it aside, because I had to save time.

These summarized notes were an arrangement used on higher staff levels for the convenience of people who had not time to study enormous files. The summarized notes contained, in a short condensed form, a description of some matter or other, frequently the views taken by other departments and sometimes even a proposal. The important point, however, is that it was not an order; it was not a draft of an order, but it formed the basis for an order.