From Jodl's IMT testimony: [This was] not exactly [a cruel order]. I should like to make a few explanatory remarks about it. Typically, as I have always said, this order was urged upon the Führer by the Reich Commissioner Terboven; not by the soldiers, but much against their will.

Secondly, this order was not carried out, because otherwise the cities of Kirkenes, Hammerfest, and Alta would today no longer exist. All these cities are east of the Lyngen Fjord. In practice, this order was moderated by our forces in agreement with me, and in conversations I had with my brother, who was the commanding general in that region, and whom I wanted to call as a witness since I expected this document to be produced. It was moderated to such an extent that, in fact, only what was necessary from a military point of view, and could be justified under Article 23 of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare, was destroyed. Otherwise, no city or house would be left today in northern Norway; and if you were to travel there, you would see that these cities are still standing, not destroyed.

The Armed Forces commander in Norway strongly protested against this attitude of Terboven, and I repeated these objections to the Führer, in similarly strong terms; but, nevertheless, he demanded that this order be issued. We, who retained our humanitarian sentiments, carried out the order, only insofar as it was absolutely necessary for military reasons. These are the facts . . . .

[My brother complained of this order], he was enraged by this decree. No, not just from my point of view, but] from the point of view of the Norwegians as well . . . . What was bombed on the day of the landing is hardly worth mentioning: just a few coastal batteries, and a few fortifications, but no cities. Villages were destroyed only later in the battle with the English brigade at Dombass and at Lillehammer; but nothing was destroyed when the country was first occupied. Then the Norwegians only stood at the quays, hands in their pockets, and looked on with great interest. [It would be better to occupy the country without opposition], undoubtedly; that would have been even better; and the Norwegians would certainly have fared very well during the occupation, if Terboven had not come.

From the IMT testimony of General August Winter: On 15 November 1944, I was called there [the Armed Forces Operations Staff] to succeed General Warlimont, who had fallen ill; and I took over his functions on 15 November 1944. My appointment was dated from 1 December 1944. I was there [situation discussions with the Führer] on an average of 5 days out of 7 during the week. The situation discussion was a permanent part of the afternoon's program, and was attended by a fairly large number of people, while there was a second situation discussion at 2 o'clock in the morning, of no importance to us here. In it, only the junior General Staff officers of the OKH made reports for the Eastern Front, and of the Operations Staff of the OKW for the Western Front.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: And I should like to refer to something I believe I have stated already, that I ordered an immediate investigation of the Malmedy incident . . . . I studied international law very carefully in its bearing on my orders. I do not wish to detain the Court with the knowledge I gathered from these regulations, for it is only incomplete; but I should like to conclude by saying that, owing to the fact that there were no regulations governing air warfare, deplorable confusion in definition arose, for instance, between rebellion and legal war force; between franc-tireur, bandit, and scout; between spy and scout; demolition crews and saboteurs. Any time, with the help of aircraft, a rebellion might be converted into a legal war; and a legal war, on the other hand, might become a state of rebellion. That is the effect that parachute troops and the furnishing of supplies by air have had on international law.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: I did not advise him [Hitler] to capitulate at that time. That was completely out of the question. No soldier would have done that. It would have been of no use. Not even after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive. The Führer realized the situation, as a whole, as well as we did, and probably much sooner than we did. Therefore, we did not need to say anything to him in this connection . . . .

In the winter of 1944, there were many reasons for not doing this [advise the Führer to capitulate], apart from the fact that the question of capitulation, or discontinuing resistance, concerns only the Supreme Commander. The reasons against it were, primarily, that we had no doubt there could be only unconditional surrender . . . . other countries left us in no doubt on that score; and even if we had had any doubt as to what faced us, it was completely removed by the fact that we captured the English "Eclipse"—the gentlemen of the British Delegation will know what that is. It was exact instructions about what the occupying power was to do in Germany after the capitulation. Now, unconditional surrender meant that the troops would cease to fight where they stood on all the fronts, and be captured by the enemy facing them. The same thing would happen as happened in the winter of 1941 at Viazma. Millions of prisoners would suddenly have to camp in the middle of winter, in the open. Death would have taken an enormous toll.

Above all, the men still on the Eastern Front, who numbered about 31 million, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy in the East. It was our endeavor to save as many people as possible by sending them into the western area. That could only be done by drawing the two fronts closer together. Those were the purely military opinions that we held in the last stages of the war. I believe that in years to come there will be more to say about this than I can say or wish to say today.

From the IMT testimony of Major Herbert Buchs: I can remember something like [a situation discussion of 27 January 1945, at which the fate of the 10,000 air force officers imprisoned in the Sagan Camp was discussed]: Fegelein must have raised the question of evacuating that camp on the approach of the Russian troops. These captured officers were asked whether they wished to remain in the camp—and be handed over to the Russian Army—or whether they wanted to be taken away in the course of the evacuation of Silesia. As far as I remember, they definitely decided on the latter alternative, that is to say, to be taken away; and I believe that the only question still to be decided was how their transport was to be arranged.

I believe, [that] at that time, the Führer only said, in general terms, that these imprisoned officers could not receive better treatment than our own people. It was just at the time of the evacuation of Silesia; and our traffic situation did not permit the transport of even our own people by means of railway trains, or in large columns; and the population had to tramp along the roads, even in winter. And I think I remember that, at the time, the Führer said, "If these officers wish to be taken along on a transport, they will have to march, just like the German civilian population."

In this connection, may I just mention that it was extremely difficult to take notes of the proceedings. Four to six people frequently spoke at once during these conference, and much more rapidly than usual. The stenographers could only take down what they heard. They could neither look up, nor make certain who actually made such and such a remark, at such and such a moment. There was a table, around which there were often some 30 people standing; and that interfered with the work of the stenographers.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: No proposal at all is being made here; but the Armed Forces Operations Staff is advising the military commander in Norway, of what Reich Commissioner Terboven has told the Führer. He [first] reported to the [Fuehrer about] the general situation and then [he] made the proposals mentioned here; and the Armed Forces Operations Staff, which obviously had a representative at this meeting—I was not there—immediately advised the military commander of the handsome proposals of his friend Terboven. That is what happened, and these proposals went beyond … they were too much even for the Führer. But they were not our proposals . . . .

["Orientation about Reich Commissioner Terboven's Report" means] Orientation of the Mountain Army, that is, of General Bohm. General Bohm, as commanding general of the Mountain Army, High Command 20, is advised of the report made to the Führer by Reich Commissioner Terboven, so that he would know what his friend Terboven was proposing. It is no more than information on what Terboven said to the Führer. I cannot tell you who was present; I was not there. The entire thing did not originate with me; I have never seen it.

From Speer's IMT testimony: Among the military leaders, there were many [who], each in his own sphere, told Hitler, quite clearly, what the situation was. Many commanders of army groups, for instance, made it clear to him how catastrophic developments were, and there were often fierce arguments during the discussions on the situation. Men like Guderian and Jodl, for instance, often talked openly about their sectors in my presence, and Hitler could see quite well, what the general situation was like. But I never observed that those who were actually responsible, in the group around Hitler, ever went to him and said, "The war is lost." Nor did I ever see these people, who had responsibility, endeavor to unite in undertaking some joint step with Hitler. I did not attempt it for my part either, except once or twice, because it would have been useless since, at this stage, Hitler had so intimidated his closest associates, that they no longer had any wills of their own.

From Albert Speer: His Battle With Truth by Gitta Sereny: Among the generals, too, [in earlier years], there were some who spoke up, however [fruitlessly, such] as Beck, Witzleben, Halder, Blomberg, Fritsch, and even, at times, the formalistic Brauchitsch. And, as Speer said, during the war, Zeitzler, Fromm, Milch, and some others also tried. And finally, there was General Jodl, who, although unhappily for him, he was never sacked or transferred, very often spoke his mind and, particularly in the last months, went through long, harrowing periods of the kind of disfavor Speer experienced, when Hitler, although insisting on his presence, would pretend he wasn't there.

Jodl's wife, Luise, a woman of great distinction, then and now, recalled when we talked: "He would come home, late, late in the [night, his face] exhausted, his voice hoarse. He didn't have to say anything: I knew that he had tried, again failed, to influence Hitler. All I could think of was how to ease his despair, how to help him just rest. So finally, one would talk about practically nothing. You know, the weather, the dogs; just things of little importance, gentle things."

From Jodl's IMT testimony: One cannot say it was really impossible to contradict the Führer. Very many times I contradicted him most emphatically; but there were moments, when one actually could not answer a word. Also, by my objections, I induced the Führer to desist from many things. There were a great number of operational questions [that] do not interest the Court; but in the sphere of interest to the Court, there was, for example, Hitler's intention to renounce the Geneva Convention. I prevented that because I objected . . . . One thing I know for certain: the Foreign Office informed me, in writing, of its unfavorable attitude toward this suggestion or idea of the Führer. For me, that was conclusive proof that the Reich Foreign Minister held this point of view. I recorded this unfavorable attitude of the Foreign Office—together with the unfavorable attitude of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe—in a short memorandum, and submitted it to the Führer. To what extent the Reich Foreign Minister personally remonstrated with the Fuehrer about the matter, I cannot say with certainty.

The Reich Foreign Minister, the Foreign Office, repeatedly remonstrated with the Führer to withdraw the order concerning the chaining of Canadian prisoners; and it must be assumed that these many objections, which were also supported by the OKW, finally succeeded in having the order withdrawn . . . .

The whole thing, as I have said, is a notice of Admiral Wagner on a conference—from which one can gather only that Großadmiral Doenitz disapproved—and that he is supposed to have made this remark at the end. I can hardly account for that remark today, because the only reason given to us by the Führer, at that time, was that the tremendous number of German soldiers in the West must be prevented from deserting, as a consequence of enemy propaganda about good treatment. I cannot explain this remark, and in my written draft, [which] I submitted to the Führer, and which contains the attitude of the Navy, that sentence was not included; but only advantages and disadvantages were compared.

The disadvantages were overwhelming; the whole thing was completely impracticable and impossible, and so it was not carried out. More, I cannot say. Witnesses will confirm my statement.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: I can only say in reply, that this was the sole method which achieved success with the Fuehrer and, by its use, success was, in fact, achieved. If I had come to him with moral or purely legal arguments, he would have said, "Leave me alone with this foolish talk," and he would have proceeded with the renunciation of the Convention; but these things compelled him to reconsider the step and, in consequence, he did not carry it through.

You must, after all, grant me that, at the end of 5 1/2 years, I knew best how to achieve good results with him, and avoid bad ones. My aim was to achieve success, and I achieved it . . . .

[That we should not have told the world the truth in 1914] was an argument that the Führer used frequently. If one repeated his arguments in that form again and again, he was more inclined to read and accept one's suggestions. One had to prevent his flinging our proposals to the ground in a fit of rage, and immediately decreeing renunciation. That was the approach one had to follow. If one cannot do good openly, it is better to do it in a roundabout way, than not at all.

From the IMT testimony of General August Winter: Immediately after the attacks on Dresden, when Hitler had raised the question of leaving the Geneva Convention, this preliminary draft was drawn up at my headquarters, under the responsibility of General Jodl; and the order stated that all angles should be worked on [that] would prevent the Führer from coming to such a decision—that is, of leaving the Geneva Convention. This document was carefully worked out from the point of view of international law, and from the point of view of the psychological effect on the enemy troops, as well as on our own at home. I myself did it. The following day, my chief, General Jodl, received me. He had this document, the contents of which I have not checked now, and he told me that he was completely in agreement with this negative treatment, but that he had felt obliged to work on the draft in more detail, and bring it into line with the information he had from the Navy; and so formulate it tactically, in such a way that would guarantee its success with Hitler, under all circumstances—for his idea must not be allowed to be put into practice.

From the IMT testimony of Major Herbert Buchs (Jodl's second adjutant): I recall that, in March 1945, the Führer again expressed himself very heatedly on this problem [the treatment of "terror-fliers"] to General Koller, who was then Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force. I myself was not present at the beginning of this conversation. I was called in, however, and heard the Führer say something to the effect that, on the basis of the attitude taken by the Armed Forces, and especially by the Air Force, it had been impossible for him to counteract the terror of the Allied fliers over Germany, by means of a corresponding counter-terror.

From the testimony of Luftwaffe General Karl Koller: From 1 September 1943 to 3 September 1944, I was Chief of the Air Force Operations Staff; from 23 November 1944, Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force. A notice taken from the Allied press reporter survey, between the beginning and the middle of March 1945, was laid before the Führer by Bormann, during the situation discussion. In brief it read somewhat to this effect: "An American combat air crew, shot down over Germany a short time previously, was overtaken by advancing American troops. They had declared that they were ill-treated by enraged members of the population, threatened with death, and probably would have been killed, if German soldiers had not released them, and taken them under their protection."

Bormann further pointed out to the Führer, in a few words, that this confirmed that soldiers, in such cases, intervene against the population.

b) Hitler turned angrily to me and said excitedly: "I have already issued one order that bomber crews which bail out are not to be protected against the population. These people only murder German women and children. It is unheard of that German soldiers should take measures to protect them against our own population, which is acting on motives of justifiable hate. Why are my orders not carried out?"

Surprised by this attack, I replied something like this: "I know nothing about any such order; and it would, in any case, be a practical impossibility."

Hitler turned to me, and said very loudly and sharply: "The reason why my orders are not carried out is only the cowardice of the Air Force, because the gentlemen of the Air Force are cowards, and are afraid that something might happen to them too. The whole thing is nothing more than a cowardly pact between the Air Force and the British and American airmen."

Hitler then turned also to Kaltenbrunner, who happened to be present in the background, and went on, addressing him but sometimes not looking at him: "I hereby order that all bomber crews who bailed out in the last few months, as well as all bomber crews bailing out in future, are to be turned over immediately by the Air Force to the SD, and are to be liquidated by the SD. Anyone failing to carry out my orders, or taking action against the population, is liable to the death penalty and is to be shot."

Hitler then further expressed, in general terms, his indignation, and his views on the matter. The assembled officers gave the impression of general surprise and disapproval.

c) After the situation discussion with the Fuehrer, I requested an interview with Kaltenbrunner in the side passageway. Essential points:

Koller: It is impossible to carry out those orders. The Air Force will have nothing more to do with them, nor I myself in any way whatsoever; and I can say as much for the Reich Marshal. It is entirely out of the question that the Air Force will agree to this, in any way, shape, or form."

Kaltenbrunner: The Führer has completely mistaken ideas. The duties of the SD are also constantly misunderstood. Those things are no concern of the SD. Moreover, no German soldier does what the Führer demands. That is not in the German soldier's line. He does not kill prisoners. If individual, fanatical Party followers of Herr Bormann try to do so, the German soldier intervenes. The Führer has a completely false idea of the views held by our soldiers. Moreover, I myself will do nothing in the matter either. I have no intention of doing anything. We must just take care that we get out of it again, otherwise we will be the first to get shot. We must gain time. I am again leaving Berlin at once, for a fairly long time anyway."

Koller: Then we are agreed on the main point. Your leaving Berlin is favorable. But we must have another way out, as far as the Führer is concerned; for it is possible that he may again refer to his order tomorrow. Later on, if it becomes extreme, we will have to see how we can put a stop to the business, or what is going to happen to us?"

The following was decided at my suggestion: "No order along the lines decreed by the Führer will be issued by the Air Force or the SD. Surrenders to the SD—none. In case the Führer should refer to his order again then, first of all, prevent further action through explanations of the following kind: All members of air crews previously captured, not in the hands of the Air Force, but dispersed under the control of the Replacement Army Commander (BdE). Time of capture not known to a central office. Therefore, a lengthy and difficult process to determine the number of air personnel captured during the last few months. Also, preparations must be made, in detail, for getting them out without attracting attention. The newly captured crews go automatically to interrogation centers. These are in process of transfer, owing to operations. Communications are bad. Detailed discussions and agreements with the SD necessary. In order to preserve the appearance of discussion, the I-c officer of the High Command of the Air Force (I-c of OKL), should go to a delegate of Kaltenbrunner who, however, would first have to be appointed."

d) After the situation discussion with the Führer, I spoke to Field Marshal Keitel at the entrance of the air-raid shelter, and said: "The Fuehrer's order is insane."

Keitel affirmed. "It certainly is."

Koller: "The Air Force must keep its escutcheon clean. The order cannot be carried out. I am convinced that the Reich Marshal is entirely of my opinion. To issue such an order—and verbally—and, moreover, with such threats of punishment. He must sign an order of this kind with his own name. It may, or may not be carried out--but not by the Air Force. Nor by the SD, either; I have spoken to Kaltenbrunner."

Field Marshal Keitel: "He will not sign such orders then, and everything is always placed on the shoulders of the OKW. But I'll be damned if I issue such an order."

Koller: "The Air Force cannot join in this in any circumstances. We will not assume such a responsibility."

Field Marshal Keitel: "You are right; neither can I. I must think over what I can do about it, and how I can do it."

The conversation was interrupted because Keitel was called to the telephone. Keitel was very indignant and annoyed about the Führer's order.

e) After refreshments in a side room of the air-raid shelter, I had to cross the antechamber of the conference room again, to reach the cloakroom and exit. Hitler happened to come out of the room, to give an order to an orderly, and he called me as I was passing. The door leading to the conference room was open, and Ley was sitting at the table. Hitler said to me: "I must come back to my order once more. You must all help me, for matters cannot go on like this any longer. The Air Force—or at least defense of the Reich—has failed. What am I to do against the frightful bombing terror which is murdering German women and children?"

Koller: "The Air Defense and our crews do what they can, and what is humanly possible. Our neglect of air armament, and the enemy's present technical and numerical superiority, cannot be eliminated or remedied overnight. When the searchlight units get stronger, the air situation over Germany will be more in our favor."

Hitler: "I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be responsible to the German people for the continuation of this situation in the air. If those fliers realize that they will be liquidated as terrorists, they will think twice about flying here."

Koller: "That will certainly not improve the situation in the air. On the contrary, it will make it worse."

Hitler: "No; the Japanese method is the best."

Hitler's manner was now calm again, in comparison with what it had been at the situation discussion. He appeared more approachable. Experience had shown that it was better to talk to him alone, than in the presence of others. I thought it was a good opportunity to attack the whole problem, and stated: "If I may state my point of view, I think that this will not do. Measures of this kind are in such crass opposition to the education, feelings, and way of thinking of all soldiers, that they cannot be carried out. One cannot train soldiers on the regulations governing warfare and decent conduct, and then order actions that are repulsive to everyone. You must not forget, my Fuehrer that enemy airmen also carry out orders, and do their duty just as ours do. If they are shot down, or make forced landings, they are defenseless and unarmed prisoners. What would the world think of us? And the first thing the enemy would do, would be to treat our aircrews in the same way. That is something for which we cannot answer to our men and their relatives. All their willingness to serve, and their discipline, would collapse at one blow."

Up to that point the Führer had not interrupted me. After his first glance at me, he looked away again and seemed to be lost in thought. He had been listening, however, and at that point he interrupted me and said, quietly and earnestly: "So the Air Force is afraid after all. That is all very well. But I am responsible for the protection of the German people, and have no other means except this."

Hitler turned away, and went back into the conference room.

I) On my arrival at the Air Force headquarters (Kurfurst), I told Colonel von Brauchitsch what had happened, and ordered him to report it to the Reich Marshal, as soon as possible. I myself could not contact the Reich Marshal at the moment. During our conversation, Brauchitsch also expressed disapproval of the Führer's order.

g) An hour or two later, the Reich Marshal called me, and began with the following words: "Tell me, has he gone quite mad now?"

It was quite clear who was meant. I myself reported the principal happenings, and the conversation with Kaltenbrunner, to the Reich Marshal again, and added: "I will not carry out this order, or anything connected with it. I will endeavor to handle the situation so as to gain time now, in any case, and will do everything in my power to protect any of us from disastrous consequences. Perhaps, after the last conference, the Fuehrer will not refer to his order again. If he does, however, a very difficult situation will arise, and you will have to go to the Führer yourself. What the Fuehrer has ordered, must in no case be allowed to happen."

The Reich Marshal expressed strong disapproval of Hitler's attitude, and agreed with me in every point. He ordered me to act as I had suggested, to inform him immediately when necessary, and ended the interview with these words, 'This is all insane, and cannot be done.'

h) Measures against Allied airmen on the basis of the above-mentioned Führer's order were taken neither by the Air Force, nor by the SD. This order did not become known, in my opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (BdE), or its offices, as the Replacement Army Command was not present at the Fuehrer's meeting, and the order was not transmitted by the Armed Forces High Command (OKW).

Hitler made no further reference to his order, either to the Reich Marshal, or to myself or my representative or, I think, to Kaltenbrunner. To be sure, I never spoke to the latter again about this matter. I cannot judge whether Hitler deliberately let the matter drop, or whether he forgot about it under the pressure of events.

i) I know that, about two or three weeks later, an OKW directive was issued—I think a teletype—in which, as I recall, mention was made of the correspondent's report that occasioned it. It disclosed the fact that the Fuehrer had expressed his displeasure that German soldiers had taken action against their own people. No mention was made of the main point of Hitler's order.. If I remember correctly, Keitel signed the directive, and [this] must be regarded as an attempt to cover himself, as far as the Fuehrer was concerned. In my opinion, General Jodl had nothing to do with the affair at all.

From the IMT testimony of Major Herbert Buchs: I remember personally something like the following formulation by the Führer: "This results from the fact that, in the Air Force, war is based on a mutual life insurance policy of 'Don't hurt me; I won't hurt you.'" That was the sentence which impressed me most strongly, which emphasizes what was said.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: [That is my note]. I am of the opinion [that], from the point of view of international [law, members] of a resistance movement, against their own Norwegian government, are certainly not to be considered as normal troops, but as constituting an uprising, a rebellion. But, if Norwegian troops come to Norway from England, then they are regular soldiers. And that, today, is still my opinion on the basis of international law.

In any event, there was the government of Quisling at the time; and in any event, speaking now from the point of view of international law, we were occupying the country, and therefore, according to international law, were justified in issuing laws and enforcing them. That is accepted under international law, and resistance against it has been considered all over the world as rebellion. The same applies to us in Germany today.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: The relations between Field Marshal Keitel and Canaris, from the first day to the last, were remarkably friendly, and unfortunately one of too much blind confidence. I know that, even after the 20th of July, Field Marshal Keitel did not believe the charges against Canaris; and that after the arrest of Canaris he supported his family with money. Canaris always tried to maintain especially good relations with Himmler and Heydrich, so that they would not distrust him.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: I can briefly say that I knew there were concentration camps at Dachau and Oranienburg. Some divisional officers visited Oranienburg once in 1937, and gave me very enthusiastic accounts of it. I heard the name of Buchenwald for the first time, in the spring of 1945. When the name was mentioned, I thought it was a new troop training camp; and I made inquiries. The inmates were always described as German habitual criminals, and certain inveterate political opponents who, however, like Schuschnigg or Niemöller, were held there in a kind of honorable detention. I never heard a single word about tortures, deported persons, or prisoners of war, crematoriums, or gas vans, torments reminiscent of the Inquisition, and medical experiments. I can only say that, even if I had heard of these things, I would not have believed them until I had seen them with my own eyes.

From Himmler by Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel: But April 20 was no day for celebrations. By now, the Americans were across the Elbe, and in Nuremberg; British patrols were approaching Berlin from the west, and the full Russian forces were marching in from the east. The American and Russian armies were almost on the point of meeting. Hitler decided to receive his guests in the great Bunker, constructed fifty feet under the Chancellery buildings and extending out under the garden.

Although Himmler, against Schellenberg's advice, had decided he had better appear and shake Hitler by the hand, he was not invited to confer in private with the Führer, along with the service chiefs. Relations were cold by now. He lined up with the rest below ground, to congratulate the man he had served as Reichsführer SS for fifteen years. Göring, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, and Speer were there; so were Doenitz, Keitel, and Jodl, all under the watchful eyes of Bormann. It was expected Hitler would now move south, and head the great German Resistance [that] was due to be organized from the Obersalzberg; Himmler joined with the others in urging him to do so.

But Hitler reserved his decision, only declaring that, if Germany should be cut in two by the forward drive of the armies from the east and the west, then Doenitz should take charge of the defenses in the north. The narrow escape route to the south was still open, and once the conference was over the great dispersal took place.

From the IMT testimony of Major Herbert Buchs: Fegelein as liaison officer to Himmler was, as far as the Führer was concerned, the man to whom he turned in all questions of material and personal equipment of the Waffen-SS divisions, whenever these questions arose during the situation discussions, in connection with putting these divisions into operation. In this connection, points which fell within Fegelein's sphere were frequently raised during situation reports. But the official connection between Jodl and Fegelein was otherwise very distant . . . .

From the IMT testimony of Major Herbert Buchs: In dealing with Bormann as Deputy of the Party, General Jodl always strictly defined his own sphere of military tasks. He always rejected complaints, or unjustifiable accusations, or possible attacks against the Armed Forces. I witnessed this especially while the war was fought on German soil, and there was often friction with the Gauleiter who had been appointed Reich Defense Commissars. For instance, I saw that General Jodl on receiving complaints or letters from Bormann, simply returned the originals with rather abrupt marginal notes of his views. If that had no effect, he did not hesitate to express his views to the Führer, in every possible way, in order to obtain his decision as to the dispute in question . . . .

To my recollection, Generaloberst Jodl had very little official contact with General Burgdorf, although it was Burgdorf who discussed the important questions of the appointment of the commanders and higher officers with the Führer. It was in just such a case that I saw General Burgdorf first of all discuss these matters with the Führer alone, so that General Jodl had comparatively little influence in that direction.

From the IMT testimony of Major Herbert Buchs: Fegelein, as liaison officer to Himmler was, as far as the Führer was concerned, the man to whom he turned in all questions of material and personal equipment of the Waffen-SS divisions, whenever these questions arose during the situation discussions, in connection with putting these divisions into operation. In this connection, points which fell within Fegelein's sphere were frequently raised during situation reports. But the official connection between Jodl and Fegelein was otherwise very distant . . . .

Jodl disliked Fegelein because, I believe, he discerned the defects of his character at a very early stage. I have known him on several occasions to call Fegelein to account and reprimand him. As for Bormann, I should say General Jodl had no connection with him at all. I also have never noticed any personal or informal relations between them. What I have said about Fegelein also applies to his relations with General Burgdorf, whom General Jodl probably also disliked personally.

From the IMT testimony of Professor Dr. Percy Ernst Schramm: It was utterly immaterial to the General [Jodl] whether the members of his staff were Party members or not. Although I was on that staff for 2 years, I personally could not tell you which of the officers were Party members. That was completely unimportant. As to whether the General tried to exercise political influence, I must again draw your attention to the tremendous amount of work for which he was responsible. He would not have had time for it; and with regard to my documents, I can only tell you that I do not remember any papers from which such a conclusion might be drawn. What the General committed to paper, and these papers, as I have seen myself, run into thousands was always strictly confined to military matters, and in no way encroached upon the sphere of politics. To be more exact, I do not remember in the course of those 2 years ever having seen in my files any document of a political nature, inspired by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, or written by himself.

I know from his associates, and from conversations with him, that all diplomatic procedure was repugnant to him, and that he disliked it because it had nothing to do with soldiers. I did not notice any ambition because, if the General was ambitious, he certainly had chosen the least suitable position for such a purpose, since he thus exposed himself to criticism from those below him: from people who did not know the underlying reasons. From that time on, he was criticized a good deal, and he did not receive, from higher quarters, the recognition he deserved. I always thought it peculiar, and even grotesque, that the General, at the time of Adolf Hitler's death, had scarcely more German war decorations than I had myself, as a mere major in the reserve. I did not see whether he had foreign decorations. I never saw him wearing a foreign order. At any rate, there were no indications of ambition or of political aspirations.

From Jodl's IMT testimony: Between 3 May and 23 May I had time and leisure to burn every piece of paper [entries in the war diary, orders, et cetera], but I gave instructions to my staff not to destroy a single file, for I felt I had nothing to conceal. I handed the complete files, and above all the especially important ones, all the original Fuehrer directives since 1940, to the American officer when I was captured.

From Eisenhower at War, 1943-1945 by David Eisenhower: With an escort of military police, the Friedeburg [Hans George von Friedeburg, Doenitz’s surrender term negotiator] group arrived shortly after dusk at 7 PM . . . . Strong [Kenneth Strong, an Allied negotiator] later described Friedeburg as physically and morally spent, unable to do anything except present Flensburg's [referring to Doenitz's Flensburg government] proposals for a "phased surrender" in the West, including seventy-two hours to permit the Germans complete freedom of movement. Friedeburg had no authority to discuss the eastern front.

On Eisenhower’s behalf, Smith [William Bedell Smith, lead Allied negotiator] replied that SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force] could not consider a phased surrender. The Germans had no alternative but unconditional surrender in place, meaning OKW must agree to implement Allied and Russian orders . . . . The German delegation was crestfallen by the refusal to permit delay and the threat to close the front. Millions had as yet not escaped to safety; surrender to the Russians was "unthinkable" . . . . No one believed that the defeated Germans took the possibility of an Allied schism seriously, and so the request for separate terms appeared to be simply a matter of German officers asking for several more days to evacuate wives and children from Czechoslovakia, where they had been sent to escape the bombing of Germany.

An hour later, news arrived from Flensburg that General Alfred Jodl would join Friedeburg with full power to discuss the eastern front. Strong reminded Eisenhower of the importance of having prominent Germans military figures like Jodl to sign the armistice. Relatively junior officers had signed the armistice document in 1918, before the whole process had been delegated to politicians--hence the myth that the German army had been betrayed by civilian politicians at the eleventh hour.