September 22, 1882: Wilhelm Bodewin Johann Gustav Keitel is born in Helmscherode, Brunswick, Germany, the son of Carl Keitel, a middle-class landowner, and Apollonia Vissering.
March 1901: Keitel becomes a Cadet Officer (Fahnenjunker), joining the 6th Lower-Saxon Field Artillery Regiment.
1902: Keitel is promoted to Second Lieutenant in the Field Artillery Regiment No. 46.
1909: Keitel weds Lisa Fontaine, a wealthy landowner's daughter. They will have six children, one of whom will die in infancy.
September 1914: Captain Keitel, while serving on the Western front with the 46th Field Artillery, is seriously wounded in his right forearm by a shell fragment.
Early 1915: Keitel, after recovering from his injuries, is posted to the German General Staff.
1916-17: Keitel serves as an officer with XIX Reserve Corps.
1917: Keitel serves with the 199th Infantry Division before returning to the General Staff in Berlin in December.
June 28, 1919: The Versailles Treaty is negotiated.
August 11, 1919: The Weimar Republic is founded as Reichspräsident Friedrich Ebert of the SPD signs a new German constitution into law.
1919: Keitel, as one of the very few to man the newly created Reichswehr (the German Army now being restricted to just 100,000 soldiers), plays a part in organizing Freikorps frontier guard units on the Polish border.
January 10, 1920: Entry into force of the Versailles Peace Treaty and of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
1920-23: Keitel serves as an instructor at the School of Cavalry at Hanover.
November 9, 1923: The so-called Beer Hall Putsch takes place in Munich. Keitel is not involved.
1924: Keitel is transferred to the Ministry of Defense (Reichswehrministerium), serving with the Troop Office (Truppenamt), the post-Versailles disguised General Staff. He will soon be promoted to the head of the organizational department, a post he will retain after the Nazi seizure of power in 1933.
May 12, 1925: Paul von Hindenburg is elected the second President of Germany.
October 16, 1925: From Article 1 of the Rhine Pact of Locarno:
The High Contracting parties, collectively and severally, guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles: the maintenance of the territorial status quo, resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France and the inviolability of the said frontiers, as fixed by, or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Versailles, on June 28, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulation of Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty, concerning the demilitarized zone.
February 1929: Keitel becomes a Lieutenant Colonel.
January 30, 1933 Machtergreifung: Hitler is appointed Chancellor of Germany.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: It was clear to me that when Hitler became Chancellor, we soldiers would undoubtedly have a different position in the Reich under new leadership, and that the military factor would certainly be viewed differently from what had been the case before. Therefore we quite honestly and openly welcomed the fact that at the head of the Reich Government there was a man who was determined to bring about an era which would lead us out of the deplorable conditions then prevailing. This much I must confess, that I welcomed the plan and intention to rearm as far as was possible at that time, as well as the ideas which tended in that direction. In any event, as early as 1933, in the late summer, I resigned from my activities in the War Ministry. I spent two years on active service and returned only at the time when the military sovereignty had been won back and we were rearming openly. Therefore, during my absence I did not follow these matters. At any rate, in the period from 1935 to 1938, during which I was Chief under Blomberg, I naturally saw and witnessed everything that took place in connection with rearmament and everything that was done in this field by the War Ministry to help the Wehrmacht branches.
The wording of the Versailles Treaty, as long as it was considered binding upon us, did not, of course, permit these things. The Treaty of Versailles, may I say, was studied very closely by us in order to find loopholes which allowed us, without violating the treaty, to take measures which would not make us guilty of breaking the treaty. That was the daily task of the Reich Defense Committee. From 1935 on, conditions were entirely different, and after my return as Chief, under Blomberg, I must state frankly that I no longer had any misgivings as to whether the Treaty of Versailles was violated or not because what was done, was done openly. We announced that we would raise 36 divisions. Discussions were held quite openly, and I could see nothing in which we soldiers could, in any way, see a violation of the treaty. It was clear to all of us, and it was our will to do everything to free ourselves of the territorial and military fetters of the Treaty of Versailles. I must say honestly that any soldier or officer who did not feel similarly about these things would in my estimation have been worthless. It was taken as a matter of course if one was a soldier.
January 30, 1933: From a telegram to Hindenburg from Ludendorff:
March 22, 1933: Dachau concentration camp opens near Munich, soon to be followed by Ravensbrück for women, Sachsenhausen near Berlin in northern Germany, and Buchenwald near Weimar in central Germany.
March 23 1933: Hitler addresses the Reichstag:
April 7, 1933: The Nazi Civil Service Act is passed. It's a law which provides that all civil servants must be trustworthy as defined by Nazi standards and also must meet the Nazi racial requirements.
May 23, 1933: At the second meeting of the Working Committee of the Councilors for Reich Defense, Colonel Keitel states:
October 14, 1933: Germany withdraws from the International Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.
June 30, 1934: The Night of the Long Knives occurs.
August 19, 1934: Polish strongman Pilsudski proposes a war against Germany by Poland and France before Hitler has he chance to rearm.
August 2, 1934: President Paul von Hindenburg dies.
August 19, 1934 Gleichschaltung: Hitler is Führer und Reichskanzler as 90% of the German electorate approves Hitler's merging the two offices of Chancellor and President.
November 8, 1934: Hitler speaks in Munich:
March 16, 1935: Hitler's Germany institutes universal military service.
May 21, 1935: Hitler's Germany announces that they will respect the territorial limitations of Versailles and Locarno. Hitler: "Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an Anschluss."
June 26, 1935: From the minutes of the working committee of the Reich Defense Council: Lieutenant Colonel Jodl:
July 26, 1935: From the Diary of Mr. William Dodd, Ambassador of the United States to Germany:
The German Propaganda Ministry therefore forbade publication of the news sent out an hour before and tried to collect all the releases that had been distributed. A copy was brought to me today by a friend. All the German papers this morning lamented the cruel murder and declared that it was simply an attack of discontented Austrians, not Nazis. News from Bavaria shows that thousands of Austrian Nazis lining for a year in Bavaria on German support had been active for ten days before, some getting across the border contrary to law, all drilling and making ready to return to Austria.
The German Propagandist of annexing the ancient realm of the Hapsburgs to the Third Reich, in spite of all the promises of Hitler to silence him. But now that the drive has failed and the assassins are in prison in Vienna, the German Government denounces all who say there was any support from Berlin. I think it will be clear one day that millions of dollars and many arms have been pouring into Austria since the spring of 1933. Once more the whole world is condemning the Hitler regime. No people in all modern History has been quite so unpopular as Nazi Germany. This stroke completes the picture. I expect to read a series of bitter denunciations in the American papers when they arrive about ten days from now.
October 1, 1935: Based on a recommendation by Werner von Fritsch, Keitel becomes Chief of the Armed Forces Department in the Reich Ministry of War (Wehrmachtsamt in Reichskriegsministerum), equal in rank to a Reich Minister.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: At that time I saw these things and judged them only according to what we were capable of in military terms. I can only say, when I left the troops in 1935, none of these 24 divisions which were to be established existed. I did not view all this from the standpoint of political aims, but with the sober consideration: Can we accomplish anything by attack and the conduct of war if we have no military means at our disposal? Consequently for me everything in this connection revolved around the programs of rearmament, which were to be completed in 1943-1945, and for the Navy in 1945. Therefore, we had 10 years in which to build up a concentrated Wehrmacht. Hence, I did not consider these problems acute even when they came to my attention in a political way, for I thought it impossible to realize these plans except by negotiations.
March 6, 1936: From an order on behalf of the Reich Minister for War, von Blomberg, signed by Keitel, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (Raeder).1. The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German bay, not over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-Day onward, has been approved. C-in-C air force will instruct the air command VI from midday 7 March to hold in readiness single reconnaissance aircraft to be at the disposal of the C-in-C fleet.
2. The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-boat reconnaissance on line, until the evening of 7 March. The immediate transfer of U-boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven has been approved.
3. The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as the first counter-measures to be taken against military preparations of neighboring states It is far more essential to examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A, to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous measures could not be omitted.
March 7, 1936: The re-occupation and fortification of the Rhineland occurs. Hitler speaks to the Reichstag:
We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above all that all the tensions resulting either from false territorial settlements or from the disproportion of the numbers of inhabitants to their living space cannot, in Europe, be solved by war.
January 3, 1937: Hitler speaks before the Reichstag:
1937: Keitel is promoted to full General.
March 5, 1937: From a letter from Ribbentrop to Keitel:
June 24, 1937: Von Blomberg orders preparations for 'Case Otto,' armed intervention in Austria in the event of a Hapsburg restoration.
2. The preparations of a general nature include: a. The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the German Armed Forces, even before the completion of rearmament and full preparedness for war. b. The further working on 'Mobilization without public announcement' in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time...
Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the Monarchy. The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed force to give up a restoration. Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian people, the march in will be made in the general direction of Vienna and will break any resistance.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: During this period of time until the first practical measures were taken in the case of Austria, I cannot remember having had any knowledge of a program, or the establishment of a program or far-reaching plan, or one covering a period of years. I must say also that we were so occupied with the reorganization of this small army of seven divisions into an expanded force of twice or three times its original size, apart from the creation of a large air force which had no equipment at all, that in those years a visit to our office would have shown that we were completely occupied with purely organizational problems, and from the way Hitler worked, as described by me today, it is quite obvious that we saw nothing of these things. ...
This document is actually an instruction for mobilization kept in general terms and was in line with our traditional General Staff policy before the war and before the World War, the World War I, that on principle something of the kind must be prepared beforehand. In my opinion, this had nothing to do with any of Hitler's political plans, for at that time I was already Chief of Staff under Blomberg, and General Jodl was at that time the Chief of the National Defense Division. Perhaps it sounds somewhat arrogant for me to say that we were very much satisfied that we were at last beginning to tell the Wehrmacht each year what it had to do intellectually and theoretically.
In the former General Staff training which I received before the World War, the chief aim of these instructions was that the General Staff tours for the purpose of study should afford an opportunity for the theoretical elaboration of all problems. Such was the former training of the Great General Staff. I no longer know whether in this connection Blomberg himself originally thought out these salient ideas of possible complications or possible military contingencies, or whether he was perhaps influenced by the Fuehrer. It is certain that Hitler never saw this. It was the inside work of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht. ...
Of course I remember the Case Otto, which indicated by its name that it concerns Otto von Hapsburg. There must have been—were of course—certain reports about an attempted restoration, and in that case an intervention, eventually an armed one, was to take place. The Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, wished to prevent a restoration of the monarchy in Austria. Later this came up again in connection with the Anschluss. I believe that I can omit that now and perhaps explain later. In any event, we believed that on the basis of the deliberations by the Army some sort of preparations were being made which would bring into being Case Otto, because the code word was "Case Otto comes into force. ...I can state here only what I experienced when Hitler sent me to the Army. I went into General Beck's office and said: "The Fuehrer demands that you report to him immediately and inform him about the preparations which have already been made for a possible invasion of Austria", and General Beck then said, "We have prepared nothing; nothing has been done, nothing at all."
November 5, 1937 Hossbach-Konferenz: Hitler addresses Göring, Raeder, Neurath and other political and military leaders.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: I already stated under oath at the preliminary interrogation that I did not know about this, and that I saw a document or the minutes or a record of this meeting at this Trial for the first time. I believe it is the Hossbach document and I do not remember that von Blomberg gave me any directions to take preparatory steps after this conference. That is not the case.
1938: The Organization Todt proper is founded as a consortium of Todt's administrative offices combined with private company subcontractors, primary sources of technical engineering expertise, and the Labor Service as the manpower source.February 2, 1938 From the Diary of Alfred Jodl:
February 4, 1938: Hitler abolishes the Ministry of War, assumes direct command of the Armed Forces himself, and creates the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht). Keitel becomes a member of the Secret Cabinet Council.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: In the years from 1935 to 1938, as chief under Blomberg, I saw the Fuehrer three times. He never spoke one word to me and so he did not know me. If he knew anything at all about me it could have been only through Herr von Blomberg. I had absolutely no contact with the Fuehrer either personally or through other people who were prominent in the Party or in politics. My first conversation with him was in the last days of January before I was appointed to this office. ...
I can say only that fundamentally I bear that responsibility which arises from my position for all those things which resulted from these orders and which are connected with my name and my signature. Further, I bear the responsibility, insofar as it is based on legal and moral principles, for those offices and divisions of the OKW which were subordinate to me. ...
Until that time we had a Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal von Blomberg. In addition there was the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht who, according to the constitution, was the head of the State-in this case, Hitler. With the resignation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, von Blomberg, there was only one Supreme Commander and that was Hitler himself. And from that time on he himself exercised command of all three arms of the Wehmiacht (German for "defence force"): The Army, Navy, and Air Force. It also says 'from now on directly.' That should establish unequivocally that any intermediary position with authority to issue orders was no longer to exist, but that Hitler's orders as Supreme Commander were issued directly to the three arms of the Wehrmacht and their Commanders. It also says here 'directly' and 'personally.' That, too, had its meaning, for the word 'personally' was to express the fact that there was and would be no, I would say, 'deputizing" of this authority. ...
I do not remember a single instance in which I signed "acting for." According to our military principles, if the question had arisen to appoint a deputy, it could have been only one person, the Commander-in-Chief of the three arms of the Wehrmacht, namely the one highest in rank. ...The Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht had his military staff in the Wehrmachtsamt (Ministry of the Reichswehr), that is to say, the Wehrmachtsamt in the Ministry of War. Hitler, as Supreme Commander, took over the Wehrmachtsamt as his military staff. Thus, this staff was to be his personal working staff. At the same time that the post of Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht was eliminated, that of Reich Minister of War was also removed. There was no War Ministry and no Minister of War as heretofore. Thus one could clearly see what Hitler wanted, namely, that between him and the Wehrmacht divisions there was to be no one holding office with any authority either in command channels or in ministerial functions. ...
I must add that I realize only now that this term in its abbreviated form (Chief OKW) is not quite apt. To be exact one should have said, "Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht," and not the abbreviation, 'Chief OKW.' From the case presented by the Prosecution I gathered that the idea of 'Chief' was interpreted as if that were a commander, chief of an office, with authority to issue orders. And that, of course, is an erroneous conclusion. It was neither a position of a chief in the sense of a commander, nor, as might have been assumed or has been assumed, was it a position as chief of a general staff. That too, is incorrect. I was never Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht. It was Hitler's unmistakable wish to concentrate in his own person all the authority, all the power of command. That is not merely a retrospective statement. He clearly expressed this desire to me on several occasions, partly in connection with the fact that he told me repeatedly, "I could never put this through with Blomberg." ...
I was discussing the fact that it was not a position of Chief of the General Staff, since it was Hitler's basic view that commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches each had his own general staff, or operations staff, and that he did not want the High Command of the Wehrmacht, including the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, to take over the functions of a general staff. Therefore, in practice the work was done by the general staffs of the Wehrmacht branches, while the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of the GKW, which was purposely kept small, was a working staff for Hitler, a staff for strategic planning and for special missions. ...General Jodl never was my Chief of Staff, he was the Chief of the Armed Forces' Operations Staff and one of the departmental chiefs of the Armed Forces High Command as I have already stated, although the first among equals.'
From The Devil's Disciples by Anthony Read: Hitler abolished the War Ministry and in its place created a unified High Command of the Armed Forces, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), with himself as Supreme Commander and the three services reduced to subsidiary arms. He chose Keitel as its Chief of Staff because he knew he was a pliable yes-man, who would do what he was told and tell him what he wanted to hear. Blomberg had dismissed Keitel as 'nothing more than the man who runs my office' when Hitler, who did not know him, asked about him as a possible replacement. 'That's exactly the man I am looking for,' Hitler had replied.
February 10, 1938: The Austro-German Crisis begins as Hitler, in company with Keitel, meets with Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden.From Keitel's IMT testimony: It was the first official action in which I took part. In the evening of 4 February Hitler left Berlin. He summoned me to be at Obersalzberg on 10 February. There, on that day the meeting with the Austrian Federal Chancellor, Schuschnigg, which has been frequently discussed here, took place. Shortly after I arrived—I had no idea why I had been summoned—General Von Reichenau arrived from Munich, and General of the Air Force, Sperrle; so that we three Generals were present when at about 10:30 Herr Schuschnigg arrived with Herr Von Papen. Since I had never attended a conference or a political action or any meeting of that nature, I did not know what I was there for. I must tell you this frankly, otherwise you will not understand it. In the course of the day the reason for the presence of the three representatives of the Wehrmacht naturally became clear to me. In certain respects they represented a military, at least a military demonstration—I may safely call it that.
In the preliminary interrogation and also in later discussions I was asked the significance of the fact that in the afternoon my name was suddenly called through the house and I was to visit the Fuehrer. I went to him in his room. Perhaps it sounds strange for me to say that when I entered the room I thought that he would give me a directive but the words were "Nothing at all." He used the words, "Please sit down." Then he said, "Yes, the Federal Chancellor wishes to have a short conference with his Foreign Minister Schmidt; otherwise I have nothing at all." I can only assure you that not one word was said to me about a political action apart from the fact that Herr Schuschnigg did not leave until the evening and that further conferences took place.
We generals sat in the anteroom, and when in the evening, shortly before my departure, I received the direction to launch reports that we were taking certain measures for mobilization, of which you have been informed here through a document, then it became quite clear to me that this day had served to bring the discussions to a head by the introduction of military representatives, and the directive to spread reports was to keep up the pressure, as has been shown here.
Upon my return to my apartment in Berlin, in the presence of Goebbels and Canaris, we discussed the reports which were to be sent out and which Canaris then broadcast in Munich. Finally, in order to conclude this matter, it might be interesting to point out that the Chief of Intelligence in the Austrian Federal Ministry, Lahousen, who has been present here in court, told Jodl and me when later on he came into the service of the Wehrmacht: "We were not taken in by this bluff." And I indubitably gave Jodl a basis for his entry in the diary, even though it is somewhat drastically worded, for I was naturally impressed by this first experience.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: Nothing further need be said concerning the further developments of the affair. It has already been presented here in detail. On the day of the invasion by the troops I flew with Hitler to the front. We drove along the highways through Braunau, Linz. We stayed overnight and proceeded to Vienna. And to put it modestly, it is true that in every village we were received most enthusiastically and the Austrian Federal Army marched side by side with the German soldiers through the streets over which we drove. Not a shot was fired. On the other side the only formation which had a certain military significance was an armored unit on the road from Passau to Vienna which arrived in Vienna with very few vehicles. This division was on the spot for the parade the next day. That is a very sober picture of what I saw.
February 13, 1938 Jodl's Diary:February 14, 1938 Jodl's Diary:
February 19, 1938: Schuschnigg's government extends full amnesty to imprisoned National Socialists and gives the National Socialists access to the Fatherland Front.
February 20, 1938: In a speech aimed specifically at Czechoslovakia, Adolf Hitler proclaims that the German government vows to protect German minorities outside of the Reich.
February 20, 1938: British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden resigns in protest of Chamberlain's policy of appeasement with Italy and Germany.
February 24, 1938: Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg, in response to an earlier speech by Hitler; calls for international support to resist future German demands for Austrian concessions; reaffirms the independence of Austria; promises to protect the ten million Germans living outside of the Reich.
March 9, 1938: Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg schedules a plebiscite on the independence of Austria for 13 March. The question is to be: 'Are you for an independent and social, a Christian, German and united Austria?
March 10, 1938 Jodl's Diary:
March 11, 1938: Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg resigns in an attempt to stall off a threatened German invasion. From Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg's farewell speech:
[For a full telling see, Austria: The Other Germany.]
March 12, 1938 Anschluss: The German Army marches unopposed into Vienna.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: I remember that this order was not issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and to the other Commanders-in-Chief until the whole project was under way. Nothing had been prepared. It was all improvised and this was to be the documentary registration of facts which were being put into practice. The commands were given verbally and individually regarding what was to be done and what actually was done on the morning of 12 March, when Austria was invaded. ... May I add to my previous answer that we can see from this that the invasion took place on the morning of 12 March and the order was issued late in the evening of 11 March. Therefore this document could not have had any real influence on this affair. Such an order cannot be worked out between 10 in the evening and 6 in the morning.
March 14, 1938: The Czechoslovak government receives assurances from Hitler's government of the German desire to improve relations between the two states.March 16-19, 1938: As most of Europe is preoccupied with the German absorption of Austria, the Polish government issues a series of demands to the Lithuanians. Faced with the threat of war, the Lithuanian government immediately agrees to all of the Polish demands, including recognition of the status quo in eastern Europe. The Lithuanian capitulation prevents the crisis from escalating.
March 25, 1938: Hitler speaks in Koenigsberg:
April 10, 1938 Annexionvolksabstimmung: In a national plebiscite, Austrian voters register 99.75% in favor of union with Germany: Austria becomes part of the Reich as a new state, divided into seven Gaue (states). Austria withdraws as a member state from the League of Nations because of the republic's incorporation into Germany.
April 19, 1938: From a top secret Nazi document, the Direction of War as a Problem of Organization; from the appendix entitled What is the War of the Future?:
From Keitel's IMT testimony: As a soldier, I must say that the term 'War of Aggression' as used here is meaningless as far as I am concerned; we learned how to conduct actions of attack, actions of defense, and actions of retreat. However, according to my own personal feelings as a military man, the concept 'war of aggression' is a purely political concept and not a military one. I mean that if the Wehrmacht and the soldier are a tool of the politicians, they are not qualified in my opinion to decide or to judge whether these military operations did or did not constitute a war of aggression. I think I can summarize my views by saying that military offices should not have authority to decide this question and are not in a position to do so; and that these decisions are not the task of the soldier, but solely that of the statesman. ...
I believe I can truthfully say that throughout the whole of my military career I was brought up, so to speak, in the old traditional concept that one never discussed this question. Naturally, one has one's own opinion and a life of one's own, but in the exercise of one's professional functions as a soldier and an officer, one has given this life away, yielded it up. Therefore I could not say either at that time or later that I had misgivings about questions of a purely political discretion, for I took the stand that a soldier has a right to have confidence in his state leadership, and accordingly he is obliged to do his duty and to obey.
Military Conclusions. 1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken security measures.
2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail-which is unavailable, but should be cut down as far as possible-must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.
3. 'separate thrusts' are to be carried out immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force. The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example developers; sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)
4. Politically, the first four days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize 'Gruen.' Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pilsen, Prague.)
5. If possible, separation of transport movement (Rot from Gruen). ['Rot' was the code name for their then plan against the West.] A simultaneous strategic concentration 'Rot' can lead 'Rot' to undesired measures. On the other hand, it must be possible to put 'Case Rot' into operation at any time. C. Propaganda. 1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland.) 2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).
From Keitel's IMT testimony: I believe 6 to 8 weeks after the march into Austria, that is, after the Anschluss toward the end of April. The Anschluss was about the middle of March and also took the form of a sudden summons, one evening, to the Reich Chancellery where the Fuehrer then explained matters to me. This resulted in the well-known directive in the Case Green. The history of this case is well known by the Schmundt Files all of which I identified in the preliminary interrogation. At that time he gave me first directives in a rather hasty manner. It was not possible for me to ask any questions, as he wished to leave Berlin immediately. These were the bases for the questions regarding the conditions under which a warlike action against Czechoslovakia could or would arise. ...In any event the instructions which he gave me that evening were to the effect that preparations for a military action with all the preliminary work, which was the responsibility of the General Staff, were to be made. He expressed himself very precisely although he explained explicitly that the date was quite open and said that for the time being it was not his intention. These were the words: "...for the time being it is not my intention."
I do not believe that we discussed it (the Sudetenland) at all that evening during that short conference. The Fuehrer did not discuss with me the political aspects; he merely assigned me to the consideration of the necessary military measures. He did not say whether he would be content with the Sudetenland or whether we were to break through the Czechoslovakian line of fortification. That was not the problem at that time. But in any event—if they had to be settled by going to war—then the war had to be prepared; if it came to a conflict with the Czech Army, that is, a real war it would have to be prepared. ...
I saw the Schmundt notes for the first time here. We did not receive it at that time as a document to work with. It is not a record. These are notes made subsequently by an adjutant. I do not want to doubt their correctness or accuracy, for memory would not permit me to recall today the exact words which were used. However this question, which is considered significant here, the assassination of the German Minister in Prague, is a situation which I have never heard of, if only for the reason that no one ever said such a thing. It was said it might happen that the Minister is assassinated whereupon I asked which minister, or something similar. Then, as I recall it, Hitler said that the war of 1914 also started with an assassination at Sarajevo, and that such incidents could happen. I did not in any way get the impression at that time that a war was to be created through a provocation. ...
To a certain extent it is true that I was called in and to my complete surprise was presented with ideas concerning preparation for war against Czechoslovakia. This took place within a very short time, before one of Hitler's departures for Berchtesgaden. I do not recall saying one word during these short instructions, but I asked only one question, and then with these extremely surprising directives I went home. ...
My reflections during the first hour after that were that this could not be carried out in view of the military strength which I knew we then possessed. I then comforted myself with the thought that the conversation premised that nothing had been planned within a measurable lapse of time. The following day I discussed the matter with the Chief of the Operations Staff, General Jodl. I never received any minutes of this discussion, nor any record. The outcome of our deliberations was "to leave things alone because there was plenty of time, and because any such action was out of the question for military reasons."
I also explained to Jodl that the introductory words had been: "It is not my intention to undertake military action against Czechoslovakia within a measurable lapse of time." Then, in the next weeks, we started theoretical deliberations; this, however, without taking into consultation the branches of the Wehrmacht because I considered myself not authorized to do so. In the following period it is to be noted, as can be seen from the Schmundt File, that the adjutants, the military adjutants, continuously asked innumerable detailed questions regarding the strength of divisions, and so on. These questions were answered by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff to the best of their knowledge.
May 23, 1938 Jodl's Diary:
May 28, 1938: Hitler calls a conference of his principal military and political advisers in the winter garden of the Reichs Chancellery in Berlin.
From an affidavit of Fritz Wiedemann (Hitler's adjutant): I recall that on the afternoon of 28 May 1938 Hitler called a conference in the winter garden of the Reich Chancellery of all the people who were important, from the Foreign Office, the Army, and the Command Staffs. Those present at this conference, as I recall, included Göring, Ribbentrop, von Neurath, General Beck, Admiral Raeder, General Keitel, and General von Brauchitsch. On this occasion Hitler made the following statement: 'It is my unshakable will that Czechoslovakia shall be wiped off the map.' Hitler then revealed the outlines of the plan to attack Czechoslovakia. Hitler addressed himself to the Generals, saying: 'So, we will first tackle the situation in the East. Then I will give you three to four years' time, and then we will settle the situation in the West.' The situation in the West was meant to be the war against England and France. I was considerably shaken by these statements, and on leaving the Reich Chancellery I said to Herr von Neurath: 'Well, what do you say to these revelations?' Neurath thought that the situation was not so serious as it appeared and that nothing would happen before the spring of 1939.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: About four weeks after I had been given this job, I sent to Obersalzberg a draft of a directive for the preparatory measures. In reply I was informed that Hitler himself would come to Berlin to speak with the commander-in-chief. He came to Berlin at the end of May, and I was present at the conference with Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. In this conference the basic plan was changed altogether, namely, to the effect that Hitler expressed the intention to take military action against Czechoslovakia in the very near future. As reason why he changed his mind he gave the fact that Czechoslovakia—I believe it was on the 20th or 21st of May—had ordered general mobilization, and Hitler at that time declared this could have been directed only against us. Military preparations had not been made by Germany. This was the reason for the complete change of his intentions, which he communicated orally to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and he ordered him to begin preparations at once. This explains the changes in the basic orders that is to say, the directive which was now being issued had as its basic idea: "It is my irrevocable decision to take military action against Czechoslovakia in the near future."
From The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler by Robert Payne: Keitel was not an imaginative man, and the preamble merely repeated what Hitler had told him. When the time came to launch the invasion, all that was necessary was to make a slight change in the wording of the opening sentence. Instead of: 'It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future,' Hitler wrote: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.' All through the summer Hitler, with the help of the Sudeten leader Conrad Henlein and his own SS disguised as Sudetens, manufactured those 'unbearable provocations,' which 'in the eyes of at least a part of world opinion' gave him the pretext he needed for a lightning invasion.
Neville Chamberlain's intervention and the Munich agreement, although satisfying to Hitler because they demonstrated British, French, and Russian weakness and fear of war, did not sway him from his main purpose. When he announced to Chamberlain that he had made his last territorial demand, he was exulting in the knowledge that he was only just beginning to make his most chilling demands. Before he could launch a war against Russia, he would need to occupy a good deal more of Eastern Europe. Keitel, who knew most of Hitler's secrets, was quite sure that Hitler would find some pretext to invade Czechoslovakia by March, 1939. There would follow in quick succession a number of carefully planned coups, for which pretexts would be manufactured as the occasion arose. Hitler despised these pretexts and seems not to have spent any time manufacturing them, but instead left the task to Himmler and Ribbentrop. Goebbels, with his customary inventiveness, could be counted on to produce banner headlines denouncing whatever country Hitler proposed to invade.
2. Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action. The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended invasion: a. suitable obvious cause and, with it b. sufficient political justification, c. action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him prepared to the least possible degree. From a military as well as a political standpoint the most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action. But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war, must terminate in sudden action on our part-which must have the elements of surprise as regards time and extent-before the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.
3. Conclusions for the Preparation of Fall Gruen. a. For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise element as the most important factor contributing to success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures already in peace-time and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four days which plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which at the same time will give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially if France-due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy-fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations within the first few days, a European crisis will certainly result.
This knowledge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action. b. The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on the other hand issue directions to national groups for support in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the date.
4. Tasks of the Armed Forces. Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the following basis: a. The mass of all forces must be employed against Czechoslovakia. b. For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be watched. c. The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time at the same time as the penetration by the Air Force before the enemy can become aware of our mobilization. For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for approval.
5. Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces. a. Army: The basic principle of the surprise attack against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the army that as many assault columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns—the composition of each, according to their tasks at that time—must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance.
The bulk of the army has the task of frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia, of forcing a battle, of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of occupying Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest possible motorized and armored units using to the full the first successes of the assault columns and the effects of the Air Force operations. The rear cover provided for the West must be limited in numbers and quality to the extent which suits the present state of fortifications. Whether the units assigned this will be transported to the Western frontier immediately or held back for the time being will be decided in my special order. Preparations must however, be made to enable security detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during the strategic concentration 'Gruen'. Independent of this, a first security garrison must be improvised from the engineers at present employed in constructing fortifications and from formations of the Labor Corps.
The remaining frontiers as well as East Prussia, are to be only weakly protected. But, always depending on the political situation, the transfers by sea, of a part or even the bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into the Reich must be taken into account. b. Air Force. While leaving a minimum of defensive forces in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be flown over at the same time as it is crossed by the first section of the Army.
May 30, 1938 Jodl's Diary:
June 2, 1938: From Plan Study 1938: Instruction for Deployment and Combat: Case Red:
June 18, 1938: From a Hitler directive prepared and initialed by Keitel:
July 18, 1938: From a confidential memorandum of a conversation with the Italian ambassador, Attolico, in Berlin. At the bottom is a handwritten note, headed "For the Reichsminister {Ribbentrop} only." This note reads:
July 24-25, 1938: From a dispatch from the American Consul General in Vienna to the Secretary of State concerning the Nazis' celebration of the murder of Dollfuss:
From the point of view of the outside world, the speech of Reichs Minister Hess was chiefly remarkable for the fact that after devoting the first half of his speech to the expected praise of the sacrifices of the men, women and youths of Austria in the struggle for a greater Germany, he then launched into a defense of the occupation of Austria and an attack on the...foreign press' and on those who spread the idea of a new war. The world was fortunate, declared Hess, that Germany's leader was a man who would not allow himself to be provoked. 'The Fuehrer does what is necessary for his people in sovereign calm...and labors for the peace of Europe' even though provocateurs, 'completely ignoring the deliberate threat to peace of certain small stated,' deceitfully claim that he is a menace to the peace of Europe.
The march on the former Federal Chancellery, now the Reichsstatthalterei, followed the exact route and time schedule of the original attack. The marchers were met at the Chancellery by the Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart, who addressed them and unveiled a memorial tablet. From the Reichsstatthalterei the Standarte marched to the old RAVAG broadcasting center from which false news of the resignation of Dollfuss had been broadcast, and there unveiled a second memorial tablet. Steinhusl, the present Police President of Vienna, is a member of the S. S. Standarte 89.
August 7, 1938: Prisoners from Dachau concentration camp are sent to the town of Mauthausen near Linz, Austria, to begin the construction of a new camp.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: I knew already before the war that concentration camps existed; but at that time I knew only two of them by name; and I supposed and assumed that there were other concentration camps besides the two I knew. I had no further particulars about the existence of concentration camps. As far as internees in such camps were concerned, I knew that they included habitual criminals and political opponents. As Reich Marshal Goering has said, that was the basis of the institution.
I assumed that it was a severe form of detention, or one which brought severe measures in its train, under certain specific circumstances. I knew nothing about the conditions found there, especially in treatment of internees, tortures, et cetera. I tried in two cases to free individuals who were in concentration camps. One was Pastor Niemöller, by intervention of Großadmiral Raeder.
With the help of Canaris and at the request of Großadmiral Raeder, I tried to get Pastor Niemöller out of the concentration camps. The attempt was unsuccessful. I made a second attempt at the request of a family in my home village, in a case where a peasant was in a concentration camp for political reasons; and in this case I succeeded. The individual involved was set free. That was in the autumn of 1940. I had a talk with this man; and when I asked him what things were like there, he gave me a non-committal reply to the effect that he had been all right. He gave me no details. I know of no other cases. ...I did not see him directly after his release. I saw him later when I was at home. The reason that I talked to him was because he came to thank me. He said nothing about being badly treated or anything like that at all. ...
I am convinced that these visits took place on Himmler's invitation. I myself once received a personal invitation from him to pay a visit to the Dachau Camp from Munich. He said he would like to show it to me. I know also that large and small groups of officers and commissions were shown through the camps. I think I need scarcely say how these visits were handled as regards the things that were shown to them. To supplement my statement I would like to say it was not uncommon to hear such remarks as "You'll end up in a concentration camp!" or "All sorts of things go on there." I do know, however, that whenever anyone came to me with these rumors and stories and I asked what exactly they knew and where the information came from, the reply was always: "I really do not know; I just heard it." So that whatever one might think, one never got at the facts and never could get at them.
The Führer becomes very indignant and flares up, bursting into the remarks that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. 'I assure you, General, the position will be held not only for 3 weeks, but for 3 years.' The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it (the General Staff) is prejudiced by old memories and feels responsible also for political decisions instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking, because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. One does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the generals' opinion and that of the Führer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that this, as well as the morale of the people, will encourage the Führer enormously when the right moment comes.
August 21-26, 1938 Jodl's Diary:
August 23, 1938: From a German Foreign Office note on a conversation with Ambassador Attolico, signed 'R' (for Ribbentrop):
August 26, 1938: From a memorandum initialed by Jodl entitled Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures (Note: In handwriting at the bottom of this document are the notes of Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant. These reveal that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on 30 August; that Hitler agreed to act along these lines; and that Jodl was so notified on 31 August):
To this the following must be said: Operation (Aktion) Green will be set in motion by means of an 'incident' in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance. It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1. It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1. On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning. If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous. For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous maneuvers and exercises.
Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident. Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e. g., death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.) If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that. In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall)
It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Führer's intentions in good time—in so far as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident. I request that the Führer's decision be obtained on these points.
August 27, 1938: From a German Foreign Office note on a conversation with Ambassador Attolico:
September 3, 1938: Keitel and von Brauchitsch meet with Hitler at the Berghof:
September 6, 1938 Jodl's Diary:
September 8, 1938 Jodl's Diary:
In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore. "1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself). We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl), (X-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, X-1 day, 7 o'clock). The 'Y time' has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.
September 9, 1938: Hitler meets with Keitel and Generals von Brauchitsch and Halder. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joins the conference, which lasts from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning.
September 10, 1938: Hitler issues an order bringing the Reichsarbeitsdienst (Reich Labor Service), the German labor service, under the OKW.
2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reich Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsführer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.
3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.
September 11, 1938 Jodl's Diary:
September 15, 1938 Jodl's Diary:
September 16, 1938 Jodl's Diary:
September 26, 1938 Jodl's Diary:
Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes. 1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Führer's opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th. It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied. A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs. The Führer has to make a decision for the commander in chief who is to have priority. The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Führer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague. 2000 hours: The Führer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportpalast.
September 27, 1938: From Conference notes initialed by Jodl:
Thus it is proposed: Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the air force—at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front. The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.
September 27, 1938: Keitel sends a most secret memorandum to Hess and the Reichsführer SS, Himmler:
September 28, 1938 Eine Einzelne Luege: Hitler speaks in Berlin:
September 29, 1938 München Konferenz: The Munich Conference concludes.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: We (Hitler's generals) were extraordinarily happy that it had not come to a military operation, because throughout the time of preparation we had always been of the opinion that our means of attack against the frontier fortifications of Czechoslovakia were insufficient. From a purely military point of view we lacked the means for an attack which involved the piercing of the frontier fortifications. Consequently we were extremely satisfied that a peaceful political solution had been reached... I believe I may say that as a result this greatly increased Hitler's prestige among the generals. We recognized that on the one hand military means and military preparations had hot been neglected and on the other hand a solution had been found which we had not expected and for which we were extremely thankful.
September 29, 1938 Jodl's Diary:September 30, 1938: After it has became clear that the Munich settlement will result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland, Keitel orders that the Free Corps Heinlein in its present composition be placed under command of Himmler:
2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks: The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over. The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation 'Gruen'... ...Heinlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.
October 1, 1938: From a memorandum of the High Command of the German Armed Forces drawn up in anticipation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia:
October 1, 1938: From a detailed study compiled by Section L, Jodl's section of the OKW, where anticipated violations of International Law in the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and counter-propaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda agencies. The first 10 hypothetical incidents:
2. Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed.
3. The Hradčany is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.
4. On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles in ordered.
5. Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of important bridges, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.
6. Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to do road work or to load munitions.
7. For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, food stuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the latter suffer from want.
8. Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily evacuated to the rear area.
9. Churches are used for military accommodation.
10. In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft.
October 14, 1938: From Top Secret minutes of a conference with Göring in the Air Ministry:
October 15, 1938: German troops occupy the Sudetenland; the Czech government resigns.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: I believe that recently Reich Marshal Göring enlarged on this question in the course of his examination. It was my impression, as I remember it, that Hitler told me at that time that he did not believe that Czechoslovakia would overcome the loss of the Sudeten-German territories with their strong fortifications; and, moreover, he was concerned about the close relations then existing between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and thought that Czechoslovakia could and perhaps would become a military and strategic menace. These were the military reasons which were given to me... ...
I was not informed of the last conversation in Munich between the British Prime Minister Chamberlain and the Führer. However, I regarded this question as far as its further treatment was concerned as a political one, and consequently I did not raise any objections, if I may so express myself, especially as a considerable reduction in the military preparations decided on before the Munich meeting was ordered. Whenever the political question was raised, the Führer refused to discuss it.
1. The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection against surprise air attacks.
2. The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
3. The occupation of the Memelland.
It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany. The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those for 'Gruen'; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The organization, order of battle and state of readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that at the same time Grenzsicherung West (the measures of frontier defense in the West) can be carried out.
The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows: a. Army—The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise type of attack. Their number will be determined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing the frontiers or sent after the attack army. b. Air Force—The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an early elimination of the Czech Air Force. For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peace-time bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger forces may be required can only be determined from the development of the military situation in Czechoslovakia. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be prepared.
October 1938: Jodl is assigned as an Artillerie-Kommandeur of the 44th Division in Vienna.
November 6, 1938: Hitler speaks in Weimar:
November 24, 1938: From an appendix issued by Keitel to a previous Hitler Order:
From Keitel's IMT testimony: At that time I accompanied Hitler on an extensive tour of inspection of the eastern fortifications. We covered the entire front from Pomerania through the Oder-Warthe marshland as far as Breslau in order to inspect the various frontier fortifications against Poland. The question of fortifications in East Prussia was thoroughly discussed at that time. When I consider this in this connection today, I can only assume that for him these discussions were possibly connected with the Danzig and Corridor problem and he simply wanted to find out whether these eastern fortifications had sufficient defensive strength, should the Danzig and Corridor question eventually lead to war with Poland... ...
I believe that as early as the late autumn of 1938 orders were issued that Danzig be occupied at a favorable moment by a coup de main from East Prussia. That is all I know about it... ...I do not recall any, nor was there any kind of preparation, any military preparations, at that time, apart from a surprise attack from East Prussia... ...This statement was made time and again, that this occupation of, or the surprise attack on Danzig was to be carried out only if it was certain that it would not lead to war... ...
I believe Poland's refusal to discuss any kind of solution of the Danzig question was apparently the reason for further deliberations and steps... ...I might perhaps add that generally after Munich the situation also in regard to the Eastern problem was viewed differently, perhaps, or as I believe, from this point of view: The problem of Czechoslovakia has been solved satisfactorily without a shot. This will perhaps also be possible with regard to the other German problems in the East. I also believe I remember Hitler saying that he did not think the Western Powers, particularly England, would be interested in Germany's Eastern problem and would sooner act as mediators than raise any objection.
The transport necessary for previous organization should be limited to the minimum and will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if any, of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to the troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the approval of the Führer. The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar general directives. For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly occupied territory and only for a short period.
January 21, 1939: From the minutes of Hitler's reception of the Czech Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chvalkovsky:
For instance, the strength of the Dutch and Danish armies rests not in themselves alone but in realizing the fact that the whole world was convinced of the absolute neutrality of these states. When war broke out, it was well known that the problem of neutrality was one of extreme importance to these countries. The case of Belgium was somewhat different, as that country had an agreement with the French General Staff. In this particular case Germany was compelled to forestall possible eventualities. These small countries were defended not by their armies but by the trust shown in their neutrality...
Chvalkovsky, backed by Mastny, again spoke about the situation in Czechoslovakia and about the healthy farmers there. Before the crisis, the people did not know what to expect of Germany. But when they saw that they would not be exterminated and that the Germans wished only to lead their people back home, they heaved a sigh of relief... World propaganda, against which the Führer had been struggling for so long a time, was now focused on tiny Czechoslovakia. Chvalkovsky begged the Führer to address, from time to time, a few kind words to the Czech people. That might work miracles. The Führer is unaware of the great value attached to his words by the Czech people. If he would only openly declare that he intended to collaborate with the Czech people—and with the people, themselves, not with the Minister for Foreign Affairs—all foreign propaganda would be utterly defeated. The Führer concluded the conversation by expressing his belief in a promising future.
January 30, 1939: Hitler speaks before the Reichstag:
January 31, 1939: From notes of a meeting between Himmler and General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin:
2) We discussed the conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the triangle Germany-Italy-Japan into an even firmer mold. He also told me that, together with German counter-espionage (Abwehr) he was undertaking long-range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization was to become effective only in case of war.
3) Furthermore, he had succeeded up to now in sending 10 Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians whom he had also sent across had been shot at the frontier.
March 13, 1939: Hitler tells recently deposed Premier Monsignor Tiso of Czechoslovakia in Berlin that 'Czechoslovakia owed it only to Germany that she had not been mutilated further.' From captured German Foreign Office minutes of this meeting:
He did not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preserving something which did not wish to be preserved at all. he took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication of interior instability. he would not tolerate it, and he had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. it was not a question of days, but of hours. he had stated at that time that if Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. he would stand by his word so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. if she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, for which he was no longer responsible. in that case he would only intercede for German interests and those did not lie east of the Carpathians.
Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. she had never belonged to Germany. The Führer asked the Reich Foreign Minister if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He showed the Führer a message he had just received which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Führer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: It is true, I believe in every case, that on the occasion of such state visits and visits of foreign statesmen I was present in the Reich Chancellery or at the reception. I never took part in the actual discussions of political questions. I was present at the reception and felt that I should be present to be introduced as a high-ranking representative of the Wehrmacht. But in each individual case that I can recall I was dismissed with thanks or waited in the antechamber in case I should be needed. I can positively say that I did not say one single word either to Tiso or to President Hacha on that night, nor did I take part in Hitler's direct discussions with these men. May I add that just on the night of President Hacha's visit I had to be present in the Reich Chancellery, because during that night the High Command of the Army had to be instructed as to how the entry which had been prepared was to take place.
March 13, 1939: Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, writes to Hitler:March 15, 1939: At 1:15 in the morning, Hacha and Chvalkovsky are ushered into the Reichs Chancellery to meet with Hitler, von Ribbentrop, Göring, Keitel, and other high Nazi officials. From an account of the conference:
Why did Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its army to a reasonable size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the State. Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission, such an army is meaningless. He enumerates several examples which proved to him that the spirit in the army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the army would be a severe political burden in the future. Added to this were the inevitable development of economic necessities and, further, the protests from national groups which could no longer endure life as it was. Last Sunday, therefore, for me the die was cast. I summoned the Hungarian envoy and notified him that I was withdrawing my [restraining] hands from that country. We were now confronted with this fact.
He had given the order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into the German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she ever had enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany's attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the government. He believes in the honesty and straight forwardness of Hacha and Chvalkovsky but doubts that the government will be able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance was offered, it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the deployment of heavy artillery.
At 6 o'clock in the morning the German army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German air force would occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that case it would be easy for the Führer to give Czechoslovakia at the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own, autonomy and a certain national liberty. We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning point. He would not like to torture and de-nationalize the Czechs. He also did not do all that because of hatred but in order to protect Germany.
If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not have yielded, the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that the Czech people should live a full national life and he believed firmly that a way could be found which would make far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting would break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in counter-pressure. One would annihilate one another and it would then not be possible any more for him to give the promised alleviation’s. Within two days the Czech army would not exist any more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would result in a hatred which would force him because of his instinct of self-preservation not to grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people when he read the foreign press. It gave him the impression expressed in a German proverb: 'The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may go.'
That was the state of affairs. There were two courses open to Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and wished in memory of the past that Czechoslovakia would be conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which corresponded with his proposals stated above. That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the Czech people. If it would come to a fight, the bloodshed would also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a form of construction which would be much more far-reaching for Czechoslovakia than she could ever have hoped for in old Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for the German people. The hours went past. At 6 o'clock the troops would march in. He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but planned with all generosity. He would advise him now to retire with Chvalkovsky in order to discuss what should be done.
March 15, 1939: In defiance of the Munich Pact, the Nazis seize and occupy Bohemia and Moravia. Proclamation of the Führer to the German people:
Since Sunday at many places wild excesses have broken out, amongst the victims of which are again many Germans. Hourly the number of oppressed and persecuted people crying for help is increasing. From areas thickly populated by German-speaking inhabitants, which last autumn Czechoslovakia was allowed by German generosity to retain, refugees robbed of their personal belongings are streaming into the Reich. Continuation of such a state of affairs would lead to the destruction of every vestige of order in an area in which Germany is vitally interested particularly as for over 1,000 years it formed a part of the German Reich.
In order definitely to remove this menace to peace and to create the conditions for a necessary new order in this living space, I have today resolved to allow German troops to march into Bohemia and Moravia. They will disarm the terror gangs and the Czechoslovakian forces supporting them, and protect the lives of all who are menaced. Thus they will lay the foundations for introducing a fundamental re-ordering of affairs which will be in accordance with the 1,000-year-old history and will satisfy the practical needs of the German and Czech peoples. -Adolf Hitler, Berlin.
March 16, 1939: From the Decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor on the Establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia:
The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to assure that the land required for these installations shall be conveyed to the German Armed Forces. Furthermore, the Government of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops and the supply of military installations.
March 17, 1939: A statement by the Acting US Secretary of State, Sumner Welles:
The position of the Government of the United States has been made consistently clear. It has emphasized the need for respect for the sanctity of treaties and of the pledged word, and for non-intervention by any nation in the domestic affairs of other nations; and it has on repeated occasions expressed its condemnation of a policy of military aggression. It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and of arbitrary force are threatening the world peace and the very structure of modern civilization. The imperative need for the observance of the principles advocated by this Government has been clearly demonstrated by the developments which have taken place during the past 3 days.
March 25, 1939: From a memorandum of information given by Hitler to von Brauchitsch:
Czech Protectorate. H. Gr. [translator's note: probably Army groups] shall be asked again whether the request shall be repeated again for the delivery of all arms within a stated time limit and under. the threat of severe penalties. We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia without paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February though shall be paid for. Bohemia-Moravia have to make annual contributions to the German treasury. Their amount shall be fixed on the basis of the expenses earmarked formerly for the Czech Army.
April 3, 1939: Keitel reissues and modifies the directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed Forces for 1939/40.
2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise timetable for 'Fall Weiss' and to arrange by conferences the synchronized timing between the three branches of the Armed Forces.
3. The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by 1 May 1939.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: In the first sentence it is already stated that this document was to replace the regular annual instructions of the Wehrmacht regarding possible preparations for mobilization, a further elaboration of subjects known to us from the instructions which had been issued in 1937-38 and which were issued every year. But in fact, at that time or shortly before, Hitler had, in my presence, directly instructed the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to make strategic and operative preparations for an attack on, for a war with Poland. I then issued these first considerations, as can be seen from this document, that is, the Führer had already ordered the following: Everything should be worked out by the OKH of the Army by 1 September 1939, and that after this a time table should be drawn up. This document was signed by me at that time. ...
I must say that at this time, as in the case of the preparations against Czechoslovakia, both the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the generals to whom I spoke, and also I, myself, were opposed to the idea of waging a war against Poland. We did not want this war, but, of course, we immediately began to carry out the given orders, at least as far as the elaboration by the General Staff was concerned. Our reason was that to our knowledge the military means which were at our disposal at that time, that is to say, the divisions, their equipment, their armament, let alone their absolutely inadequate supply of munitions kept reminding us as soldiers that we were not ready to wage a war... I did not concern myself with the political problems but only with the question: Can we or can we not?"
April 1939: Hitler awards Keitel the Golden Party Badge.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: Hitler presented this Golden Badge of the Party to me in April 1939, at the same time that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General von Brauchitsch, received it. The Fuehrer said it was to be in commemoration of the march into Czechoslovakia. The Golden Badge had '16 and 17 March' engraved on it.
April 15, 1939: From notes of a conference between Goering, Mussolini, and Ciano:The action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed as an advantage for the axis in case Poland should finally join the enemies of the axis powers. Germany could then attack this country from 2 flanks and would be within only 25 minutes flying distance from the new polish industrial center which had been moved further into the interior of the country, nearer to the other Polish industrial districts, because of its proximity to the border. Now by the turn of events it is located again in the proximity of the border.
May 22, 1939: Hitler signs the 'Pact of Steel' with Italy.
[See, How Did the Pact of Steel Effect Germany and Italy?.]
May 23, 1939: Hitler addresses his Generals about his future plans. From a summary: [For the full text, Click here.]
From Keitel's IMT testimony: I saw the minutes of it for the first time in the course of my interrogations here. It reminded me of the situation at that time. The purpose of this address was to show the generals that their misgivings were unfounded, to remove their misgivings, and finally to point out that the conditions were not yet given and that political negotiations about these matters still could and perhaps would change the situation. It was however simply to give encouragement...at that time—and this was perhaps rather naïve—I believed that war would not break out, that in view of the military preparations ordered, negotiations would take place again and a solution would be found. In our military considerations a strictly military point of view was always dominant. We generals believed that France—to a lesser extent England—in view of her mutual-assistance pact with Poland would intervene and that we did not at all have the defensive means for this. For this very reason I personally was always convinced that there would be no war because we could not wage a war against Poland if France attacked us in the West.
May 24, 1939: General Thomas gives the Führer an update in broad terms of German numerical strength: Army: 51 divisions. Navy: 2 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 17 destroyers, one aircraft carrier 47 submarines. Luftwaffe: 21 squadrons, 260,000 men.June 14, 1939: From a directive by Commander-in-Chief of the Army von Brauchitsch:
June 22, 1939: Keitel submits to Hitler a 'preliminary timetable for Operation White,' the invasion of Poland.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: The question concerning the problem of Danzig and the Corridor were known to me. I also knew that political discussions and negotiations with regard to these questions were pending. The case of the attack on Poland, which in the course of time had to be and was prepared, was, of course, closely connected with these problems. Since I myself was not concerned with political matters, I personally was of the opinion that, as in the case of Munich and before Munich, military preparations, that is, military pressure if I may call it such, would play the same kind of role as in my opinion it had played at Munich. I did not believe that the matter would be brought to an end without military preparations...
I know that several discussions took place concerning the Danzig question as well as concerning a solution of the Corridor problem. I recall a remark that impressed me at the time, when Hitler once said he deplored Marshal Pilsudski's death, because he believed he had reached or could have reached an agreement with this statesman. This statement was once made to me.
July 27, 1939: From minutes of a conference in Berlin between Göring and a group of officials from the OKW and from other agencies of the German government concerned with war production:
July 31, 1939: An agreement between the military and the SS concerning the task of the Einsatzgruppen (EG) in Poland is defined this day as the 'combating of all anti-German elements in hostile country behind the troops in combat.'
August 19, 1939: General Halder makes a strange entry in his diary: "Canaris checked with Section I (Operations). Himmler, Heydrich, Obersalzberg: 150 Polish uniforms with accessories for Upper Silesia." (Shirer I) (See August 31, 1939)
From the IMT testimony of Abwehr General Erwin Lahousen: The name of this undertaking which took place just before the Polish campaign, was 'Undertaking Himmler.' ...The affair on which I am now giving testimony is one of the most mysterious actions which took place within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr. A few days, or sometime before-I believe it was the middle of August-the precise date can be found in the diary of the division-Abwehr Division I, as well as my division, Abwehr Division II, were given the task of providing Polish uniforms and equipment such as identification cards and so on, for an Undertaking Himmler. This request, according to an entry in the diary of the division which was kept not by me, but by my adjutant, was received by Canaris from the Wehrmacht Operations Staff or from the National Defense Department. I believe the name of General Warlimont is mentioned. . . .
Where the request originated I cannot say, I can only say that it reached us in the form of an order. It was, to be sure, an order on which we, the divisional chiefs concerned, already had some misgivings without knowing what, in the last analysis, it meant. The name Himmler, however, spoke for itself, and that is also evident from entries of the diary which record my question why Herr Himmler should come to receive uniforms from us. ...These articles of equipment had to be kept in readiness, and one day some man from the SS or the SD—the name is given in the official war diary of the division—collected them. ...The real purpose was unknown to us then; we do not know its details even today. All of us, however, had the reasonable suspicion that something entirely crooked was being planned; the name of the undertaking was sufficient guarantee for that.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: This document deals with Polish uniforms for border incidents or for some sort of illegal actions. It has been shown to me, I know it; it is a subsequent note made by Admiral Canaris of a conversation he had with me. He told me at that time that he was to make available a few Polish uniforms. This had been communicated to him by the Führer through the adjutant. I asked: "For what purpose?" We both agreed that this was intended for some illegal action. If I remember rightly I told him at that time that I did not believe in such things at all and that he had better keep his hands off. We then had a short discussion about Dirschau which was also to be taken by a coup de main by the Wehrmacht. That is all I heard of it. I believe I told Canaris he could dodge the issue by saying that he had no Polish uniforms. He could simply say he had none and the matter would be settled.
August 22, 1939: Meeting in Obersalzberg, Hitler tells his generals that the destruction of Poland "starts on Saturday morning" (26 August), the aim of this war is the wholesale destruction of Poland. [For the full text, Click here.]From Keitel's IMT testimony: This speech was made at the end of August and was addressed to the generals assembled at Obersalzberg, the commanders-in-chief of the troops preparing in the East. When Hitler, towards the end of this speech, declared that a pact had been concluded with the Soviet Union, I was firmly convinced that there would be no war because I believed that these conditions constituted a basis for negotiation and that Poland would not expose herself to it. I also believed that now a basis for negotiations had been found although Hitler said in this speech, a copy of which I read here for the first time from notes, that all preparations had been made, and that it was intended to put them into execution.
August 23, 1939: The German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact is signed in Moscow. Sometimes called the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement of Non-aggression, or simply the 'Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.'August 23, 1939: Hitler is delighted with the pact, and believes Stalin has just handed him the perfect opportunity to restore the Reich's "rightful possessions" without having to fight a war on two fronts. He is certain that this new treaty with the Russians will allow him to safely reclaim Danzig and take back the Polish Corridor; so certain that he tells his staff that Britain and France, without other major allies, will not go to war in such a situation... "especially over what everyone knows are, by all rights, German territories anyway."
August 23, 1939: Secret Additional Protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact:
2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San. The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments. In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.
3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares; its complete political disinterestedness in these areas. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.
August 23, 1939: Hitler sets the date for the invasion of Poland: Saturday, August 26, at 4:30am.
August 24, 1939: Poland and Great Britain formally sign a treaty of mutual assistance. The British Parliament reconvenes and passes the Emergency Powers Act. Royal Assent is given on the same day and the Royal Navy is ordered to war stations. Soon afterward a general mobilization begins. Hitler predicts that the Chamberlain government will fall. President Roosevelt telegrams the President of Poland:
August 25, 1939: Hitler writes to Mussolini, informing him of his intent to fall upon Poland and requesting his assistance:
August 25, 1939: Mussolini replies to Hitler's letter (above):
At our meetings the war was envisaged for after 1942 and at such time I would have been ready on land, on sea, and in the air according to the plans which had been arranged. I am also of the opinion that the purely military preparations which have already been undertaken and the others which will be entered upon in Europe and Africa will serve to immobilize important French and British forces. I consider it my implicit duty as a true friend to tell you the whole truth and inform you about the actual situation in advance. Not to do so might have unpleasant consequences for us all. This is my point of view and since within a short time I must summon the highest governmental bodies of the realm, I ask you to let me know yours as well...
August 25, 1939 Vollkommen Klar: After reading Mussolini's reply, Hitler cancels his invasion of Poland scheduled for 4:30 AM the following morning.
August 25, 1939: Keitel meets with Hitler in Berlin.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: The first thing which was very surprising to me was that on one of those days which have been discussed here repeatedly, namely on the 24th or 25th, only a few days after the conference at Obersalzberg, I was suddenly called to Hitler at the Reich Chancellery and he said to me only, "Stop everything at once, get Brauchitsch immediately. I need time for negotiations." I believe that after these few words I was dismissed. ...
I at once rang up the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and passed on the order, and Brauchitsch was called to the Fuehrer. Everything was stopped and all decisions on possible military action were suspended, first without any time limit, on the following day for a certain limited period, I believe it was 5 days according to the calculations we can make today. ...
I believe that I saw them (the so-called minimum demands on Poland) in the Reich Chancellery, that Hitler himself showed them to me, so that I knew about them. ...At that time I was always only a few minutes in the Reich Chancellery and as a soldier I naturally believed that these were meant perfectly honestly. ...This question of border incidents was also extensively discussed with me here in my interrogations. In this situation and in the few discussions we had at the Reich Chancellery in those days there was no talk at all on this question.
August 30, 1939: Keitel becomes a member of the Ministerial Council for the defense of the Reich.
August 30, 1939: Unofficial peace envoy Birger Dahlerus continues his shuttle diplomacy:
From Keitel's IMT testimony: I knew nothing at all of the political discussions that took place in those days from the 24th to the 30th, 31st of August or the beginning of September 1939. I never knew anything about the visits of a Herr Dahlerus. I knew nothing of London's intervention. I remember only that, while in the Reich Chancellery for a short time, I met Hitler, who said to me: "Do not disturb me now, I am writing a letter to Daladier." This must have been in the first days of September. Neither I nor, to my knowledge, any of the other generals ever knew anything about the matters I have heard of here or about the steps that were still taken after 1 September. Nothing at all.
August 30, 1939: Hitler agrees to Britain's request for a 24-hour extension to permit a Polish negotiator to meet with von Ribbentrop.From Keitel's IMT testimony: May I add...that on 30 August, I believe, the day for the attack, which took place on 1 September, was again postponed for 24 hours. For this reason Brauchitsch and I were again called to the Reich Chancellery and to my recollection the reason given was that a Polish Government plenipotentiary was expected. Everything was to be postponed for 24 hours. Then no further changes of the military instructions occurred.
August 31, 1939: At half past noon, Hitler issues a Directive for the conduct of the war:2. The attack on Poland is to be carried out. Date of attack: September 1, 1939. Time of attack: 4:45 AM.
August 31, 1939: SS Sturmbannführer (SS Storm Command Leader, equal to rank of Major) Alfred Helmut Naujocks receives the code words "Grandmama dead," thus ending a 14 day wait at the German radio station at Gleiwitz, where he and Gestapo head Heinrich Mueller are to carry out a mock attack. The "canned goods:" a dozen "condemned criminals" dressed in Polish military uniforms and given fatal injections before being shot. Note: See Alfred Naujocks, sworn affidavit, Nuremberg, November 20, 1945, the only documentary evidence for this item.
From Lahousen's IMT testimony: The actual course of events was the following: When the first Wehrmacht communiqué spoke of the attack of Polish units on German territory, Pieckenbrock, holding the communiqué in his hand, and reading it aloud, observed that now we knew why our uniforms had been needed. On the same day or a few days later, I cannot say exactly, Canaris informed us that people from concentration camps had been disguised in these uniforms and had been ordered to make a military attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. I cannot recall whether any other locality was mentioned. Although we were extremely interested, particularly General Oster, to know details of this action, that is, where it had occurred and what had happened—actually we could well imagine it, but we did not know how it was carried out—I cannot even today say exactly what happened. ...
This matter has always held my interest, and even after the capitulation I spoke about these matters with an SS Hauptsturmführer (equivalent to Captain)—he was a Viennese in the hospital in which both of us were staying, and I asked him for details on what had taken place. The man—his name was Birckel—told me: "It is odd, that even our circles heard of this matter only very much later, and then only by intimation." He added: "So far as I know, even all members of the SD who took part in that action were put out of the way, that is, killed." That was the last I heard of this matter.
From Keitel's IMT testimony: This incident, this action came to my knowledge for the first time here through the testimony of witnesses. I never found out who was charged to carry out such things and I knew nothing of the raid on the radio station at Gleiwitz until I heard the testimonies given here before the Tribunal. Neither do I recall having heard at that time that such an incident had occurred.
September 1, 1939: After some delays, Hitler's forces invade Poland. The Wound Badge for Wehrmacht (German Army, SS, Kriegsmarine (German “War Navy”), and Luftwaffe (German Air Force) soldiers is instituted. The final version of the Iron Cross is also instituted. Hitler's Proclamation to the German Army:[Next: Part Two, Click Here.]
[Part Four, 1/4/1944-10/20/12946.] [Part Three, 6/22/1941-12/29/1944.] [Part Two, 9/1/1939-6/21/1941.] [Part One, 9/22/1892-9/1/1939.]
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