Fritz Sauckel 3

January 5, 1943: From a Sauckel circular (556(13)-PS, USA-194):

On 4 January 1943, at 8 o'clock in the evening, Minister Speer telephoned from the general headquarters of the Führer giving the information that, by virtue of a decision of the Führer it was no longer necessary, when recruiting skilled and unskilled labor in France, to have any particular regard for the French. Recruitment could be carried on there with pressure and more severe measures.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: This note or rather this decision did not come from me. This was a communication which came from the Führer's headquarters, based on a decision made by the Führer. In spite of that—and I want to emphasize that particularly—my attitude towards the French Government did not change, and it does not say so in this record either. I continued to adopt the same polite attitude in my negotiations with the Government, and I ask the Tribunal to be allowed to make a short statement on how these negotiations with the French Government were conducted.

From Ribbentrop's IMT Testimony: According to what I heard, all these foreign workers are supposed to have been well treated in Germany. I think it is possible, of course, that other things might have happened, too; but on the whole, I believe that a good deal was done to treat these workers well. I know that on occasion departments of the Foreign Office co-operated in these matters with a view to preventing those possible things. Generally speaking, however, we had no influence in that sphere, as we were excluded from Eastern questions. ....

We in the Foreign Office—in the case of the French, for instance, and quite a number of other foreign workers—co-operated in getting musicians, et cetera, from France for them. We advised on questions concerning their welfare. And I know that the German Labor Front did everything in its power, at least with regard to the sector which we could view to some extent, to treat the workers well, to preserve their willingness to work, and to make their leisure pleasant. I know, at least, that those of its efforts in which we co-operated were on these lines.

January 6, 1943: After a stormy interview with Hitler, Grand Admiral Raeder tenders his resignation.

January 6, 1943: Sauckel summons some 800 officials to a meeting in Weimar (Sauckel-82, IMT XLI):

Sauckel: 1. Where voluntary recruitment fails (and experience shows that it is failing everywhere), compulsory service takes its place. That is now the Iron Law of the year 1943 in the labor service: in a few weeks, there should be no occupied territory in which compulsory service for Germany is not the most natural thing in the world. We will slough off the last dregs of our humanitarian daydreaming. Every additional cannon which we manufacture brings us one minute closer to victory! It is bitter to tear people away from their homes, from their children. But we didn’t want the war! The German child who loses his father at the front, the German woman who bewails her fallen husband, suffers much more deeply. Let us renounce all false sentimentality here.

2. Even though I wish to come to terms with the severity of the war, I nevertheless request that under no circumstances may the German nation, the name of the Führer, my own name, or even your names, be exposed to shame. What we must do, will be done. But it will be done so that, with all severity—and I will punish pitilessly where necessary—account is taken of the principles of German correctness. We are not a perverse, bestially-inclined nation whose highest joy is to torment prisoners. With us, everything is done according to regulations, but with chivalry. This chivalry has been proven a thousand times by German soldiers. We are also guided by the recognition here that, in the long run, efficiency in production can only be demanded from foreign workers if they are satisfied with their lot. I will not tolerate men being mistreated. You must compel people to do their duty, you must cart them away under certain circumstances, but you must not commit a fault, you must not torment and play tricks; rather, I hereby make you personally responsible for ensuring the greatest possible comfort for our foreign labor recruits during transport and in their accommodation, for the purpose of bringing healthy workers to Germany, people who are able to go to work immediately.

3. As recruitment commissioners in foreign countries, you must under no circumstances whatsoever to promise things which are not possible according to the applicable guidelines and regulations, or not practicable due to the war situation. It is much better to go up to persons liable for labor service and tell them ‘You must do this, and, in return, you will have the rights of workers working in Germany’. Anyone who works in Germany has a right to life in Germany, even if he is Bolshevik. We will watch strictly to ensure that no shame falls upon the German name in so doing. You may demand every sort of protection from me in your service territory, but not for any crimes. The name of our nation is holy. For the first time in German history, you must represent the principles of German labor for the Reich. Be conscious of this at all times.

4. For your part, you must tell the truth about labor service in Germany at all times. You of the labor service are an advance troop of German National Socialist propaganda in foreign countries. You must learn to represent our German standpoint, the standpoint of our Führer, our people, and the Reich, in foreign countries. I wish to make you responsible, in addition to your official and professional duties, for being propagandists of the National Socialist life and faith. You must create validity and respect for the true facts.

5. You must also spread the word in foreign countries that anyone who works properly in Germany will enjoy the best protection for his life and health. This promise must make the rounds in the occupied territories. The sick rate in the camps of Soviet workers working in Germany is less than two percent. That is unequalled! The reason for this is that the Soviet workers are cleanly and hygienically housed, and decently nourished. Carry this out, regardless of all lies. You can and must represent the concept in foreign countries that there has never been a labor service like the one in Germany!

6. We must also spread the word, as a further promise, that everyone who works in Germany is helping to bring Europe closer to peace, and to eliminate the misery caused by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin from the world. All soldiers and all offices must cooperate in keeping this promise. Anyone who works in Germany is protecting his life, and is working to eliminate mass misery from the world.

7. Every recruiter is obliged to take care that the recruited workers bring as much food, clothing, and, possibly, bedding, along with them as possible in any way. All useful things must be packed and brought along. We do not have these things in abundance in Germany at the present time.

8. In no case may sick people, or people who are unable to work, be taken along to work—or children who are unable to work.

9. The transports must be carefully prepared and cautiously carried out.

The German labor service, I emphasize once again, must be the best life insurance for foreign peoples. This is how our propaganda should work. That which was not yet good enough, should be improved; that which was better, will be made more perfect by us. I demand this of you, not for ourselves, but for the Führer, for his soldiers, and for our beloved German people.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: It can be seen very clearly from that document that I did not tolerate any crime. I would not protect these people, who were not subordinate to me, if they committed crimes there. They were not to do that; that was what I prohibited.

From Inside The Third Reich, by Albert Speer: It was also Lammers who from January 1943 on presided over the Cabinet meetings, which were then resumed, in Hitler's stead. Not all members of the Cabinet were invited, only those who were concerned with the subjects on the agenda. But the meeting place, the Cabinet Room, showed what power the Committee of Three had acquired or at any rate intended to acquire.

These meetings turned out quite heated. Goebbels and Funk supported my radical views. Minister of the Interior Frick, as well as Lammers himself, raised the anticipated doubts. Sauckel maintained that he could provide any number of workers requested of him, including skilled personnel, from abroad. Even when Goebbels demanded that leading party members forgo their previous, almost limitless luxuries, he could change nothing. And Eva Braun, ordinarily so unassuming, had no sooner heard of a proposed ban on permanent waves as well as the end of cosmetic production when she rushed to Hitler in high indignation.

Hitler at once showed uncertainty. He advised me that instead of an outright ban I quietly stop production of "hair dyes and other items necessary for beauty culture," as well as "cessation of repairs upon apparatus for producing permanent waves."

After a few meetings in the Chancellery it was clear to Goebbels and me that armaments production would receive no spur from Bormann, Lammers, or Keitel. Our efforts had bogged down in meaningless details.

January 11, 1943: From a declaration by Sauckel (1342-PS, RF-63):

Sauckel: The French Government is composed of nothing but adepts at temporization. If the first 250,000 workers had arrived in Germany in time, before the autumn—the negotiations with the French Government having already been begun in the preceding spring—we might perhaps have been able to recruit key men in the Reich earlier and form new divisions; and it might then not have come to the cutting off of Stalingrad. In any case, the Führer is now absolutely decided to rule in France, if need be even without a French Government.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: This is not a conference with the French Government. This is a statement of facts. That [Hitler was determined to rule in France] was a straightforward decision and a statement from the Führer, for which I am not responsible. I merely repeated it, and in any case it was never realized. I could not exert any pressure by that, because this was merely transmitting a statement of the situation. I did not tell the French Government that the Führer would remove them and that therefore they would have to do such and such a thing. I merely negotiated. I repeated that, but not with the intention of doing that.

That I imposed this law by pressure, that I do deny. I negotiated about it. It was my duty to report when I made such journeys for I was carrying out the Führer's orders. I cannot conceive in what other way a basis for negotiations could be found. The German Government made demands, and because of those demands there were negotiations with the French Government which had to be considered by me as de jure. The German Government was making demands, yes, that is true. I can only say that I was very polite and accommodating when talking to the French Premier and that our negotiations ran very smoothly. He often mentioned that, and it is in the record.

January 12, 1943: From notes of a meeting between Sauckel and Vichy French authorities at the German Embassy in Paris (F-809, RF-1509):

Vichy French Premier Pierre Laval: Gauleiter Sauckel demands a further 250,000 new workers. Gauleiter Sauckel knows very well-and his offices have certainly informed him about this-the difficulties which the French Government had in carrying out the program last year. The Gauleiter must realize that as a result of the number of prisoners of war and workers who are already employed by Germany, the sending of another 250,000 workers will increase even further the difficulties of the French Government. I cannot conceal these difficulties from the Gauleiter, because they are evident; and the Germans who are in Paris know these difficulties. When the Gauleiter replies that they have had to overcome the same difficulties in Germany and when he even states that French industry must be expanded, it seems to me that I must remind him that Germany not only demands workers of France, but is also beginning to take away the machines from factories in order to transport them to Germany. France may have nothing left, but until now she still had her means of production. If these too are taken from her, France loses even her possibilities for working.

I do everything to facilitate a German victory, But I must admit that German policy makes heavier demands on me nearly every day and these demands do not conform to a definite policy. Gauleiter Sauckel can tell the German workers that they are working for Germany. I cannot say that Frenchmen are working for France.

I see that in many fields the French Government is not able to act. One would almost believe that on the German side they set no value on the good will of the French and that they are bent on instituting a German administration throughout France. My task is being made more difficult every day. It is true that I do not allow myself to be discouraged; but I consider, however, that it is my duty to remind the Gauleiter of the gravity of Franco-German relations and of the impossibility of continuing along this path. It is no longer a matter of a policy of collaboration; rather, it is on the French side a policy of sacrifice, and on the German side a policy of coercion.

The present state of mind in France, the uncertainty concerning the means which the French Government possesses, the half-freedom in which it finds itself, all these do not give me the necessary authority to furnish Gauleiter Sauckel with an immediate reply. We can do nothing. We are not free to change salaries; we are not free even to combat the black market; we cannot take any political measure without everywhere coming up against some German authority which has substituted itself in our place.

I cannot guarantee measures which I do not take myself. I am persuaded that the Führer is unaware that the French Government cannot act. There cannot be in one country two governments on questions which do not concern directly the security of the occupation forces. It is not possible for me to be a mere agent for German measures of coercion.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I only talked to French ministers in the German Embassy in Paris. Usually the French Premier, the French Minister for Labor, Minister Bichelonne, took part in such discussions. On the German side, the Ambassador; on behalf of the military commander, Dr. Fischer; and, as my representative, probably Dr. Hildebrandt or some other gentleman. Very many matters were discussed in great detail during these conferences.

To begin with, if the Tribunal would permit it, I should have to read my reply to Premier Laval. The document proves, and this has been confirmed to me by Premier Laval on various occasions, that I conducted my negotiations with him in a proper manner; and in spite of the fact that I had orders not to conduct political conversations but only to deal with my actual task, I always reported to the Führer about these matters. But I think that the tone of my reply was definitely beyond reproach. I would have to read my answer. I cannot remember it now.

Premier Laval did not complain about me in this connection. He complained about general conditions in France, because this was the time of occupation. The situation was that there was a German occupation. It was war.

I think that an error in translation has been made here. I understood that you asked whether I denied that I was putting pressure on the Tribunal. I respect this Tribunal too highly to try to exert pressure upon it. I do not understand the question. I understood you to ask me whether I denied that I exerted pressure on the Tribunal; and, of course, that question I have to answer with "no."

January 13, 1943: Hitler approves a draft decree authored by Goebbels “for a more total waging of the war”. Goebbels’ plan is designed to raise an additional half to three-quarters of a million more men for the front in four months time. (Reuth, p. 310)

January 18, 1943: Hitler appoints Bormann, Lammers, and Keitel in charge of Goebbels’ Total War plan. Goebbels is “Outraged and most deeply offended" not to have ben put in charge of implementing his own plan. (Reuth, p. 311)

January 18, 1943: From a letter of the Reich Security Main Office concerning "Concentration Camp Hertogenbosch":

This camp will be equipped as a transit and reception camp.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: Upon their arrival in Germany the people of the transport had not only to be properly received but they also had to be medically examined again and checked at a transit camp. One examination had to be made at the time and place of recruitment, and another took place at a fixed point before the border. Thus, from the time of recruitment until being put to work three medical examinations and checks had to be made, according to my directives. These transit camps were camps in which the people from the various transports came together at the border, and where they were examined and registered in the proper manner. The Allocation of Labor had nothing at all to do with these camps and concentration camps. This was not a transit camp for workers but was obviously the transit camp of a concentration camp. These were not at all known to me. I never had to and never did concern myself with such transports and transit camps; and I would not have done it.

I believe every German employer who received these workers, either in agriculture or in war industry, is a witness to the fact that a procedure of this sort never took place in any form; that it was quite inconceivable that such slave markets were instituted through the authority of the Reich Ministry of Labor; but that these workers who passed through National Socialist labor exchanges received exactly the same contracts and conditions as the German workers themselves, with some variations, and in no case were they put to work like slaves without rights or pay, without a contract, without sickness insurance, or without accident insurance. That may be seen from the numerous directives and decrees which were issued by the Reich Ministry of Labor and by me for every race involved.

The general living conditions of foreign workers in Germany as far as they were recruited through the offices of the Allocation of Labor, were exactly the same as those of German workers who were accommodated in camps. Living conditions were dependent on the circumstances of war and, in contrast with peacetime, were subject to the same limitations as applied to the German population. The adjutant of Herr von Schirach, a man unknown to me, who appeared here as a witness yesterday, described conditions in Vienna; those conditions existed in other German cities too.

January 20, 1943: At a Reich ministers conference, Goebbels—supported by Funk and Speer but opposed by Frick and Lammers—unsuccessfully presents his Total War plan for approval. Sauckel puts the final nail in the plans coffin when he claims that he will be able to raise the extra manpower from the occupied territories, making the Propaganda Minister’s plans unnecessary. Goebbels contents himself with a "calming feeling of having done whatever can be done.” (Reuth, p. 311)

January 24, 1943 Casablanca: FDR, flanked by Churchill, announces the controversial policy of Unconditional Surrender:

Some of you Britishers know the old story: we had a general called US Grant. His name was Ulysses Simpson Grant but in my, and the Prime Minister's early days, he was called "Unconditional Surrender Grant." The elimination of German, Japanese and Italian war power means the unconditional surrender of Germany, Italy and Japan...It does not mean the destruction of the population of Germany, Italy or Japan, but it does mean the destruction of the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest and the subjugation of other people.

January 30, 1943: Raeder resigns from command of the Kriegsmarine, becoming Admiral Inspector of the Navy, an honorary position. Dönitz becomes Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy (Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine). Note: Dönitz remains in command of the U-boat fleet (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote, B.d.U.). (Shirer)

February 2, 1943: Paulus surrenders at Stalingrad.

February 2, 1943: From an official directive, printed by the Kreishauptmann of the Minsk and Warsaw district (USSR-469):

Pursuant to the compulsory service decree dated 13 May 1942 Verordnungsblatt, I direct you to labor service in the Reich. Your employment in the Reich will be under properly regulated working conditions and your wages will be paid according to a regular scale. Wage savings can be transmitted regularly by you to your home. Close relatives, to whose support you have hitherto been substantially contributing, may apply to the labor office for special allowances.

Should you disobey this compulsory service decree, the members of your family (parents, wife, brothers, sisters, and children) will be placed in a punitive camp and will be liberated only after you have presented yourself. Moreover, I reserve for myself the right to confiscate your personal and real property as well as the personal and real property of the members of your family. Moreover you, in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the above-mentioned decree, will be punished with confinement in prison, or with penal servitude, or with internment in a concentration camp. Kreishauptmann (captain of the circle) Dr. Bittrich.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I can openly and clearly answer that the threat of such penalties in this form was completely unknown to me and that I would never have mentioned it. If I had learned of it, I would have stopped it immediately. I must, however, beg permission to tell the Tribunal that this appendix at the end of the document, regarded as coming from my office, is incorrect, and was not sanctioned by me.

I myself was not able to issue orders for compulsory service in the occupied territories, that had to be done by the district authorities. But by compulsion I did not understand that penalties would be threatened to the extent as stated in that one document signed by Bittrich (above), but that they would be in keeping with German regulations. That is a very substantial difference.

February, 1943: From a letter written by the chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee at Krakow (1526-PS, USA-178):

The general nervousness is still further increased by the wrong methods of labor mobilization which have been used more and more frequently in recent months. The wild and ruthless manhunt as practiced everywhere in towns and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, as well as at night in homes, has shaken the feeling of security of the inhabitants. Every man is exposed to the danger of being seized suddenly and unexpectedly, anywhere and at any time, by the police, and brought into an assembly camp. None of his relatives knows what has happened to him, and only weeks or months later one or another gives news of his fate by a postcard...

In November of last year an inspection of all males of the age-classes born 1910 to 1920 was ordered in the area of Zalesaczyti (district of Czortkow). After the men had appeared for inspection, all those who were selected were arrested at once, loaded into trains, and sent to the Reich. Similar recruitment of laborers for the Reich also took place in other areas of this district. Following some interventions, the action was then stopped.

February 5-6, 1943: Sauckel speaks at the Congress of Gauleiter and Reichsleiter held at Posen:

The remarkable violence of the war forces me to mobilize, in the name of the Führer, many millions of foreigners for labor for the entire German war economy and to urge them to effect the maximum production. The purpose of this utilization is to assure in the field of labor the war material necessary in the struggle for the preservation of the life and liberty, in the first place, of our own people, and also for the preservation of our Western culture for those peoples who, in contrast to the parasitical Jews and plutocrats, possess the honest will and strength to shape their life by their own work and effort. This is the vast difference between the work which was exacted through the Treaty of Versailles and the Dawes and Young Plans at one time—which took the form of slavery and tribute to the might and supremacy of Jewry—and the use of labor which I, as a National Socialist, have the honor to prepare and to carry out as a contribution by Germany in the fight for her liberty and for that of her allies.

From Schirach's IMT testimony: I had the impression that the functionaries of the labor employment administration felt that they had to keep strictly to Sauckel's orders, and in those industrial plants which I visited I was able to ascertain that the requirements stated in the directives were in fact fulfilled. I remember that Sauckel once came to Vienna—I think in 1943—and that on that occasion he addressed all his labor employment functionaries and repeated orally everything that he had stated in his directives. He spoke of the foreign workers in particular, demanding just treatment for them; and I remember that on this occasion he even spoke of putting them on the same footing as German workers. After the Gauleiter assemblies the Führer always held forth in a comparatively large circle just as he did in his speeches. Interviews in the real sense of the word did not exist. He always made speeches. Fixed dates on which Gauleiter could have interviews with Hitler almost ceased to exist once the war had begun . . . .

[A Gauleiter] could ask for an interview [with Hitler], but he did not get it; he received an answer from Bormann, usually in the form of a telegram. That happened to me very frequently, because I made such requests; one was asked to submit in writing the points one wanted to discuss, after which one either received an answer or did not receive one.

From the IMT testimony of Hartmann Lauterbacher: In March 1943, when I made an unofficial visit to Vienna, a very long conversation took place between von Schirach and myself. At that time, von Schirach talked very pessimistically about the prospects of the war and told me that we should soon be fighting outside Vienna, in the Alps and along the Rhine. On that occasion he said that he had not been able to see Adolf Hitler for a very long time; that he had had no further opportunity of reporting to him, as had formerly been the case; and that the Chief of the Party Chancellery, Bormann, had consistently prevented him from seeing the Führer and talking to him alone; and that he therefore no longer had any opportunity whatsoever of discussing Viennese questions or general questions with Hitler. In this connection he also stated that Bormann came to him with objections and complaints every day, canceling orders and directives he had issued in his capacity of Gauleiter in Vienna, and that in view of all this, it was no longer possible for him to remain in office and to shoulder the responsibility.

At a later stage of that conversation, in the course of which we considered all kinds of possibilities, he said that, as he had sworn an oath of allegiance to Hitler, he felt bound to remain in office whatever happened and that, above all, he could not take the responsibility in the present military situation for abandoning the population over which he had been appointed Gauleiter. He saw the catastrophe coming but said that even his resignation or any action that he might take would not have any influence on the leaders of the State or on Hitler himself and that he would, therefore, remain true to his oath, as a soldier would, and retain his appointment . . . .

I, like all other Gauleiter of the NSDAP, constantly received instructions from Sauckel with regard to the recruitment of labor; that is to say, regarding the welfare of these civilian workers. The instructions which I received as Gauleiter consisted almost exclusively of repeated demands to do everything to satisfy the foreign workers in matters of accommodation, food, clothing, and cultural welfare. It was naturally carried out within the limits of existing possibilities. I myself inspected such camps and especially such factories on my official trips. Apart from that I had, as my Gau supervisor of the German Labor Front, a man who assisted me in this task on such occasions. After the air raids from which Hanover and Brunswick suffered particularly badly from 1943 onwards, I found conditions in foreign civilian labor camps—just as I did in the living quarters of German people—to be what I would call, perhaps not shocking, but certainly very serious; and after that I tried as far as possible to have these destroyed dwellings repaired, for instance, or to have new ones built.

February 12, 1943: From a meeting of the Military Commanders and all responsible officials of the Reich labor service:

Gauleiter Sauckel likewise thanks the various services for the successful carrying out of the first action. Immediately after the beginning of the new year, he is obliged to announce further severe measures. There is a great new need of labor for the front as well as for the Reich armament industry ...

The situation at the front calls for 700,000 soldiers fit for front-line service. The armament industry would have to lose 200,000 key workers by the middle of March. I have received an order from the Führer to find 200,000 foreign skilled workers as replacements and I shall need for this purpose 150,000 French skilled workmen, while the other 50,000 can be drawn from Holland, Belgium, and other occupied countries. In addition, 100,000 unskilled French workers are necessary for the Reich. The second action of recruitment in France makes it necessary that by the middle of March 150,000 skilled workers and 100,000 unskilled workmen and women be transferred to Germany.

February 18, 1943 Totalkrieg: In Berlin, Goebbels delivers his most famous speech:

The tragic battle of Stalingrad is a symbol of heroic, manly resistance to the revolt of the steppes. It has not only a military, but also an intellectual and spiritual significance for the German people. Here for the first time our eyes have been opened to the true nature of the war. We want no more false hopes and illusions. We want bravely to look the facts in the face, however hard and dreadful they may be. The history of our party and our state has proven that a danger recognized is a danger defeated. Our coming hard battles in the East will be under the sign of this heroic resistance. It will require previously undreamed of efforts by our soldiers and our weapons. A merciless war is raging in the East. The Führer was right when he said that in the end there will not be winners and losers, but the living and the dead...

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: After the fall of Stalingrad and the proclamation of the state of total war, Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels in Berlin interfered considerably in all these problems. He ordered that in cases of persistent refusal or signs of resistance compulsion was to be used by means of refusing additional food rations, or even by withdrawal of ration cards. I personally rejected measures of that kind energetically, because I knew very well that in the western territories the so-called food ration card played a subordinate role and that supplies were provided for the resistance movement and its members on such a large scale that such measures would have been quite ineffective. I did not order or suggest them.

February 19, 1943: From notes of a meeting of the Central Planning Board, attended by Speer, Sauckel, and Field Marshal Milch (R-124):

Sauckel: If any prisoners. are taken, they will be needed there.

Milch: We have made a request for an order that a certain percentage of men in the antiaircraft artillery must be Russians. Fifty thousand will be taken altogether, thirty thousand are already employed as gunners. It is an amusing thing that Russians must work the guns.

Note: This is a clear violation of the Hague Convention Number IV of 1907, which provides that the tasks of prisoners of war shall have no connection with the operations war.

February 24, 1943: A letter from Sauckel to Hitler:

Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, to the Führer general headquarters of the Führer. My Führer, I beg herewith to take leave of you before my intended journey to France. The purpose of my journey is:

1) To put at the disposal of the Reich, within the given time, skilled labor to replace German key workers being drafted into the Wehrmacht. May I add that Field Marshal Keitel and General Von Unruh received a communication from me yesterday to the effect that half of these replacements for key men, that is 125,000 French qualified skilled men, have already arrived in the Reich on I January 1943 and that a corresponding number of soldiers can be called to the colors. I shall now make sure in France that the second half shall arrive in the Reich by the end of March, or earlier if possible. The first French program was executed by the end of December.

2) To assure the necessary labor for the French dockyards for the carrying out of the programs drawn up by Grand Admiral Dönitz and Gauleiter Kaufmann.

3) To assure the necessary labor for the programs of the Luftwaffe.

4) To assure the necessary labor for the other German armament programs which are in progress in France.

5) To make available supplementary labor in agreement with State Secretary Backe, with a view to intensifying French agricultural production.

6) To have discussions, if necessary, with the French Government on the subject of the carrying out of the labor service, the calling up of age-groups, and so forth, with a view to activating the recruitment of labor for the benefit of the German war economy.

March 5, 1943: Erich Koch, Reich Commissar for the Ukraine, at a meeting of the National Socialist Party in Kiev (1130-PS, USA-169):

1. We are the master race and must govern hard but just ....

2. I will draw the very last out of this country. I did not come to spread bliss. I have come to help the Führer. The population must work, work, and work again . . . for some people are getting excited that the population may not get enough to eat. The population cannot demand that. One has only to remember what our heroes were deprived of in Stalingrad .... We definitely did not come here to give out manna. We have come here to create the basis for victory.

3. We are a master race, which must remember that the lowliest German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the population here.

March 10, 1943: When German field commanders on the Eastern Front attempt to resist or restrain Sauckel's demands (because forced recruitment is swelling the ranks of the partisans and making the Army's task more difficult) Sauckel sends this telegram to Hitler (407(II)-PS, USA-226):

Therefore, my Führer, I ask you to abolish all orders which oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor and kindly to report to me whether my conception of the mission presented here is all right. ...

If the obligation for labor and the forced recruiting of workers in the East is not possible any more, then the German war industries and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the full extent. ...

I myself have the opinion that our Army leaders should not give credence, under any circumstances, to the atrocity and defamatory propaganda campaign of the partisans. The generals themselves are greatly interested that the support for the troops is made possible in time. I should like to point out that hundreds of thousands of excellent workers going into the field as soldiers now cannot possibly be replaced by German women not used to work, even if they are trying to do their best. Therefore, I have to use the people of the Eastern Territories. I myself report to you that the workers belonging to all foreign nations are treated humanely, and correctly, and cleanly; are fed and housed well and are even clothed. On the basis of my own services with foreign nations I go as far as to state that never before in the world were foreign workers treated as correctly as they are now, in the hardest of all wars, by the German people.

March 11, 1943: From the record of a telephone conversation of the Chief of the Economic Staff East of the German Army (3012(1)-PS, USA-190):

The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, points out to me in an urgent teletype that the allocation of labor in German agriculture, as well as all the most urgent armament programs ordered by the Führer, make the most rapid procurement of approximately 1 million women and men from the newly occupied Eastern Territories within the next 4 months an imperative necessity. For this purpose, Gauleiter Sauckel demands the shipment of 5,000 workers daily beginning 15 March; 10,000 workers, male and female, beginning 1 April, from the newly occupied Eastern Territories ...

In consideration of the extraordinary losses of workers which occurred in German war industry because of the developments of the past months, it is now necessary that the recruiting of workers be taken up again everywhere with all vigor. The tendency momentarily noticeable in that territory, to limit and/or entirely stop the Reich recruiting program, is absolutely not bearable in view of this state of affairs. Gauleiter Sauckel, who is informed about these events, because of this applied directly to General Field Marshal Keitel on 10 March 1943, in a teletype, and emphasized on this occasion that, as in all other occupied territories, where all other methods fail a certain pressure must be used, by order of the Führer.

March 17, 1943: Sauckel to Rosenberg (019-PS, USA-181):

After a protracted illness, my deputy for labor allocation in the Occupied Eastern Territories, State Councilor Peuckert, is going there to regulate the allocation of labor both for Germany and the territories themselves. I ask you sincerely, dear Party Member Rosenberg, to assist him to your utmost on account of the pressing urgency of Peuckert's mission. I may thank you already at this moment for the good reception accorded to Peuckert up to this time. He himself has been charged by me to co-operate fully and unreservedly with all bureaus of the Eastern Territories. Especially the labor allocation for German agriculture and likewise the most urgent armament production programs ordered by the Führer, make the fastest importation of approximately 1 million men and women from the Eastern Territories within the next 4 months, a necessity.

Starting 15 March the daily shipment must reach 5,000 female or male workers, while from the beginning of April this number has to be stepped up to 10,000, if the most urgent programs and the spring tillage and other agricultural tasks are not to suffer to the detriment of the food and of the Armed Forces. I have provided for the allotment of the draft quotas for the individual territories, in agreement with your experts for labor supply, as follows: Daily quota starting 15 March 1943: From General Kommissariat, White Ruthenia—people: Economic Inspection, Center—500 people; Reichskommissariat, Ukraine—3,000 people; Economic Inspection, South—1,000 people; total—5,000 people. Starting 1 April 1943, the daily quota is to be doubled corresponding to the doubling of the entire quota. I hope to visit personally the Eastern Territories towards the end of the month, and ask you once more for your kind support.

From a pre-trial interrogation of Rosenberg (USA-187):

Q: Isn't it a fact that Sauckel would allocate to the various areas under your jurisdiction the number of persons to be obtained for labor purposes?

A: Yes.

Q: And that thereafter your agents would obtain that labor in order to meet the quota which had been given. Is that right?

A: Sauckel, normally, had very far-reaching desires, which one could not fulfill unless one looked very closely into the matter.

Q: Never mind about Sauckel's desires being far-reaching or not being far-reaching. That has nothing to do with it. You were given quotas for the areas over which you had jurisdiction, and it was up to you to meet that quota?

A.: Yes. It was the responsibility of the administrative officials to receive this quota and to distribute the allotments over the districts in such a way, according to number and according to the age groups, that they would be most reasonably met.

Q: These administrative officials were part of your organization, isn't that right?

A: They were functionaries or officials of the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine; but, as such, they were placed in their office by the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories.

Q: You recognized, did you not, that the quotas set by Sauckel could not be filled by voluntary labor; and you did not disapprove of the impressment of forced labor. Isn't that right?

A: I regretted that the demands of Sauckel were so urgent that they could not be met by a continuation of voluntary recruitments, and thus I submitted to the necessity of forced impressment.

Q: The letters that we have already seen between you and Sauckel do not indicate, do they, any disagreement on your part with the principle of recruiting workers against their will? They indicate, as I remember, that you were opposed to the treatment that was later accorded these workers, but you did not oppose their initial impressment.

A: That is right. In those matters I mostly discussed the possibility of finding the least harsh methods of handling the matter, whereas in no way did I place myself in opposition to the orders that he was carrying out for the Führer.

Q: Did you ever argue with Sauckel that perhaps in view of the fact that the quotas could not be met by voluntary labor, the labor recruiting program be abandoned, except for what recruits could be voluntarily enrolled?

A: I could not do that because the numbers or allotments that Sauckel had received from the Three to meet were absolutely binding for him, and I couldn't do anything about that.

From Funk's IMT testimony: I was called into the Central Planning Board in the fall of 1943, when I turned over all production matters to Speer and when, for the first time, on 22 November 1943 I attended a session of the Board. At that time I not only had no interest in having foreign workers brought to Germany but actually, from the economic aspect, I wanted to have the workers remain abroad, for the production of consumer goods had, to a large extent, been shifted from Germany to the occupied countries so that in other words this production, that is, French production or Belgian production, could work unhindered for the German populace; I did not want the workers taken away, and particularly I did not want them to be taken away by force, for in that way the entire order and the whole social life would be disturbed. Before that time, as Minister of Economics, I was naturally interested in seeing that the German economy had workers. However, these questions were not dealt with in the Ministry of Economics, but either in the Four-Year Plan, where a Plenipotentiary General for Labor had been active from the beginning . . . .

As far as the negotiations of the Central Planning Board were concerned, I was essentially interested only in the fact that in that meeting the necessary raw materials were allocated for the administration of consumer goods and the export trade. For that reason Ohlendorf and two other experts for the administration of consumer goods and the export trade were sent to the meeting. Ohlendorf was brought into my Ministry by State Secretary Hayler. Before that I had only known Ohlendorf vaguely from one or two meetings and I had had an extraordinarily favorable impression of him, for he had an extremely lucid mind and could always express his thoughts in a most impressive way. Before that time I didn't even know that Ohlendorf had another position in the Reich Security Main Office, for he was introduced to me as a manager of the Main Organization for German Trade. Hayler was the chief of this organization, of the Reichsgruppe Handel, and Ohlendorf was his manager and was introduced to me as such. Therefore I had no objections to Ohlendorf being brought into the ministry and taking over that field which corresponded to his private business activities up to now—the province of administration of consumer goods.

Then through Hayler he discovered that Ohlendorf was active also in the RSHA—or whatever the name is—as an office chief in the SD. However, I took no exception to this activity, for I was not fully acquainted with these assignments and in any case I was not convinced that anything was taking place which was unacceptable for the Ministry. Ohlendorf was active chiefly as manager of the Reichsgruppe Handel. As far as I know, he only had an auxiliary occupation in the RSHA, or however it was called. Naturally I was very much affected and painfully surprised when I heard here about assignments which Ohlendorf with his Einsatzstab had had in previous years in Russia. I had never heard one word about this activity of Ohlendorf. He himself never mentioned these things to me and until this time I did not know the type of assignments such Einsatzstabe had.

Ohlendorf never talked about his activity in the SD. Hayler, who knew him much better and more intimately than I did, is better qualified to give information. In any event I knew nothing of this activity of Ohlendorf, which after all he had carried on in years prior to this date, and I was very much affected to find that this man had done such things.

March 19, 1943: From a secret SS order (3012-PS, USA-l90):

The activity of the labor offices, that is, of recruiting commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible. It mill not be possible always to refrain from using force. During a conference with the chief of the labor avocation staffs, it was agreed that whatever prisoners could be released should be put at the disposal of the commissioner of the labor office. When searching villages or when it becomes necessary to burn down villages, the whole population will be put at the disposal of the commissioner by force. ...

As a rule, no more children will be shot.

March 26, 1943: From a letter from Sauckel to the chiefs of the regional labor offices (L-156, RF-1522):

In agreement with me and the Reich Minister for Armaments. and Munitions, the Reichsführer SS, for reasons of state security, removed from their place of work at the end of February such Jews as were not living in camps and who were working as free workers. They have been formed into working units or assembled for deportation. In order not to endanger the efficacy of this measure, I have avoided issuing any notification beforehand, and I have notified only those regional labor offices in whose districts free Jewish manpower was employed in large numbers.

So as to have a general view of the effect of those measures on the manpower position, I ask you to let me have, as from 31 March 1943, returns showing how many Jews were removed from their work, and how many it has been found necessary to replace by other workers. When giving the numbers of the factories and of the Jews employed by them, one should take into account the situation which existed before the evacuation. The enclosed form should be used for making reports, et cetera.

From Sauckel’s pre-trial interrogation (RF-1521): I never had anything to do with it. I had nothing to do with the question of the eviction of Jews from industry. I had no influence in this matter. It was an enigma to me.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I did not say the eviction of the Jews from industry was a secret to me; I said that, to the best of my recollection, I had nothing to do with it. Here again I must state emphatically that this letter was never put before me. It has no signature, and here again it comes from a subdivision in the Reich Ministry of Labor at 96 Saarlandstrasse. Some official dealt with it there. I myself have absolutely no recollection of having ever had knowledge of this letter, I did not write it, it does not come from my office, it has been written "by order," and the signature is not mine. I merely want to say that the letterhead belongs to some office, but I have never known anything about the letter. This is the first time in my life that I have seen it, and I myself did not have it written. I can say that under oath. I told my counsel yesterday that my department, of course, had to furnish replacements if workers were taken away from a concern, either by being called up for service or for some other measure. I did not always know the details. Such a request could not come from my department. The evacuation of Jews was entirely the responsibility of the Reichsführer SS. I had only troubles because of such measures, as it was very difficult to replace workers. I had no interest in it. I had nothing to do with it. It was not my task.

April 12, 1943: At a meeting at the Berghof, the Goebbels/Speer/Göring 'conspiracy' confronts Bormann's man Sauckel in an attempt to further their plan for a Council of Ministers.

From Speer's Spandau Draft: Göring showed his true colors at once. Instead of calling Sauckel to task as he had promised, he immediately launched a violent attack against his own Secretary of State, Field Marshall Milch, who by prior arrangement was the one who raised our objection to Sauckel's labor-bookkeeping. How could Milch accuse that good party comrade Sauckel, who worked so hard for the Führer, of wrongdoing, Göring thundered. Ironically, it was he who only two days earlier had proposed the strategy of spearheading our general attack with an objection to Sauckel's fantasy-figure reports to Hitler.

And Himmler immediately joined the stifling of our initiative. "Isn't the most likely explanation for the million missing bodies that they are dead?" he asked equably. It was only when I learned in Nuremberg of the numbers of dead in the concentration camps that I understood what he meant.

From Inside The Third Reich, by Albert Speer: For a considerable time the numbers of workers whom Sauckel claimed to have sent into industry, statistics which he reported to Hitler, had ceased to correspond with the actual figures. The difference amounted to several hundred thousand. I proposed to our coalition that we join forces in compelling Sauckel, Bormann's outpost in our territory, as it were, to report truthful data.

At Hitler's request a large building in the rustic Bavarian style had been erected near Berchtesgaden to house the Berlin Chancellery secretariat. Whenever Hitler stayed at Obersalzberg for months at a time, Lammers and his immediate staff conducted the business of the Chancellery there. Göring arranged for Lammers as the host to invite our group, as well as Sauckel and Milch, to meet in the conference room of this building on April 12, 1943. Before the meeting Milch and I once more reminded Göring of what we wanted. He rubbed his hands: "That will soon be taken care of!"

We were surprised to find that Himmler, Bormann, and Keitel were also in the conference room. And to make matters worse, our ally Goebbels sent his apologies: On the way to Berchtesgaden he had suffered an attack of kidney colic and was lying ill in his special car. To this day I don't know whether this was true or whether he merely had an instinct for what was going to happen.

That session marked the end of our alliance. Sauckel simply challenged our demand for an additional two million, one hundred thousand workers for the entire economy, insisted that he had delivered the needed forces, and became furious when I charged that his figures could not be accurate. (Later we learned from General Roesch, our armaments inspector for Upper Bavaria, that Sauckel had directed his employment bureaus to list every worker who was assigned to a factory as placed, even if the worker turned out to be unqualified for the particular job and was sent back to the bureau. The factories, on the other hand, listed only those workers who were actually hired.)

Milch and I expected that Göring would ask Sauckel for explanations and make him change his labor-assignment policy. Instead, to our horror Göring began with a violent attack upon Milch, and thus indirectly upon me. It was outrageous that Milch was making so many difficulties, he said. Our good party comrade Sauckel who was exerting himself to the utmost and had achieved such successes. . . . He at any rate felt a great debt of gratitude toward him. Milch was simply blind to Sauckel's achievements.

It was as though Göring had picked out the wrong phonograph record. In the ensuing prolonged discussion on the missing workers, each of the ministers present offered explanations, on entirely theoretical grounds, of the difference between the real and the official figures. Himmler commented with the greatest calm that perhaps the missing hundreds of thousands had died.

The conference proved a total failure. No light was thrown on the question of the missing labor force, and in addition our grand assault on Bormann had come to grief.

After this meeting Göring took me aside. "I know you like to work closely with my state secretary, Milch," he said. "In all friendship I'd like to warn you against him. He's unreliable; as soon as his own interests are in question, he'll trample over even his best friends." I immediately passed this remark on to Milch. He laughed. "A few days ago Göring told me exactly the same thing about you." This attempt on Göring's part to sow distrust was the very opposite of what we had agreed on: that we would form a bloc. The sad fact was that our circles were so infected by suspicion that friendship was felt to be a threat.

A few days after this affair Milch commented that Göring had switched sides because the Gestapo had proof of his drug addiction. Quite some time before Milch had suggested to me that I look closely at Göring's pupils. At the Nuremberg Trial my attorney, Dr. Flachsner, told me that Göring had been an addict long before 1933. Flachsner had acted as his lawyer once when he was sued for improperly administering a morphine injection.

Our attempt to mobilize Göring against Bormann was probably doomed to failure from the start for financial reasons as well. For as was later revealed by a Nuremberg document, Bormann had made Göring a gift of six million marks from the industrialists' Adolf Hitler Fund.

From Göring: The Iron Man, by R. J. Overy: Göring's abrupt change of support was understandable. He always hesitated to oppose the SS openly. While intriguing with Goebbels and Speer, Göring was simultaneously trying to improve his relations with Himmler. Göring was contemptuous of Lammers and Keitel—'nothing but the Führer's secretaries'—but he was much more cautious with Himmler and Bormann, who Göring did not yet regard as a proven political enemy.

Because Sauckel was Himmler's ally, and enjoyed the strong support of Hitler, Göring was loth to tilt at him too obviously. Milch, less charitably, attributed his change of heart to the fact that the Gestapo had firm evidence of drug addiction and that Göring feared the consequences of its exposure. This is an unlikely explanation. Hitler, Himmler and Goebbels, while highly critical of Göring's political behavior, were agreed that his authority had to be maintained. Though there was talk in April and May of a crisis over Göring's political position, the SS could not have involved him in a drugs scandal as long as Hitler believed for his own reasons that Göring was 'indispensable to the supreme leadership of the Reich'.

A more obvious explanation was Göring's distrust of the leading conspirators, since most of them had been involved recently in the process of reducing his political power. Milch had suggested to Hitler some four weeks before that Göring be relieved of his command of the Luftwaffe and had said as much openly to Göring. Goebbels and Ley hoped to use the episode to improve their own political standing by exploiting Göring's remaining political authority for their own ends. He was too adept a politician not to recognize this. During 1943 he drew closer to Himmler and the SS appointees in the economy in order to revive his fortunes by association, judging, perhaps righty, that this was a surer way of rehabilitating himself with Hitler. (Overy, P. 221, 222)

Albert Speer, from a later interview with Gitta Sereny: And much later, in Spandau, Funk said that I had been mad ever to trust Goebbels. 'He was never honest with you,' he said. 'How so?' I asked him. 'Because he was not an honest man,' he replied. 'But who was, in those times? I, after all, went along with it too.' Well, I suppose he was right. The very next day, Goebbels, miraculously recovered, let Bormann know that from then on he would use him as the conduit for his communications with Hitler and would be grateful if, on the other hand, Bormann would see to it that his requests got prompt and favorable attention. ...

Himmler, running into me at Führer HQ a few weeks later, threatened me for the first time. 'I advise you never to try again to recruit the Reichsmarshal [Göring] for your goals.' I wasn't intending to, but still, that was when Himmler began to alarm me personally—the first time I suddenly found him sinister. (Sereny p. 376)

April 14-15, 1943: From a letter written by Sauckel reporting to Hitler on his accomplishments in his first year as Labor Czar (407(VI)-PS, USA-209):

After 1 year's activity as Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers were given to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31 March of this year....

The 3,638,056 are distributed amongst the following branches of the German war economy: Armament, 1,568,801 ...

April 17, 1943: From a memo written by Dr. Lammers, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery (2220-PS, USA-175):

As things were, the recruiting of manpower had to be accomplished by means Of more or less forceful methods, such as the instances when certain groups appointed by the labor offices caught church and movie-goers indiscriminately and transported them into the Reich. That such methods only undermine the people's willingness to work and the people's confidence to such a degree that it cannot be checked even with terror, is just as clear as the consequences brought about by a strengthening of the political resistance movement.

April 20, 1943: From a telegram from Sauckel to Hitler (566-PS):

I shall devote my entire strength with fanatical determination to the accomplishment of my task, and to justify your confidence.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I saw in Hitler, whom at that time I revered, a man who was the leader of the German people, who had been chosen by the German people; and I, as a German citizen and a member of a German government department, considered it my duty to justify by my work in my own sphere the confidence placed in me by the head of the State. I was unable to see a criminal in Hitler at that time, and I never felt he was one; but I did feel obliged to do my duty, nothing else. As a human being and as the result of my upbringing I would never have supported crime.

April 22, 1943: From notes of remarks made by Speer at a meeting of the Central Planning Board (R-124):

There is a detailed statement showing in what sectors the Russian prisoners of war have been distributed. This statement is quite interesting. It shows that the armaments industry received only 30 percent. I constantly complained about this. ... The 90,000 Russian prisoners of war employed in the whole of the armament industry are for the greatest part skilled men.

April 24, 1943: Goebbels’ Diary:

Speer came in late in the afternoon. He remained until the evening, which gave me a chance to discuss the general situation fully with him. He has had a long talk with Göring, and what he reported to me about it was all to the good. Göring has so far adhered to our line and intends to do so in future. Speer, however, also reported that he still gives the impression of a rather tired man.

Speer told me about a so-called manifesto that Sauckel addressed to his organization within the Reich and the occupied areas. [This document appears to have been a more or less typical combination of bombast and special pleading concerning the GBA's achievements and failure to meet all demands put upon it.] . . . This manifesto is written in a pompous, terribly overladen, baroque style. Sauckel is suffering from paranoia. When he signs off with the words "Written on the Führer's birthday in an aeroplane over Russia," it smells . . . It is high time that his wings were clipped. (Clark, p. 320)

April 1943: Sauckel travels to Rovno, Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporoahe, Simferopol, Minsk, and Riga in order to accelerate the deportation of manpower to Germany from the occupied territories

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I went to these towns to see for myself whether the methods were correct or not, and to discuss them with the departments. That is true, for it was not necessary for me to visit Kharkov, Kiev, or any other town to discuss my task in terms of figures. For that I would only have to talk to the reporter for the East, whose office was in Berlin, or with the Reich Commissioner, whom I did not contact as he was sometimes in Rovno. Every department, anywhere in every country of the world, it is a matter of course that administrative orders should be checked. One does not need to know that mistakes are made in human life and in every human organization; a control must be exercised all the same.

I undertook these journeys in order to satisfy myself, within the scope of my duties, how this task was being carried out, and to stop defects which were reported to me, as for instance—as I once told my defense counsel during my interrogation—I had also been asked to do so by Field Marshal Kluge. But I also wanted to look into matters carefully and myself give appropriate admonitions and instructions to the departments. My best evidence of this is the manifesto produced during this journey.

May 3, 1943: From a letter from the Reich Commissar for the Ostland (Lohse) to the Commissioner General in Riga (2280-PS, USA-183):

Following the basic statements of the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, on the occasion of his visit to Riga on the 21st of April 1943, it was decided, in view of the critical situation and in disregard of all adverse considerations, that a total of 183,000 workers would have to be supplied from the Ostland to the Reich territory. This task absolutely must be accomplished within the next 4 months and at the latest must be completed by the end of August.

May 17, 1943: Sauckel to Hitler (407(VIII)-PS, USA-210):

In addition to the labor allotted to the total German economy by the Arbeitseinsatz since I took office, the Organization Todt was supplied with new labor continually. ... Thus the Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make possible the completion of the Atlantic Wall.

From Speer's IMT testimony: Beginning with the middle of 1943, I was at odds with Sauckel over questions of production and about the insufficient availability of reserves of German labor. But that has nothing to do with my fundamental attitude toward Sauckel's work . . . .

Those workers [the 50,000 skilled workers] had been working on the Atlantic Wall. From there they were transferred to the Ruhr to repair the two dams which had been destroyed by an air attack. I must say that the transfer of these 50,000 workers took place without my knowledge, and the consequences of bringing 50,000 workers from the West into Germany amounted to a catastrophe for us on the Atlantic Wall. It meant that more than one-third of all the workers engaged on the Atlantic Wall left because they, too, were afraid they might have to go to Germany. That is why we rescinded the order as quickly as possible, so that the French workers on the Atlantic Wall should have confidence in us. This fact will show you that the French workers we had working for the Organization Todt were not employed on a coercive basis, otherwise they could not have left in such numbers when they realized that under certain circumstances they, too, might be taken to Germany. So these measures taken with the 50,000 workers from the Organization Todt in France were only temporary and were revised later. It was one of those mistakes which can happen if a minister gives a harsh directive and his subordinates begin to carry it out by every means in their disposal . . . .

I do not deny that a large number of the people working for the Organization Todt in the West had been called up and came to their work because they had been called up, but we had no means whatsoever of keeping them there by force. That is what I wanted to say. So if they did not want to work, they could leave again; and then they either joined the resistance movement or went into hiding somewhere else.

May 17, 1943 Operation Chastise: Using a specially developed bouncing bomb, Royal Air Force Squadron No. 617 (subsequently known as the Dambusters) attack the Moehne and Eder dams in Germany's Ruhr valley. A catastrophic flooding of the Ruhr valley results. 53 of the 133 aircrew who participate in the attack are killed in action and three bail out to be made prisoners of war. This represents a casualty rate of almost 40%. (Davies)

From Speer's US SBS interview: In the case of the Moehne, it was the water supply of the Ruhr that was principally concerned. The attacks—which were also directed against the Sorpo and another small dam—indicated an intention to flood the Ruhr valley and destroy the summertime drinking water supplies of that area. The plan was excellent and might well have been expected to paralyze the Ruhr area. That it did not succeed was due only to the fact that the Moehne valley basin emptied and we were able to pump water from the other side of the Rhine at that time. The English probably did not know that as yet. The flooding filled the pumping stations in the power plants with mud, several units were soaked and had to be dried; this took weeks, but constituted no special loss for the industry. The Edor dam and the power plant below it is of no special importance as a source of power, but serves to regulate the water level of the Wesor for ship traffic. The attack was of little importance to us, and we did not understand what reasons lay behind it. Other than these two we never experienced attacks on power generating plants. (SBS)

From Speer's IMT testimony: After the attack on the Moehne Dam and the Eder Dam in April and May 1943, I went there and in that period I ordered that a special group from the Organization Todt should take over the restoration of these plants. I did this because I also wanted the machinery and the technical staff on the spot. This special group right away without asking me brought the French workers along. This had tremendous repercussions for us in the West because the workers on the building sites on the Atlantic Wall, who had up to that time felt safe from Sauckel's reach.

1943: Sauckel writes the Foreword for the Nazi book 'Europe at Work in Germany: Sauckel Mobilizes the Labor Reserves':

The party, the German Labor Front, the state and the economy have worked together as National Socialists to create labor conditions that have never before in history been matched in their cleanliness, correctness, care, and justice. I know this better than anyone, because during the World War I was a prisoner of war myself. The correct and exemplary treatment explains the good results even of those workers from former Soviet territories, who for decades heard only hate-filled propaganda about National Socialist Germany. The fact that millions of citizens of enemy states are now working satisfactorily in Germany is the sharpest criticism of the criminal conduct of the so-called statesman who drove these people to war against the German people. These foreign workers now repair some of the damage that their irresponsible leaders caused for Europe's peoples. These foreign workers are proof that their peoples were victims of the lies of the worst, base, and corrupt criminals of Jewish plutocracy and Bolshevist hangmen. Now they have seen the true Germany with their own eyes and experienced social and medical services that no one even dreams of in Soviet Russia. They have seen how developed Germany is in all areas, and have found a culture so advanced that they are not only astonished, but also realize how misled they were.

June 17, 1943: From a secret report of a conference between the Commissioner General of Zhitomir and Rosenberg in the community of Vinnitza:

The symptoms created by the recruiting of workers are, no doubt, well known to the Reich Minister through reports and his own observations. Therefore I shall not repeat them. It is certain that a recruitment of labor in the true sense of the word can hardly be spoken of. In most cases it is nowadays a matter of actual conscription by force. ...

But as the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor (Sauckel) explained to us the gravity of the situation, we had an alternative. I consequently have authorized the commissioners of the areas to apply the severest measures in order to achieve the imposed quota. That a lowering of morale is coupled with this needs no further proof. It is nevertheless essential to win the war on this front too. The problem of labor mobilization cannot be handled with gloves.

June 21, 1943: Goebbels—after weeks of consultations with Funk, Speer, Ley, Sauckel, and others on his Total War conception—meets with his Führer. Detailing "all the considerations against unfounded optimism, not to say illusionism", Goebbels does his best to sway a reluctant Hitler, but again falls short of the needed approval. (Reuth, p. 327, 328)

June 22, 1943: A massive Soviet Summer Offensive commences. (Reuth, p. 328)

June 27, 1943: Sauckel to Hitler:

My Führer: Herewith I beg to report my return from my official trip to France. Inasmuch as the free labor reserves in the territories occupied by the German Armed Forces have been, numerically, absorbed to saturation point, I am now carefully examining the possibilities of mobilizing additional labor reserves in the Reich and the occupied territories to work on German war production. In my reports of 20 April I was allowed to point out that intensive and careful utilization must be made of European labor forces in territories submitted to direct German influence. It was the purpose of my recent stay in Paris to investigate the possibilities still existing in France for the recruitment of labor by extensive conferences and my own personal inspection. On the basis of a carefully established balance sheet I have come to the following decision:

1. Assuming that war economy measures are carried out in France which would at least prove partially effective or approximately approach, in efficacy, the measures carried out in Germany, a further million workers, both men and women, could be assigned to the French war and armament industries up to December 1943 for work on German orders and assignments. In this case additional German orders might be placed in France.

2. In consideration of these measures and given a careful study of the subject together with the co-operation of our German armament services and the German labor recruiting offices, it should be possible to transfer a further 500,000 workers, both men and women, from France to the Reich between now and the end of the year.

The prerequisites for the realization of this program, drafted by me are as follows:

1. Closest collaboration between all German offices especially in dealing with the French services.

2. A constant check on French economy by joint commissions, as already agreed upon by the Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production Party Member Speer, and myself.

3. Constant, skillful, and successful propaganda against the cliques of De Gaulle and Giraud.

4. The guarantee of adequate food supplies to the French population working for Germany.

5. An emphatic insistence on this urgency before the French Government, in particular before Marshal Petain, who still represents the main obstacle to the further recruiting of French women for compulsory labor.

6. A pronounced increase in the program which I have already introduced in France, for retraining workers to trades essential to war production. ...

I therefore beg you, my Führer to approve my suggestion of making available I million French men and women for German war production in France proper in the second half of 1943 and, in addition, of transferring 500,000 French men and women to the Reich before the end of the current year. Yours faithfully and obediently, Fritz Sauckel.

From Speer's IMT testimony: But here again I must add something. This report is dated June 1943. In October 1943 the whole of the Organization Todt was given the status of a "blocked factory" and thereby received the advantages which other blocked factories had. I explained that sufficiently yesterday. Because of this, the Organization Todt had large offers of workers who went there voluntarily, unless, of course, you see direct coercion in the pressure put on them through the danger of their transfer to Germany, and which led them to the Organization Todt or the blocked factories. That [the workers were kept in labor camps] is the custom in the case of such building work. The building sites were far away from any villages, and so workers' camps were set up to accommodate the German and foreign workers. But some of them were also accommodated in villages, as far as it was possible to accommodate them there. I do not think that on principle they were only meant to be accommodated in camps, but I cannot tell you that for certain.

June 28, 1943: From a report from the chief of Main Office III with the High Command in Minsk (3000-PS, USA-192):

Thus recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, had disastrous effects, for the recruitment measures in the last months and weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an irreparable political and economic effect.... From... White Ruthenia approximately 50,000 people have been obtained for the Reich so far. Another 130,000 are to be taken. Considering the 2,400,000 total population. . . the fulfillment of these quotas is impossible.... Owing to the sweeping drives of the SS and police in November 1942, about 115,000 hectares of farmland. . . are not used, as the population is not there and the villages have been razed...

June 1943: Sauckel visits Prague, Kiev, Krakow, Zaporoahe, and Melitopolto accelerate the deportation of manpower to Germany from the occupied territories.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: During those journeys I personally satisfied myself that my departments were working properly. That was the object of my journey. I visited these areas to satisfy myself personally as to how my offices in these cities-I should not say "my," but the labor offices of the local administrations-were working; whether they were conscientiously carrying out their obligations towards the workers; whether they were attending to medical examinations, card indexing, et cetera, according to my instructions. That is why I went to those towns. I negotiated with the chiefs in the matter of quotas, that is quite true, since it was my task to recruit workers and to check the quotas, but during my visits to these cities I inspected the offices personally to satisfy myself that they were functioning properly. To employ the best possible methods for the purpose in view. That is indisputably stated in my orders, and the manifesto which has been submitted to the Tribunal was written on this very journey.

July 23, 1943: From the Office Journal of Speer’s ministry: The minister proposed to improve the situation by designating protected factories. These would be guaranteed against levying of workers and would thus be made more attractive to French labor.

From Inside The Third Reich, by Albert Speer: France was the most important of the occupied industrial countries. Until the spring of 1943, however, its industrial production scarcely helped us. Sauckel's forcible recruiting of labor had done more damage there than its results warranted. For in order to escape forced labor, the French workers fled their factories, quite a few of which were producing for our armaments needs. In May 1943, I remonstrated to Sauckel about this. That July at a conference in Paris I proposed that at least the factories in France that were working for us be immune from Sauckel's levies.

My associates and I intended to have the factories in France particularly, but also in Belgium and Holland, produce large quantities of goods for the German civilian population, such as clothing, shoes, textiles, and furniture, in order to free similar factories in Germany for armaments.

August 13, 1943: Sauckel writes to Hitler (PS-556, RF-67):

My Führer, I take the liberty of informing you of my return from France, Belgium, and Holland, where I went on official business. After difficult and lengthy negotiations, I have imposed upon the occupied territories of the West, for the 5 last months of the year 1943, the program which is indicated below; and I have also prepared detailed measures for its implementation—in France through the military commander, the German Embassy, the French Government; in Belgium through the military commander; and in Holland through the offices of the Reich Commissioner.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: It was a realization of the Führer's labor program as he, the Führer, had ordered it. I was in Belgium and Holland only for a very short time. I had conferences there with the leading men, and according to my recollection I visited the labor authorities in Antwerp and saw how they functioned-the German ones. I did not draft [detailed measures for the implementation of the labor program] during those journeys; I discussed them there. Of course, I did some work while traveling.

I cannot tell you exactly from memory how many Dutch workers were employed on the basis of contracts with them and on the basis of these laws. Maybe there were 200,000 or 300,000, maybe more. I cannot tell you offhand what these Dutch figures were. Regarding the instructions which I issued, that was discussed adequately and clearly yesterday. My instructions are available practically in their entirety, and discountenance any brutal recruitment which.... From time to time I heard about excesses, and I stopped them at once, and I protested against them when I heard of them. I received protests... I had those cases investigated and left any further measures to the authorities concerned. I did everything on my side to prevent and stop such occurrences, and that can and will be testified to here.

August 17, 1943: From a secret operational order of the Army Group South (3010-PS):

The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, in Decree Az. VI A 5780.28, a copy of white is enclosed (Enclosure 1), has ordered the mustering and calling-up of two complete age classes for the whole newly occupied Eastern Territory. The Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions has approved this order.

According to this order by the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor (GBA) you have to recruit and to transport to the Reich immediately all labor forces in your territory born during 1926 and 1927. The decree of 6 February 1943 relative to labor duty and labor employment in the theater of operations of the newly occupied Eastern Territory and the executive orders issued on this subject are the authority for the execution of this measure. Enlistment must be completed by 30 September 43 at the latest.

August 20, 1943: Heinrich Himmler receives a further appointment, that of Minister of the Interior of the Reich. (Speer)

August 22, 1943: Alarmed at the destruction of the rocket facilities at Peenemuende, Speer and Himmler confer at Rastenburg with their Führer. Heinrich Himmler offers to use concentration camp workers for A-4 production, and Hitler takes him up on it, ordering that some prisoners from Buchenwald be shifted to Nordhausen. Speer’s ministry will pay all the bills. Himmler places SS Brigadeführer Hans Kammler, a ruthless Nazi of the worst sort, in change of what will become known as Camp Dora. Note: 60,000 prisoners will be funneled into the camp, half will perish. (Sereny, Sellier, Cornwell, Piszkiewicz)

August 24, 1943: From a Sauckel speech to to the presidents of the Gau labor offices:

We are not concerned with material things but, and I would emphasize this again very definitely, with human beings, with many millions of human beings, every single one of whom—whether we want it or not—makes his criticism from his own point of view, be he a German or a foreign worker. On the other hand, the output of the individual, be he a Volksgenosse (a German) or not a Volksgenosse (an alien) be he a friend or an enemy of Germany, will always depend on whether he admits to himself that he is being treated justly, or whether he comes to the conclusion that he has been exposed to injustice. Be just! There are many questions which you cannot always answer by merely studying my instructions, or the Gesetzblatt, or the Reichsarbeitsblatt. The worker's life is so rich that it cannot be comprised even in many thick volumes. But every human breast harbors a feeling which says to him, “Have you been treated with kindness and justice.”

August 30, 1943: From a speech by Sauckel in Paris to the Allocation of Labor staffs, which was setting up in France (RF-1517):

The most severe measures for recruiting labor—police action or the use of handcuffs—must be applied by us in the most unobtrusive manner.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I hear now for the first time that I am supposed to have sent, or had workers sent to their places of work handcuffed. I do not remember that. In any case, I never decreed anything like that; that much I can say.

It can only be a statement regarding cases of flagrant resistance to the authority of the state or to the execution of some administrative action. Experience shows us that this has been found necessary the whole world over. I merely said that everything should be done in an orderly and correct way. I did not call that a rule to be applied for the recruitment of labor. It cannot be understood in any other way. But it must be interpreted as being applied only if there were flagrant resistance to an executive authority; otherwise it was never intended.

September 8, 1943: Italy surrenders to the Allies.

September 10, 1943: German forces occupy Rome.

September 17, 1943: Speer meets with Vichy France’s Minister of Industrial Production, Jean Bichelonne. He succeeds in having the entire French industrial sector declared Sperrbetrieben (blocked factories), thus denying them to his rival, Sauckel.

From Inside The Third Reich, by Albert Speer: As soon as I was charged with all of German production at the beginning of September, I invited the French Minister of Production to Berlin. Minister Bichelonne, a professor at the Sorbonne, was reputed to be a capable and energetic man. After some bickering with the Foreign Office, I ensured that Bichelonne would be treated as a state visitor. To win that point I had to appeal to Hitler, explaining to him that Bichelonne was not going to "come up the back stairs" to see me. As a result, the French Production Minister was quartered in the Berlin government guest house. Five days before Bichelonne arrived I cleared the idea with Hitler that we would set up a production planning council on a pan-European basis, with France as an equal partner along with the other nations. The assumption was, of course, that Germany would retain the decisive voice in this planning.

On September 17, 1943, I received Bichelonne, and before very long a distinctly personal relationship sprang up between us. We were both young, we believed the future was on our side, and both of us therefore promised ourselves that someday we would avoid the mistakes of the First World War generation that was presently governing. I was even prepared to prevent what Hitler had in mind in the way of carving up France, all the more so since in a Europe integrated economically it did not matter where the frontiers ran. Such were the Utopian thoughts in which Bichelonne and I lost ourselves for a while at that time—a token of the world of illusions and dreams in which we were moving.

On the last day of the negotiations Bichelonne asked to have a private talk with me. At the instigation of Sauckel, he began, Premier Laval had forbidden him to discuss the question of the transportation of workers from France to Germany. Would I nevertheless be willing to deal with the question? I said I would. Bichelonne explained his concern, and I finally asked him whether a measure protecting French industrial plants from deportations would help him. "If that is possible, then all my problems are solved, including those relating to the program we have just agreed on," Bichelonne said with relief. "But then the transfer of labor from France to Germany will virtually cease. I must tell you that in all honesty." I was fully aware of that, but this seemed the only way I could harness French industrial production to our purposes. Both of us had done something unusual. Bichelonne had disobeyed an instruction from Laval, and I had disavowed Sauckel. Both of us, basically without the backing of our superiors, had come to a far-reaching agreement.

September 20, 1943: An agreement is reached between Sauckel and Chief of the German Labor Front, Dr. Ley (USA-227):

The Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, Dr. Ley, in collaboration with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, will establish a 'Central Inspection' for the continuous supervision of an measures concerning the care of the foreign workers mentioned under 1. This will have the designation: Central Inspection for Care of Foreign Workers. ...

The offices for the administration of the Allocation of Labor will be constantly informed by the 'Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers' of its observations, in particular, immediately in each case in which action of state organizations seems to be necessary. ...

The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor to empower the members of his staff and the presidents of the state employment offices to get direct information on the conditions regarding the employment of foreigners in the factories and camps will remain untouched.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I had set up that inspection department, which had not existed before in the Ministry of Labor, because I wanted to ascertain the uniformity and execution of contracts throughout the entire area of the Reich, as well as in the occupied territories where German undertakings and German labor contracts were being carried out; also to examine and control the unified administrative regulations; and, moreover, to see whether my orders concerning food, lodging, treatment, and care were being observed and to what extent they were in need of change. All this was also contained in a directive which I gave to the inspection department.

The Central Inspection Department of the DAF had the task of supervising the welfare of foreign workers in the camps in Germany to see whether they were being fed, and so on, in the prescribed way. An agreement between the Führer, the German Labor Front, Dr. Lye, and myself, was added as a supplement to the decree concerning the formation of the Central Inspection Department, and it stated that where it was a question of conditions in camps the Central Inspection Department had to deal directly with the Reich offices concerned, or with the industrial inspection office in the Reich Labor Ministry, in order to remedy the conditions; whereas cases of shortage or surplus of manpower, et cetera, were to be reported to me.

I consider myself responsible for the directives which I issued regarding the feeding of foreign workers. The actual feeding of these people was not the task and responsibility of the labor authorities. That was the responsibility of the factories, or the camp leaders who had been charged by the factories to look after this.

September 27, 1943: Speer travels to Hitler’s HQ in order to “beat Sauckel to the punch in reporting to Hitler” about his agreement with Jean Bichelonne.

From Inside The Third Reich, by Albert Speer: In this way Sauckel's operations in France virtually came to an end. Instead of the previous monthly quota of fifty thousand, before long only five thousand workers a month were being taken to Germany." A few months later (on March 1, 1944), Sauckel reported angrily: "I hear from my offices in France that everything is finished there. 'We might as well close down,' they tell me. It's the same story in every prefecture: Minister Bichelonne has made an agreement with Minister Speer. Laval has the nerve to say: 'I won't give you any more men for Germany.'" A short while later I proceeded to apply the same principle to Holland, Belgium, and Italy.

October 13, 1943: Pietro Badoglio declares that the Kingdom of Italy is now at war with its former ally, Nazi Germany. Note: Italy has the distinction of being the only nation that ended neither World War on the same side on which it had begun the war.

October 3, 1943: From a letter by Sauckel addressed to Gauleiter Meyer (017-PS):

I do not underestimate the difficulties connected with the execution of the new task, but I am convinced that with the ruthless employment of all means and with the absolute devotion of all concerned, the new quota can be filled by the date fixed.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I wrote that, yes. But I want you to let me give you an explicit explanation: In all my directives I invariably demanded the most considerate treatment for the workers; that has already been proved in the Trial. When I refer here to the ruthless use of all means, I only mean the ruthless use of all technical means and propaganda, because I had been told from different sources that such means were not available there to a sufficient degree. This is an explanation of what led up to this letter.

October 4, 1943: From an infamous speech by Reichsführer SS Himmler to a group of SS Generals at Posen (1919-PS, USA-170):

What happens to the Russians, to the Czechs, does not interest me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of good blood of our type we will take, if necessary, by kidnapping their children and raising them here with us. Whether the other nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only insofar as we need them as slaves for our culture; otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch or not interests me only insofar as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished.

October 1943: Hitler, in reference to Allied bombing, tells Speer, Sauckel, and Milch that Germany will easily survive Allied bombing raids: “If Berlin disappears from the face of the earth that is frightful but not fatal. The German race already existed before Berlin.” (Overy, p. 226)

November 1, 1943 Moscow Declaration:

Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done. The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the government of the Allies.

November 8, 1943: Hitler speaks in Munich:

The battle in the East is the most difficult which the German People have ever had to bear. Our enemy's achievements pale by comparison with what our men are enduring here. Here, too, not only will their ultimate goal, to cause the collapse of the German front, not be achieved, but as always in world history only the final battle will decide the final outcome. This battle will, however, be won by the People which with the greatest innate worth, with the greatest persistence and with the greatest fanaticism take advantage of the decisive moment. Hence what I am demanding of the German soldier is enormous. The task of those at the front is to accomplish the seemingly impossible. The task of those at home is to support and strengthen those at the front line in their struggle to achieve what seems impossible, or what may seem impossible to bear, so that those at the front recognize clearly that the fate of our entire People, of our women and children and of our entire future depends on the mobilization of our total strength to force a decision in our favor; that every sacrifice which we make today is nothing compared to the sacrifices which we would be forced to make if we were not to win the war; that therefore our only thought must be to conduct the war ruthlessly with the unalterable goal of achieving victory, no matter what the situation and where we have to fight...

November 12, 1943: From correspondence originating within the Rosenberg ministry (290-PS, USA-189):

But even if Muller had been present at the burning of houses in connection with the Reich conscription in Bielosersk, this should by no means lead to the removal of Muller from office. It is mentioned specifically in a directive of the Commissioner General in Luck, of 21 September 1942, referring to the extreme urgency of national conscription, that farms of those who refuse to work are to be burned and their relatives are to be arrested as hostages and brought to forced labor camps.

November 20, 1943: Dr. Franz Hayler becomes an official in the Reich Ministry of Economics.

From the IMT testimony of Dr. Franz Hayler: I was an independent business man and merchant and as such first became the head of the "Economic Group Retail Trade" within the organization of industrial economy. In this capacity I had very close contact with the Ministry of Economics. After Minister Funk had been appointed Minister for Economics I reported to him regarding the scope of my work, and on that occasion I made his acquaintance. When I was then put in charge of the "Reich Group Trade," the working relations between the organization directed by me and the Ministry, especially between the then State Secretary Landfried and the Minister himself, became very friendly.

After the separation of the ministries in the autumn of 1943, the main task of the Ministry of Economics was to provide for the German people, that is, the civilian population. As head of the trade organization I was the person responsible for the sale of merchandise, that is, for the procurement of supplies, and during a conference with Minister Funk regarding the co-operation between trade' and the Ministry, Herr Landfried, who was then State Secretary, made the suggestion that Minister Funk call me into his Ministry and make me his deputy. Herr Landfried believed that under the existing conditions he himself was not strong enough to carry out this difficult task since the Ministry had been deprived of its influence on production. Then, when Minister Funk told him in reply to his suggestion that he, Landiried, was the deputy of the Minister, Landiried replied that he could not continue to carry out these tasks and that he asked to be permitted to retire and proposed that I be his successor. About two or three weeks later I was put in charge of the affairs of the State Secretary . . . .

This conference took place in October 1943; my appointment came on 20 November 1943. I became an official with this position of State Secretary on 30 January 1944. I was [Funk's] deputy . . . .

Funk is above all very human, and always has been. Radicalism is quite foreign to his entire character and being. He is more of an artist, a man of very fine artistic feeling and scholarly ideas. I believe one can say that at no time was he a doctrinaire or dogmatic. On the contrary, he was conciliatory and anxious to settle disputes. For this reason, in Party circles in particular, he was considered too soft, too indulgent, in fact he was accused many times of being too weak. He tried to protect domestic economy from political encroachment and from unnecessary severity; and because of his respect and his regard for enterprising endeavor and out of his own responsibility to economy and to the people, he fought against unnecessary intervention in various enterprises even during the war. He protected industry against mergers end closures. This finally led to his being deprived of the responsibility for production in the decisive phase of the war.

I recall from the time of my collaboration with him, when I was still in charge of the trade organization, that Funk on various occasions interceded for men in the industrial world who were in political difficulties. I believe, however, that because of these individual cases, such as his intervention on behalf of Consul General Hollaender or of Herr Pietsch, and because of his attempts to promote peace, he at that time had to expect grave consequences; also because of his intervention in the case of Richard Strauss, as is surely known, and in similar cases. I do not think these individual cases are of such importance as perhaps the following: After the catastrophe of 9 November 1938 the process of Aryanization was to be intensified in the Ministry of Economics; and at that time a few political men were forced upon the Ministry, especially Herr Schmeer. I remember distinctly that at that time Landfried in particular, as well as Funk, slowed down considerably this radicalization of the Ministry; and Funk and the Ministry were blamed for doing so.

After 8 and 9 November I once had a conference regarding the events of that date with Himmler, in which I voiced my complaints. Himmler on that occasion finally reproached both Funk and myself by saying, among other things:

"Finally, you people on the economic side and connected with the economic management are also to blame that things have gone too far. People like Herr Schacht cannot be expected to do anything except go slow ail the time and oppose the will of the Party; but if you and Funk and all you people on the economic side had not slowed things down so much, these excesses would not have happened." I believe two facts must be stated first of all: First, the influence of the Ministry of Economy on the occupied territories was relatively limited. Secondly, during the year in which I was in the Ministry these questions were no longer particularly important.

Generally speaking, the position was as follows: Funk was constantly accused of thinking more of peace than of war. The opinions he proclaimed both in his speeches and in print referred to a European economic policy; and I assume that these talks and publications or articles are before the Court.

Funk looked at the occupied territories from exactly the same point of view. He raised repeated objections to the over-exploitation of the occupied territories and expressed the view that war-time co-operation should form the basis of later co-operation in peace. His view was that confidence and willingness to co-operate should be fostered in the occupied territories during the war. He expressed the view that the black market cannot be combated by the black market and that, since we were responsible for the occupied territories, we must avoid anything likely to disturb the currency and economic system of these territories.

I think I remember that he also discussed the question with the Reich Marshal and defended his own point of view. He also repeatedly opposed unduly heavy occupation expenses, and always favored the reduction of our own expenditure, that is, of German expenditure in the occupied territories. In other words, he regarded the occupied territories in exactly the same way as other European countries; and this attitude is best illustrated by the speech he made in Vienna, I believe, in which he publicly acknowledged as genuine debts the clearing debts, the high totals of which were due mainly to differences in price, that is, inflationary tendencies, in the countries which delivered the goods.

There can be no question of Funk's co-operation in questions regarding the employment of foreign labor at this time, but only within the scope of his responsibility in the Central Planning Board. But it remains to be seen whether the Central Planning Board was at all responsible for the employment of workers or whether the Central Planning Board did nothing more than ascertain the manpower needs of the various production spheres. However, regardless of what the tasks of the Central Planning Board may have been, Funk's position in the Central Planning Board was the following:

Funk, as Minister of Economy, was responsible for the supplies for the civilian population and for export. In the period following the separation of the ministries, no additional foreign worker I believe was employed in the production of supplies for civilians or for export. On the contrary, Funk was constantly confronted with the fact that during that time German and foreign workers were continually being removed from the production of consumer goods and put into armament production. Consequently, I cannot imagine that an accusation of this sort can be made against Funk with reference to this period of time.

On this occasion I should like to emphasize another point which seems important to me. Provisioning the foreign workers was a very serious question. I believe that even Herr Sauckel will corroborate the fact that, when this question came up, Funk was at once ready—even though there—was already a great scarcity of provisions for the German people due to many air raids and destruction’s to release large quantities of supplies and put them at the disposal of the foreign workers. Particularly shoes and clothing; Funk was not the competent authority for food. I have specific knowledge of this. And as a result Funk had considerable difficulty; for the Gauleiter, in view of the great scarcity of goods, did their best to secure supplies for the inhabitants of their own Gau for whom they were responsible, and in so doing used every means which came to hand. Funk constantly had to oppose the arbitrary acts of the Gauleiter, who broke into the supply stores in their Gau and appropriated stocks intended for the general use. I know very well that Funk represented that viewpoint and it is in accordance with his general attitude, for the political disquiet and dissatisfaction which accompany the displacement of such large masses of human beings temporarily uprooted was in opposition to the policy of appeasement and reconstruction which was definitely Funk's goal.

December 24, 1943: FDR delivers a Fireside Chat:

During the last two days in (at) Teheran, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Churchill and I looked ahead—ahead to the days and months and years that (which) will follow Germany's defeat. We were united in determination that Germany must be stripped of her military might and be given no opportunity within the foreseeable future to regain that might. The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people. We wish them to have a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable members of the European family. But we most certainly emphasize that word "respectable"—for we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the Master Race...

December 25, 1943: From a secret order, issued by a rear area military commandant to the district commissar at Kasatin (1702-PS, USA-193):

The able-bodied male population between 15 and 65 years of age and the live stock are to be shipped back from the district east of the line Belilovka-Berditchev-Zhitomir (exclusive of these places).

January 4, 1944: Hitler, in Sauckel’s last labor program, demands 4 million workers. The demand was met by 3 million, 0.9 million of which were foreign workers.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I naturally cannot give you the exact figure here without data or statistics, but on an average I would say that the figure for each group [laborers from the East and West] might be about 30 percent; the percentage of workers from the East was certainly somewhat higher. [The employers of labor] were the Economic Ministry, the Armament Ministry, the Agricultural Ministry, the various trades, the State Railways, the mines, et cetera, all big undertakings. Usually the demand was made simultaneously to the Führer and to me, or to the collecting agencies provided for by the Four Year Plan. The demands were sent in to me, and at the same time they were almost always sent to the Führer, because the Führer had to approve these demands.

The Central Planning Board was an office where above all, as far as I know, the quotas for raw materials were fixed, but where questions of work and manpower were also discussed. The demands which were put to me I had to consider as orders, for the Führer had laid on me the duty of meeting the demands of the war economy. was only called in when there were to be debates on the use of manpower. My office had to meet the demands made by Speer. [Speer had his own machinery for directing labor], he had to have that in his ministry, and he did have it. That was essential.

According to my conviction, yes; for already in 1943—and it was one of the purposes of my manifesto—I pointed out that the economic problems of the occupied countries were very serious and had to be regulated and settled so as to avoid confusion. In Germany after 1943 there were no more really usable reserves of manpower left. Many discussions took place on this problem, but the labor most in demand was skilled labor, miners, and workers for the heavy industries. I must say that from our point of view, and according to our judgment concerning economic and labor questions, there was a great deal of manpower and very extensive reserves in the occupied territories. Perhaps I can show it by a comparison with the first World War. In the first World War, 10 to 12 million Germans were mobilized for labor. In this war about 25 million German men and women were used, and more than half were women. I must add that all the women who did Red Cross or other welfare work Germany were not included in my statistics. They were included in other countries.

I myself and the entire German people were of the opinion, and had to be, that this war was neither willed nor brought about by the German people-and, to be truthful, I must include the Party. Our standpoint was that we had to do our duty to our people. From the point of view of the war situation and of German economy, and as I saw and tried to carry out my allocation of labor, I considered it justified, and, above all, inevitable; for Germany and the countries we occupied were an economic whole that could not be split up. Without such an exchange of eastern and western manpower Germany could not have existed for even 1 day. The German people themselves were working to the extreme limit of their capacity.

From Speer's IMT testimony: The [labor] program was extended to Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. The entire production in these countries was also declared blocked, and the laborers in these blocked industries were given the same protection as in France, even after the meeting with Hitler on 4 January 1944, during which the new program for the West for 1944 was fixed. I adhered to this policy. The result was that during the first half of 1944, 33,000 workers came from France to Germany as compared with 500,000, proposed during that conference; and from other countries, too, only about 10 percent of the proposed workers were taken to Germany.

His [Hitler's] decision was a useless compromise, as was often the case with Hitler. These blocked factories were to be maintained, and for this purpose Sauckel was given the order to obtain 3,500,000 workers from the occupied territories. Hitler gave the strictest instructions through the High Command of the Armed Forces to the military commanders that Sauckel's request should be met by all means. Contrary to the Führer's decision during that meeting, I informed the military commander of the way I wanted it, so that in connection with the expected order from the High Command of the Armed Forces the military commander would have two interpretations of the meeting in his hands. Since the military commander was agreeable to my interpretation, it could be expected that he would follow my line of thought.

January 4, 1944: Sauckel meets with Hitler and Reichsführer SS Himmler (1292-PS, USA-225):

A conference took place with the Führer today which was attended by: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel; the Secretary for Armament and War Production, Speer; the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army, General Field Marshal Keitel; General Field Marshal Milch; the acting Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, State Secretary Backer the Minister of the Interior, Reichsführer of the SS, Himmler; and myself. (The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Economy had repeatedly asked to be permitted to participate prior to the conference, but the Führer did not wish their attendance.)

The Führer declared in his introductory remarks: I want a clear picture:

(1) How many workers are required for the maintenance of German war economy?

(a) For the maintenance of present output?

(b) To increase its output?

(2) How many workers can be obtained from occupied countries, or how many can still be gained in the Reich by suitable means (increased output)? For one thing, it is a matter of making up for losses of labor by death, infirmity, the constant fluctuation of workers, and so forth; and further it is a matter of procuring additional workers.

The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, Sauckel, declared that, in order to maintain the present amount of workers he would have to add at least 2'/: but probably 3 million new workers in 1944. Otherwise production would fall off.

Reich Minister Speer declared that he needed an additional 1,300,000 laborers. However, this would depend on whether it will be possible to increase production of iron ore. Should this not be possible, he would need no additional workers. Procurement of additional workers from occupied territory would, however, be subject to the condition that these workers will not be withdrawn from armament and auxiliary industries already working there. For this would mean a decrease of production of these industries which he could not tolerate. Those, for instance, who are already working in France in industries mentioned above must be protected against being sent to work in Germany by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.

The Führer agreed with the opinions of Reich Minister Speer and emphasized that the measures taken by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor should create no circumstances which would lead to the withdrawal of workers from armament and auxiliary industries working in occupied territories, because such a shifting of workers would only cause disturbance of production in occupied countries.

The Führer further called attention to the fact that at least 250,000 laborers will be required for preparations against air attacks in the field of civilian air raid protection. For Vienna alone 2,000-2,500 are required immediately. The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor mill need at least 4 million workers considering that he requires 2 1/2 million workers for maintenance of the present level, that Reich Minister Speer needs 1,300,000 additional workers, and that the above-mentioned preparations for security measures against air attacks call for 250,000 laborers. ...

The Reichsführer SS explained that the executive agents put at his disposal are extremely few, but that he would try helping the Sauckel project to succeed by increasing them and working them harder. The Reichsführer SS made immediately available 2,000 to 2,500 men from concentration camps for air raid preparations in Vienna. ...

The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor shall procure at least 4 million new workers from occupied territories. The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, Sauckel, declared that he will attempt with fanatical determination to obtain these workers. Until now he has always kept his promises as to the number of workers to be furnished. With the best of intentions, however, he is unable to make a definite promise for 1944. He will do everything in his power to furnish the requested manpower in 1944. Whether it will succeed depends primarily on what German executive agents will be made available. His project cannot be carried out with indigenous executive agents. The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor must, before taking measures, contact the Minister for Foreign Affairs. ....

Sauckel: Success will depend mainly on what German executive forces are made available. My action cannot be carried through with native executive forces.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: That is a statement, a rather abbreviated statement, probably [originally] made by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers. But I should like to say emphatically that it can be interpreted only in this way: In those areas, which were very numerous at the time, I could not put into effect an administration to deal with manpower until order had been restored through executive forces. This statement, therefore, is not quite correct as presented here. ...

The Foreign Office was connected with this matter in the following way: It had to establish connections with countries where embassies, legations, or German delegations were acting. Negotiations would then take place under the chairmanship of the head of an embassy or delegation. The Foreign Office always made every effort to conduct these negotiations in a suitable way and in a proper manner. In this case it meant that if I had to negotiate with the French or the Italian Government, I would first have to get in touch with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. ...

It is obvious that I myself, in my office, could not do certain things without informing the high-ranking authorities of the Reich. It merely proves that I was attempting to work correctly, and not to interfere wildly within the Reich, or in other administrative departments. For the recruiting of manpower, that is in the registration according to German orders, it was the chief, duly authorized and appointed for this purpose at the time, of a territorial government, a Reich commissariat, or the like, who participated-for I emphasize that I was unable to issue any laws in that field and was not allowed to do so. I could not interfere in any government department; that is impossible in any government system in the world. Not to co-ordinate, but to instruct them: and to ask for their co-operation where the case arose, if it came within their jurisdiction. The distribution and direction of manpower in the Reich was my principal task. It included, with the German workers, 30 million persons. I do not wish to minimize this task, for I did my best to introduce order into this mass of workers, as dictated by my sense of duty. I do not wish to minimize anything. It was my task and my duty towards my people. I knew that the German people were engaged in their most bitter struggle. It was my duty to carry on with my task with all my strength-that is what I meant by "fanatical." I further explained, in another sentence, that I could not accomplish my task that year. As far as I was able to accomplish it in 1944 two-thirds were German workers, not mainly aliens but more than two-thirds Germans; and I was trying my utmost to put all German women to work, as far as they were capable of working, and in 1944 there were over 2 million of them.

January 6, 1944: Speer writes to Sauckel:

Dear Party-Comrade Sauckel, I ask you, in accordance with your promise to the Führer, to assign these workers so that the orders issued to me by the Führer may be carried out on time. In addition there is an immediate need of 70,000 workers for the Todt Organization to meet the time limit set on the Atlantic Wall by the Führer in Order Number 51; notification of the need for this labor was given more than 6 months ago, but it has not yet been complied with.

From Speer's IMT testimony: I should like to summarize the entire subject and say a few words about it. We had a technique of dealing with inconvenient orders from Hitler that permitted us to by-pass them. Jodl has already said in his testimony that for his part he had developed such a technique too. And so, of course, the letters which are being submitted here are only clear to the expert as to their meaning and the results they would have to have.

January 25, 1944: Sauckel writes a letter to Heinrich Otto Abetz, the German ambassador to Vichy France (F-822, RF-1513):

The long-expected invasion has finally begun. Thus ends also for the Allocation of Labor a period of waiting which up to now has served as an obvious, sometimes tacit, pretext for saying that the sending of workers into the Reich was impossible owing to the political atmosphere in the country. ...

Now that the German soldier must once more fight and bleed on the Channel coast, now that the struggle may extend at any hour to many other parts of France, any call or any ' words from Laval can have no weight whatsoever. The only language which can now be understood is that of the German soldier. I beg you, therefore, in these decisive hours to ask Premier Laval at last to do something which is obviously very difficult for him; that is to say, that he should at last sign the order for the calling up of the 1944 class. I do not wish to be kept waiting any longer. Neither do I wish to leave with an opinion which might be unjust but which at the same time is forced upon me, concerning the temporizing tactics of the French Government.

I beg you, therefore, most urgently, to obtain by 10 o'clock tomorrow morning the signature of the French Premier to the decree for the calling up of the 1944 class, or else to inform me quite clearly if Laval should answer with a categorical 'no.' I will not accept any delaying excuses, as all technical preparations regarding the quotas from the departments, as well as the arrangements for transport, have either been made or are now about to be made, thanks to the joint discussions which have been going on.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: It is only an ultimatum insofar as my departure was in question and nothing else. I could not exert any pressure on Laval or use any threats. It is only an ultimatum insofar as I could not wait any longer. I had to leave, because I had orders to leave. I was trying to get a decision, a "yes" or "no," nothing else. I had to leave, and I wanted a decision as to whether the French Premier would sign it or not.

As far as I can remember—I cannot say exactly offhand—there were 700,000 to 800,000 French workers employed in Germany. However, I cannot tell you exactly without documents.

January 25, 1944: From a Sauckel order “Subject: Formation of a protection corps for the execution of the tasks of the Allocation of Labor in France and in Belgium during the year 1944” (F-827, RF-1518):

1) To the Military Commander in France, Paris. To the Military Commander for Belgium and Northern France, Brussels.

In order to secure the carrying out of the necessary tasks of the Allocation of Labor in Belgium and France, especially the assignments for Germany, and to strengthen the executive, a protective corps, the Committee for Social Peace, is to be created in France and Belgium. This protective corps is to consist of indigenous forces with a nucleus of German police who will act as leaders. This protective corps will consist of approximately 5,000 men in France, and approximately 1,000 men in Belgium. I give the following provisional instructions for the formation of this protective corps and the accomplishment of its tasks:

I. Selection of members of the Protective Corps.

The selection shall be made in close agreement with the competent Police and SD offices, which shall approve the candidates, especially from the point of view of their loyalty. The selection shall be made especially among the members of political movements favorably disposed to collaboration with Germany.

II. Organization of the Protective Corps.

The Protective Corps will be directed from central offices to be set up in Paris and Brussels. The heads of these offices shall be designated by me."-That is to say, by you, Defendant Sauckel.-"They shall take orders from my delegates in France. In purely police questions, the Protective Corps shall be directed by the Higher SS and Police Leader. The regional groups of the Protective Corps shall take orders from the commanders of German police forces, and the latter will receive technical directions from the Feldkommandantur and from the recruiting offices as to their participation in tasks concerning the Allocation of Labor. The German Police and the services of the SD will deal with instruction in police matters; technical training, as far as the Allocation of Labor is concerned, will be given insofar as is necessary by the experts of the Felikommandantur and the recruiting offices.

The members of the Protective Corps will not wear uniform; they will however, carry firearms.

III. Execution of orders.

The members of the Protective Corps assigned to the recruiting of flees or to the Feldkommandantur shall be employed in such a way as to insure maximum efficiency in the execution of measures ordered. For example, they must be informed immediately if Frenchmen who have been summoned by German offices do not appear. They must find out the domiciles of these persons and bring them to report in accordance with instructions from the German police leader in collaboration with the French and German police. Furthermore, they must track down immediately all those who have refused to appear when summoned, and those who have broken their contracts. In the interests of an effective executive, it is expedient that they receive regularly lists of persons summoned and persons liable for service, to enable them to act immediately in cases where German directives have not been complied with.

It is to be presumed that these quick methods, coupled with fitting punishment and immediate publication of the punishments, will have a more deterrent effect than that achieved by tracking down the men afterward, as has been done up to now. Furthermore, members of the Protective Corps are to keep the German offices informed of any particular difficulties in recruitment.

From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I established no special police; I explained that yesterday. That was a suggestion put forward by the French units themselves for protection. At a conference I exaggerated and called it "police," but it was not a police force. [A"Committee for Social Peace” and "League for Social Order and Justice”] was talked about. It was proposed, yes, and it was discussed. As far as I remember that was in the spring of 1944.

I already told my attorney yesterday that in agreement with French organizations such a protective corps was set up, so that on the one hand people who wanted to work could be protected, and on the other hand administrative measures could be carried out. Since the Frenchmen themselves declared that they were ready and willing to collaborate, I did not see anything unfavorable in this or anything that was in any way out of order. It was to alleviate the conditions of the indigenous people themselves.

I admit that I suggested this Protective Corps, and that it was set up, but only on a small scale. I did not issue them myself, but rather the French Government did. That is correct; for in every occupied territory—and that is true the whole world over—the authority of the occupying power must be respected. It is true that at a conference with the French Premier Laval, I demanded, by way of negotiations, the death penalty in cases of very serious obstruction; if a serious case of sabotage was in question, according to martial law.

January 25, 1944: Speer writes to Sauckel:

I am informed by Thyssen [an armaments firm in the Ruhr] that in a transport of 509 just-arrived workers from the East were 161 children from 1 to 14 years old, and 49 men and 69 women incapable of performing work: it seems pointless to assign family groups to factory work for which, obviously, only young and unattached workers are suitable. The others, if anything, would surely be more useful on the land . . . .

My understanding is that 40,000 [armaments workers in the Hamburg area], who apparently just wandered off, remain unaccounted for. It is essential to proceed very sharply indeed here; they are to be brought back from wherever they are and put to work in the places they were assigned to. (Sereny)

January 25, 1944: Speer writes to Hitler:

I need hardly emphasize to you, Mein Führer, that I have never aspired to enter the realm of politics, either in wartime or after the war. I regard my present activities simply as wartime service, and I am looking forward to the time when I will be able to devote myself to artistic matters which are more to my liking than any ministerial post or political work.

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