From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: This note or rather this decision did not come from me. This was a communication which came from the Führer's headquarters, based on a decision made by the Führer. In spite of that—and I want to emphasize that particularly—my attitude towards the French Government did not change, and it does not say so in this record either. I continued to adopt the same polite attitude in my negotiations with the Government, and I ask the Tribunal to be allowed to make a short statement on how these negotiations with the French Government were conducted.
From Ribbentrop's IMT Testimony: According to what I heard, all these foreign workers are supposed to have been well treated in Germany. I think it is possible, of course, that other things might have happened, too; but on the whole, I believe that a good deal was done to treat these workers well. I know that on occasion departments of the Foreign Office co-operated in these matters with a view to preventing those possible things. Generally speaking, however, we had no influence in that sphere, as we were excluded from Eastern questions. ....
We in the Foreign Office—in the case of the French, for instance, and quite a number of other foreign workers—co-operated in getting musicians, et cetera, from France for them. We advised on questions concerning their welfare. And I know that the German Labor Front did everything in its power, at least with regard to the sector which we could view to some extent, to treat the workers well, to preserve their willingness to work, and to make their leisure pleasant. I know, at least, that those of its efforts in which we co-operated were on these lines.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: It can be seen very clearly from that document that I did not tolerate any crime. I would not protect these people, who were not subordinate to me, if they committed crimes there. They were not to do that; that was what I prohibited.
From Inside The Third Reich, by Albert Speer: It was also Lammers who from January 1943 on presided over the Cabinet meetings, which were then resumed, in Hitler's stead. Not all members of the Cabinet were invited, only those who were concerned with the subjects on the agenda. But the meeting place, the Cabinet Room, showed what power the Committee of Three had acquired or at any rate intended to acquire.
These meetings turned out quite heated. Goebbels and Funk supported my radical views. Minister of the Interior Frick, as well as Lammers himself, raised the anticipated doubts. Sauckel maintained that he could provide any number of workers requested of him, including skilled personnel, from abroad. Even when Goebbels demanded that leading party members forgo their previous, almost limitless luxuries, he could change nothing. And Eva Braun, ordinarily so unassuming, had no sooner heard of a proposed ban on permanent waves as well as the end of cosmetic production when she rushed to Hitler in high indignation.
Hitler at once showed uncertainty. He advised me that instead of an outright ban I quietly stop production of "hair dyes and other items necessary for beauty culture," as well as "cessation of repairs upon apparatus for producing permanent waves."
After a few meetings in the Chancellery it was clear to Goebbels and me that armaments production would receive no spur from Bormann, Lammers, or Keitel. Our efforts had bogged down in meaningless details.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: This is not a conference with the French Government. This is a statement of facts. That [Hitler was determined to rule in France] was a straightforward decision and a statement from the Führer, for which I am not responsible. I merely repeated it, and in any case it was never realized. I could not exert any pressure by that, because this was merely transmitting a statement of the situation. I did not tell the French Government that the Führer would remove them and that therefore they would have to do such and such a thing. I merely negotiated. I repeated that, but not with the intention of doing that.
That I imposed this law by pressure, that I do deny. I negotiated about it. It was my duty to report when I made such journeys for I was carrying out the Führer's orders. I cannot conceive in what other way a basis for negotiations could be found. The German Government made demands, and because of those demands there were negotiations with the French Government which had to be considered by me as de jure. The German Government was making demands, yes, that is true. I can only say that I was very polite and accommodating when talking to the French Premier and that our negotiations ran very smoothly. He often mentioned that, and it is in the record.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I only talked to French ministers in the German Embassy in Paris. Usually the French Premier, the French Minister for Labor, Minister Bichelonne, took part in such discussions. On the German side, the Ambassador; on behalf of the military commander, Dr. Fischer; and, as my representative, probably Dr. Hildebrandt or some other gentleman. Very many matters were discussed in great detail during these conferences.
To begin with, if the Tribunal would permit it, I should have to read my reply to Premier Laval. The document proves, and this has been confirmed to me by Premier Laval on various occasions, that I conducted my negotiations with him in a proper manner; and in spite of the fact that I had orders not to conduct political conversations but only to deal with my actual task, I always reported to the Führer about these matters. But I think that the tone of my reply was definitely beyond reproach. I would have to read my answer. I cannot remember it now.
Premier Laval did not complain about me in this connection. He complained about general conditions in France, because this was the time of occupation. The situation was that there was a German occupation. It was war.
I think that an error in translation has been made here. I understood that you asked whether I denied that I was putting pressure on the Tribunal. I respect this Tribunal too highly to try to exert pressure upon it. I do not understand the question. I understood you to ask me whether I denied that I exerted pressure on the Tribunal; and, of course, that question I have to answer with "no."
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: Upon their arrival in Germany the people of the transport had not only to be properly received but they also had to be medically examined again and checked at a transit camp. One examination had to be made at the time and place of recruitment, and another took place at a fixed point before the border. Thus, from the time of recruitment until being put to work three medical examinations and checks had to be made, according to my directives. These transit camps were camps in which the people from the various transports came together at the border, and where they were examined and registered in the proper manner. The Allocation of Labor had nothing at all to do with these camps and concentration camps. This was not a transit camp for workers but was obviously the transit camp of a concentration camp. These were not at all known to me. I never had to and never did concern myself with such transports and transit camps; and I would not have done it.
I believe every German employer who received these workers, either in agriculture or in war industry, is a witness to the fact that a procedure of this sort never took place in any form; that it was quite inconceivable that such slave markets were instituted through the authority of the Reich Ministry of Labor; but that these workers who passed through National Socialist labor exchanges received exactly the same contracts and conditions as the German workers themselves, with some variations, and in no case were they put to work like slaves without rights or pay, without a contract, without sickness insurance, or without accident insurance. That may be seen from the numerous directives and decrees which were issued by the Reich Ministry of Labor and by me for every race involved.
The general living conditions of foreign workers in Germany as far as they were recruited through the offices of the Allocation of Labor, were exactly the same as those of German workers who were accommodated in camps. Living conditions were dependent on the circumstances of war and, in contrast with peacetime, were subject to the same limitations as applied to the German population. The adjutant of Herr von Schirach, a man unknown to me, who appeared here as a witness yesterday, described conditions in Vienna; those conditions existed in other German cities too.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I can openly and clearly answer that the threat of such penalties in this form was completely unknown to me and that I would never have mentioned it. If I had learned of it, I would have stopped it immediately. I must, however, beg permission to tell the Tribunal that this appendix at the end of the document, regarded as coming from my office, is incorrect, and was not sanctioned by me.
I myself was not able to issue orders for compulsory service in the occupied territories, that had to be done by the district authorities. But by compulsion I did not understand that penalties would be threatened to the extent as stated in that one document signed by Bittrich (above), but that they would be in keeping with German regulations. That is a very substantial difference.
From Schirach's IMT testimony: I had the impression that the functionaries of the labor employment administration felt that they had to keep strictly to Sauckel's orders, and in those industrial plants which I visited I was able to ascertain that the requirements stated in the directives were in fact fulfilled. I remember that Sauckel once came to Vienna—I think in 1943—and that on that occasion he addressed all his labor employment functionaries and repeated orally everything that he had stated in his directives. He spoke of the foreign workers in particular, demanding just treatment for them; and I remember that on this occasion he even spoke of putting them on the same footing as German workers. After the Gauleiter assemblies the Führer always held forth in a comparatively large circle just as he did in his speeches. Interviews in the real sense of the word did not exist. He always made speeches. Fixed dates on which Gauleiter could have interviews with Hitler almost ceased to exist once the war had begun . . . .
[A Gauleiter] could ask for an interview [with Hitler], but he did not get it; he received an answer from Bormann, usually in the form of a telegram. That happened to me very frequently, because I made such requests; one was asked to submit in writing the points one wanted to discuss, after which one either received an answer or did not receive one.
From the IMT testimony of Hartmann Lauterbacher: In March 1943, when I made an unofficial visit to Vienna, a very long conversation took place between von Schirach and myself. At that time, von Schirach talked very pessimistically about the prospects of the war and told me that we should soon be fighting outside Vienna, in the Alps and along the Rhine. On that occasion he said that he had not been able to see Adolf Hitler for a very long time; that he had had no further opportunity of reporting to him, as had formerly been the case; and that the Chief of the Party Chancellery, Bormann, had consistently prevented him from seeing the Führer and talking to him alone; and that he therefore no longer had any opportunity whatsoever of discussing Viennese questions or general questions with Hitler. In this connection he also stated that Bormann came to him with objections and complaints every day, canceling orders and directives he had issued in his capacity of Gauleiter in Vienna, and that in view of all this, it was no longer possible for him to remain in office and to shoulder the responsibility.
At a later stage of that conversation, in the course of which we considered all kinds of possibilities, he said that, as he had sworn an oath of allegiance to Hitler, he felt bound to remain in office whatever happened and that, above all, he could not take the responsibility in the present military situation for abandoning the population over which he had been appointed Gauleiter. He saw the catastrophe coming but said that even his resignation or any action that he might take would not have any influence on the leaders of the State or on Hitler himself and that he would, therefore, remain true to his oath, as a soldier would, and retain his appointment . . . .
I, like all other Gauleiter of the NSDAP, constantly received instructions from Sauckel with regard to the recruitment of labor; that is to say, regarding the welfare of these civilian workers. The instructions which I received as Gauleiter consisted almost exclusively of repeated demands to do everything to satisfy the foreign workers in matters of accommodation, food, clothing, and cultural welfare. It was naturally carried out within the limits of existing possibilities. I myself inspected such camps and especially such factories on my official trips. Apart from that I had, as my Gau supervisor of the German Labor Front, a man who assisted me in this task on such occasions. After the air raids from which Hanover and Brunswick suffered particularly badly from 1943 onwards, I found conditions in foreign civilian labor camps—just as I did in the living quarters of German people—to be what I would call, perhaps not shocking, but certainly very serious; and after that I tried as far as possible to have these destroyed dwellings repaired, for instance, or to have new ones built.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: After the fall of Stalingrad and the proclamation of the state of total war, Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels in Berlin interfered considerably in all these problems. He ordered that in cases of persistent refusal or signs of resistance compulsion was to be used by means of refusing additional food rations, or even by withdrawal of ration cards. I personally rejected measures of that kind energetically, because I knew very well that in the western territories the so-called food ration card played a subordinate role and that supplies were provided for the resistance movement and its members on such a large scale that such measures would have been quite ineffective. I did not order or suggest them.February 19, 1943: From notes of a meeting of the Central Planning Board, attended by Speer, Sauckel, and Field Marshal Milch (R-124):
From a pre-trial interrogation of Rosenberg (USA-187):
Q: Isn't it a fact that Sauckel would allocate to the various areas under your jurisdiction the number of persons to be obtained for labor purposes?
Q: And that thereafter your agents would obtain that labor in order to meet the quota which had been given. Is that right?
A: Sauckel, normally, had very far-reaching desires, which one could not fulfill unless one looked very closely into the matter.
Q: Never mind about Sauckel's desires being far-reaching or not being far-reaching. That has nothing to do with it. You were given quotas for the areas over which you had jurisdiction, and it was up to you to meet that quota?
A.: Yes. It was the responsibility of the administrative officials to receive this quota and to distribute the allotments over the districts in such a way, according to number and according to the age groups, that they would be most reasonably met.
Q: These administrative officials were part of your organization, isn't that right?
A: They were functionaries or officials of the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine; but, as such, they were placed in their office by the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories.
Q: You recognized, did you not, that the quotas set by Sauckel could not be filled by voluntary labor; and you did not disapprove of the impressment of forced labor. Isn't that right?
A: I regretted that the demands of Sauckel were so urgent that they could not be met by a continuation of voluntary recruitments, and thus I submitted to the necessity of forced impressment.
Q: The letters that we have already seen between you and Sauckel do not indicate, do they, any disagreement on your part with the principle of recruiting workers against their will? They indicate, as I remember, that you were opposed to the treatment that was later accorded these workers, but you did not oppose their initial impressment.
A: That is right. In those matters I mostly discussed the possibility of finding the least harsh methods of handling the matter, whereas in no way did I place myself in opposition to the orders that he was carrying out for the Führer.
Q: Did you ever argue with Sauckel that perhaps in view of the fact that the quotas could not be met by voluntary labor, the labor recruiting program be abandoned, except for what recruits could be voluntarily enrolled?
A: I could not do that because the numbers or allotments that Sauckel had received from the Three to meet were absolutely binding for him, and I couldn't do anything about that.
From Funk's IMT testimony: I was called into the Central Planning Board in the fall of 1943, when I turned over all production matters to Speer and when, for the first time, on 22 November 1943 I attended a session of the Board. At that time I not only had no interest in having foreign workers brought to Germany but actually, from the economic aspect, I wanted to have the workers remain abroad, for the production of consumer goods had, to a large extent, been shifted from Germany to the occupied countries so that in other words this production, that is, French production or Belgian production, could work unhindered for the German populace; I did not want the workers taken away, and particularly I did not want them to be taken away by force, for in that way the entire order and the whole social life would be disturbed. Before that time, as Minister of Economics, I was naturally interested in seeing that the German economy had workers. However, these questions were not dealt with in the Ministry of Economics, but either in the Four-Year Plan, where a Plenipotentiary General for Labor had been active from the beginning . . . .
As far as the negotiations of the Central Planning Board were concerned, I was essentially interested only in the fact that in that meeting the necessary raw materials were allocated for the administration of consumer goods and the export trade. For that reason Ohlendorf and two other experts for the administration of consumer goods and the export trade were sent to the meeting. Ohlendorf was brought into my Ministry by State Secretary Hayler. Before that I had only known Ohlendorf vaguely from one or two meetings and I had had an extraordinarily favorable impression of him, for he had an extremely lucid mind and could always express his thoughts in a most impressive way. Before that time I didn't even know that Ohlendorf had another position in the Reich Security Main Office, for he was introduced to me as a manager of the Main Organization for German Trade. Hayler was the chief of this organization, of the Reichsgruppe Handel, and Ohlendorf was his manager and was introduced to me as such. Therefore I had no objections to Ohlendorf being brought into the ministry and taking over that field which corresponded to his private business activities up to now—the province of administration of consumer goods.
Then through Hayler he discovered that Ohlendorf was active also in the RSHA—or whatever the name is—as an office chief in the SD. However, I took no exception to this activity, for I was not fully acquainted with these assignments and in any case I was not convinced that anything was taking place which was unacceptable for the Ministry. Ohlendorf was active chiefly as manager of the Reichsgruppe Handel. As far as I know, he only had an auxiliary occupation in the RSHA, or however it was called. Naturally I was very much affected and painfully surprised when I heard here about assignments which Ohlendorf with his Einsatzstab had had in previous years in Russia. I had never heard one word about this activity of Ohlendorf. He himself never mentioned these things to me and until this time I did not know the type of assignments such Einsatzstabe had.
Ohlendorf never talked about his activity in the SD. Hayler, who knew him much better and more intimately than I did, is better qualified to give information. In any event I knew nothing of this activity of Ohlendorf, which after all he had carried on in years prior to this date, and I was very much affected to find that this man had done such things.
From Sauckel’s pre-trial interrogation (RF-1521): I never had anything to do with it. I had nothing to do with the question of the eviction of Jews from industry. I had no influence in this matter. It was an enigma to me.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I did not say the eviction of the Jews from industry was a secret to me; I said that, to the best of my recollection, I had nothing to do with it. Here again I must state emphatically that this letter was never put before me. It has no signature, and here again it comes from a subdivision in the Reich Ministry of Labor at 96 Saarlandstrasse. Some official dealt with it there. I myself have absolutely no recollection of having ever had knowledge of this letter, I did not write it, it does not come from my office, it has been written "by order," and the signature is not mine. I merely want to say that the letterhead belongs to some office, but I have never known anything about the letter. This is the first time in my life that I have seen it, and I myself did not have it written. I can say that under oath. I told my counsel yesterday that my department, of course, had to furnish replacements if workers were taken away from a concern, either by being called up for service or for some other measure. I did not always know the details. Such a request could not come from my department. The evacuation of Jews was entirely the responsibility of the Reichsführer SS. I had only troubles because of such measures, as it was very difficult to replace workers. I had no interest in it. I had nothing to do with it. It was not my task.April 12, 1943: At a meeting at the Berghof, the Goebbels/Speer/Göring 'conspiracy' confronts Bormann's man Sauckel in an attempt to further their plan for a Council of Ministers.
From Speer's Spandau Draft: Göring showed his true colors at once. Instead of calling Sauckel to task as he had promised, he immediately launched a violent attack against his own Secretary of State, Field Marshall Milch, who by prior arrangement was the one who raised our objection to Sauckel's labor-bookkeeping. How could Milch accuse that good party comrade Sauckel, who worked so hard for the Führer, of wrongdoing, Göring thundered. Ironically, it was he who only two days earlier had proposed the strategy of spearheading our general attack with an objection to Sauckel's fantasy-figure reports to Hitler.
And Himmler immediately joined the stifling of our initiative. "Isn't the most likely explanation for the million missing bodies that they are dead?" he asked equably. It was only when I learned in Nuremberg of the numbers of dead in the concentration camps that I understood what he meant.
From Inside The Third Reich, by Albert Speer: For a considerable time the numbers of workers whom Sauckel claimed to have sent into industry, statistics which he reported to Hitler, had ceased to correspond with the actual figures. The difference amounted to several hundred thousand. I proposed to our coalition that we join forces in compelling Sauckel, Bormann's outpost in our territory, as it were, to report truthful data.
At Hitler's request a large building in the rustic Bavarian style had been erected near Berchtesgaden to house the Berlin Chancellery secretariat. Whenever Hitler stayed at Obersalzberg for months at a time, Lammers and his immediate staff conducted the business of the Chancellery there. Göring arranged for Lammers as the host to invite our group, as well as Sauckel and Milch, to meet in the conference room of this building on April 12, 1943. Before the meeting Milch and I once more reminded Göring of what we wanted. He rubbed his hands: "That will soon be taken care of!"
We were surprised to find that Himmler, Bormann, and Keitel were also in the conference room. And to make matters worse, our ally Goebbels sent his apologies: On the way to Berchtesgaden he had suffered an attack of kidney colic and was lying ill in his special car. To this day I don't know whether this was true or whether he merely had an instinct for what was going to happen.
That session marked the end of our alliance. Sauckel simply challenged our demand for an additional two million, one hundred thousand workers for the entire economy, insisted that he had delivered the needed forces, and became furious when I charged that his figures could not be accurate. (Later we learned from General Roesch, our armaments inspector for Upper Bavaria, that Sauckel had directed his employment bureaus to list every worker who was assigned to a factory as placed, even if the worker turned out to be unqualified for the particular job and was sent back to the bureau. The factories, on the other hand, listed only those workers who were actually hired.)
Milch and I expected that Göring would ask Sauckel for explanations and make him change his labor-assignment policy. Instead, to our horror Göring began with a violent attack upon Milch, and thus indirectly upon me. It was outrageous that Milch was making so many difficulties, he said. Our good party comrade Sauckel who was exerting himself to the utmost and had achieved such successes. . . . He at any rate felt a great debt of gratitude toward him. Milch was simply blind to Sauckel's achievements.
It was as though Göring had picked out the wrong phonograph record. In the ensuing prolonged discussion on the missing workers, each of the ministers present offered explanations, on entirely theoretical grounds, of the difference between the real and the official figures. Himmler commented with the greatest calm that perhaps the missing hundreds of thousands had died.
The conference proved a total failure. No light was thrown on the question of the missing labor force, and in addition our grand assault on Bormann had come to grief.
After this meeting Göring took me aside. "I know you like to work closely with my state secretary, Milch," he said. "In all friendship I'd like to warn you against him. He's unreliable; as soon as his own interests are in question, he'll trample over even his best friends." I immediately passed this remark on to Milch. He laughed. "A few days ago Göring told me exactly the same thing about you." This attempt on Göring's part to sow distrust was the very opposite of what we had agreed on: that we would form a bloc. The sad fact was that our circles were so infected by suspicion that friendship was felt to be a threat.
A few days after this affair Milch commented that Göring had switched sides because the Gestapo had proof of his drug addiction. Quite some time before Milch had suggested to me that I look closely at Göring's pupils. At the Nuremberg Trial my attorney, Dr. Flachsner, told me that Göring had been an addict long before 1933. Flachsner had acted as his lawyer once when he was sued for improperly administering a morphine injection.
Our attempt to mobilize Göring against Bormann was probably doomed to failure from the start for financial reasons as well. For as was later revealed by a Nuremberg document, Bormann had made Göring a gift of six million marks from the industrialists' Adolf Hitler Fund.
From Göring: The Iron Man, by R. J. Overy: Göring's abrupt change of support was understandable. He always hesitated to oppose the SS openly. While intriguing with Goebbels and Speer, Göring was simultaneously trying to improve his relations with Himmler. Göring was contemptuous of Lammers and Keitel—'nothing but the Führer's secretaries'—but he was much more cautious with Himmler and Bormann, who Göring did not yet regard as a proven political enemy.
Because Sauckel was Himmler's ally, and enjoyed the strong support of Hitler, Göring was loth to tilt at him too obviously. Milch, less charitably, attributed his change of heart to the fact that the Gestapo had firm evidence of drug addiction and that Göring feared the consequences of its exposure. This is an unlikely explanation. Hitler, Himmler and Goebbels, while highly critical of Göring's political behavior, were agreed that his authority had to be maintained. Though there was talk in April and May of a crisis over Göring's political position, the SS could not have involved him in a drugs scandal as long as Hitler believed for his own reasons that Göring was 'indispensable to the supreme leadership of the Reich'.
A more obvious explanation was Göring's distrust of the leading conspirators, since most of them had been involved recently in the process of reducing his political power. Milch had suggested to Hitler some four weeks before that Göring be relieved of his command of the Luftwaffe and had said as much openly to Göring. Goebbels and Ley hoped to use the episode to improve their own political standing by exploiting Göring's remaining political authority for their own ends. He was too adept a politician not to recognize this. During 1943 he drew closer to Himmler and the SS appointees in the economy in order to revive his fortunes by association, judging, perhaps righty, that this was a surer way of rehabilitating himself with Hitler. (Overy, P. 221, 222)
Albert Speer, from a later interview with Gitta Sereny: And much later, in Spandau, Funk said that I had been mad ever to trust Goebbels. 'He was never honest with you,' he said. 'How so?' I asked him. 'Because he was not an honest man,' he replied. 'But who was, in those times? I, after all, went along with it too.' Well, I suppose he was right. The very next day, Goebbels, miraculously recovered, let Bormann know that from then on he would use him as the conduit for his communications with Hitler and would be grateful if, on the other hand, Bormann would see to it that his requests got prompt and favorable attention. ...
Himmler, running into me at Führer HQ a few weeks later, threatened me for the first time. 'I advise you never to try again to recruit the Reichsmarshal [Göring] for your goals.' I wasn't intending to, but still, that was when Himmler began to alarm me personally—the first time I suddenly found him sinister. (Sereny p. 376)
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I saw in Hitler, whom at that time I revered, a man who was the leader of the German people, who had been chosen by the German people; and I, as a German citizen and a member of a German government department, considered it my duty to justify by my work in my own sphere the confidence placed in me by the head of the State. I was unable to see a criminal in Hitler at that time, and I never felt he was one; but I did feel obliged to do my duty, nothing else. As a human being and as the result of my upbringing I would never have supported crime.April 22, 1943: From notes of remarks made by Speer at a meeting of the Central Planning Board (R-124):
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I went to these towns to see for myself whether the methods were correct or not, and to discuss them with the departments. That is true, for it was not necessary for me to visit Kharkov, Kiev, or any other town to discuss my task in terms of figures. For that I would only have to talk to the reporter for the East, whose office was in Berlin, or with the Reich Commissioner, whom I did not contact as he was sometimes in Rovno. Every department, anywhere in every country of the world, it is a matter of course that administrative orders should be checked. One does not need to know that mistakes are made in human life and in every human organization; a control must be exercised all the same.
I undertook these journeys in order to satisfy myself, within the scope of my duties, how this task was being carried out, and to stop defects which were reported to me, as for instance—as I once told my defense counsel during my interrogation—I had also been asked to do so by Field Marshal Kluge. But I also wanted to look into matters carefully and myself give appropriate admonitions and instructions to the departments. My best evidence of this is the manifesto produced during this journey.
From Speer's IMT testimony: Beginning with the middle of 1943, I was at odds with Sauckel over questions of production and about the insufficient availability of reserves of German labor. But that has nothing to do with my fundamental attitude toward Sauckel's work . . . .
Those workers [the 50,000 skilled workers] had been working on the Atlantic Wall. From there they were transferred to the Ruhr to repair the two dams which had been destroyed by an air attack. I must say that the transfer of these 50,000 workers took place without my knowledge, and the consequences of bringing 50,000 workers from the West into Germany amounted to a catastrophe for us on the Atlantic Wall. It meant that more than one-third of all the workers engaged on the Atlantic Wall left because they, too, were afraid they might have to go to Germany. That is why we rescinded the order as quickly as possible, so that the French workers on the Atlantic Wall should have confidence in us. This fact will show you that the French workers we had working for the Organization Todt were not employed on a coercive basis, otherwise they could not have left in such numbers when they realized that under certain circumstances they, too, might be taken to Germany. So these measures taken with the 50,000 workers from the Organization Todt in France were only temporary and were revised later. It was one of those mistakes which can happen if a minister gives a harsh directive and his subordinates begin to carry it out by every means in their disposal . . . .
I do not deny that a large number of the people working for the Organization Todt in the West had been called up and came to their work because they had been called up, but we had no means whatsoever of keeping them there by force. That is what I wanted to say. So if they did not want to work, they could leave again; and then they either joined the resistance movement or went into hiding somewhere else.
From Speer's US SBS interview: In the case of the Moehne, it was the water supply of the Ruhr that was principally concerned. The attacks—which were also directed against the Sorpo and another small dam—indicated an intention to flood the Ruhr valley and destroy the summertime drinking water supplies of that area. The plan was excellent and might well have been expected to paralyze the Ruhr area. That it did not succeed was due only to the fact that the Moehne valley basin emptied and we were able to pump water from the other side of the Rhine at that time. The English probably did not know that as yet. The flooding filled the pumping stations in the power plants with mud, several units were soaked and had to be dried; this took weeks, but constituted no special loss for the industry. The Edor dam and the power plant below it is of no special importance as a source of power, but serves to regulate the water level of the Wesor for ship traffic. The attack was of little importance to us, and we did not understand what reasons lay behind it. Other than these two we never experienced attacks on power generating plants. (SBS)
From Speer's IMT testimony: After the attack on the Moehne Dam and the Eder Dam in April and May 1943, I went there and in that period I ordered that a special group from the Organization Todt should take over the restoration of these plants. I did this because I also wanted the machinery and the technical staff on the spot. This special group right away without asking me brought the French workers along. This had tremendous repercussions for us in the West because the workers on the building sites on the Atlantic Wall, who had up to that time felt safe from Sauckel's reach.1943: Sauckel writes the Foreword for the Nazi book 'Europe at Work in Germany: Sauckel Mobilizes the Labor Reserves':
From Speer's IMT testimony: But here again I must add something. This report is dated June 1943. In October 1943 the whole of the Organization Todt was given the status of a "blocked factory" and thereby received the advantages which other blocked factories had. I explained that sufficiently yesterday. Because of this, the Organization Todt had large offers of workers who went there voluntarily, unless, of course, you see direct coercion in the pressure put on them through the danger of their transfer to Germany, and which led them to the Organization Todt or the blocked factories. That [the workers were kept in labor camps] is the custom in the case of such building work. The building sites were far away from any villages, and so workers' camps were set up to accommodate the German and foreign workers. But some of them were also accommodated in villages, as far as it was possible to accommodate them there. I do not think that on principle they were only meant to be accommodated in camps, but I cannot tell you that for certain.June 28, 1943: From a report from the chief of Main Office III with the High Command in Minsk (3000-PS, USA-192):
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: During those journeys I personally satisfied myself that my departments were working properly. That was the object of my journey. I visited these areas to satisfy myself personally as to how my offices in these cities-I should not say "my," but the labor offices of the local administrations-were working; whether they were conscientiously carrying out their obligations towards the workers; whether they were attending to medical examinations, card indexing, et cetera, according to my instructions. That is why I went to those towns. I negotiated with the chiefs in the matter of quotas, that is quite true, since it was my task to recruit workers and to check the quotas, but during my visits to these cities I inspected the offices personally to satisfy myself that they were functioning properly. To employ the best possible methods for the purpose in view. That is indisputably stated in my orders, and the manifesto which has been submitted to the Tribunal was written on this very journey.July 23, 1943: From the Office Journal of Speer’s ministry: The minister proposed to improve the situation by designating protected factories. These would be guaranteed against levying of workers and would thus be made more attractive to French labor.
From Inside The Third Reich, by Albert Speer: France was the most important of the occupied industrial countries. Until the spring of 1943, however, its industrial production scarcely helped us. Sauckel's forcible recruiting of labor had done more damage there than its results warranted. For in order to escape forced labor, the French workers fled their factories, quite a few of which were producing for our armaments needs. In May 1943, I remonstrated to Sauckel about this. That July at a conference in Paris I proposed that at least the factories in France that were working for us be immune from Sauckel's levies.
My associates and I intended to have the factories in France particularly, but also in Belgium and Holland, produce large quantities of goods for the German civilian population, such as clothing, shoes, textiles, and furniture, in order to free similar factories in Germany for armaments.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: It was a realization of the Führer's labor program as he, the Führer, had ordered it. I was in Belgium and Holland only for a very short time. I had conferences there with the leading men, and according to my recollection I visited the labor authorities in Antwerp and saw how they functioned-the German ones. I did not draft [detailed measures for the implementation of the labor program] during those journeys; I discussed them there. Of course, I did some work while traveling.
I cannot tell you exactly from memory how many Dutch workers were employed on the basis of contracts with them and on the basis of these laws. Maybe there were 200,000 or 300,000, maybe more. I cannot tell you offhand what these Dutch figures were. Regarding the instructions which I issued, that was discussed adequately and clearly yesterday. My instructions are available practically in their entirety, and discountenance any brutal recruitment which.... From time to time I heard about excesses, and I stopped them at once, and I protested against them when I heard of them. I received protests... I had those cases investigated and left any further measures to the authorities concerned. I did everything on my side to prevent and stop such occurrences, and that can and will be testified to here.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I hear now for the first time that I am supposed to have sent, or had workers sent to their places of work handcuffed. I do not remember that. In any case, I never decreed anything like that; that much I can say.
It can only be a statement regarding cases of flagrant resistance to the authority of the state or to the execution of some administrative action. Experience shows us that this has been found necessary the whole world over. I merely said that everything should be done in an orderly and correct way. I did not call that a rule to be applied for the recruitment of labor. It cannot be understood in any other way. But it must be interpreted as being applied only if there were flagrant resistance to an executive authority; otherwise it was never intended.
From Inside The Third Reich, by Albert Speer: As soon as I was charged with all of German production at the beginning of September, I invited the French Minister of Production to Berlin. Minister Bichelonne, a professor at the Sorbonne, was reputed to be a capable and energetic man. After some bickering with the Foreign Office, I ensured that Bichelonne would be treated as a state visitor. To win that point I had to appeal to Hitler, explaining to him that Bichelonne was not going to "come up the back stairs" to see me. As a result, the French Production Minister was quartered in the Berlin government guest house. Five days before Bichelonne arrived I cleared the idea with Hitler that we would set up a production planning council on a pan-European basis, with France as an equal partner along with the other nations. The assumption was, of course, that Germany would retain the decisive voice in this planning.
On September 17, 1943, I received Bichelonne, and before very long a distinctly personal relationship sprang up between us. We were both young, we believed the future was on our side, and both of us therefore promised ourselves that someday we would avoid the mistakes of the First World War generation that was presently governing. I was even prepared to prevent what Hitler had in mind in the way of carving up France, all the more so since in a Europe integrated economically it did not matter where the frontiers ran. Such were the Utopian thoughts in which Bichelonne and I lost ourselves for a while at that time—a token of the world of illusions and dreams in which we were moving.
On the last day of the negotiations Bichelonne asked to have a private talk with me. At the instigation of Sauckel, he began, Premier Laval had forbidden him to discuss the question of the transportation of workers from France to Germany. Would I nevertheless be willing to deal with the question? I said I would. Bichelonne explained his concern, and I finally asked him whether a measure protecting French industrial plants from deportations would help him. "If that is possible, then all my problems are solved, including those relating to the program we have just agreed on," Bichelonne said with relief. "But then the transfer of labor from France to Germany will virtually cease. I must tell you that in all honesty." I was fully aware of that, but this seemed the only way I could harness French industrial production to our purposes. Both of us had done something unusual. Bichelonne had disobeyed an instruction from Laval, and I had disavowed Sauckel. Both of us, basically without the backing of our superiors, had come to a far-reaching agreement.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I had set up that inspection department, which had not existed before in the Ministry of Labor, because I wanted to ascertain the uniformity and execution of contracts throughout the entire area of the Reich, as well as in the occupied territories where German undertakings and German labor contracts were being carried out; also to examine and control the unified administrative regulations; and, moreover, to see whether my orders concerning food, lodging, treatment, and care were being observed and to what extent they were in need of change. All this was also contained in a directive which I gave to the inspection department.
The Central Inspection Department of the DAF had the task of supervising the welfare of foreign workers in the camps in Germany to see whether they were being fed, and so on, in the prescribed way. An agreement between the Führer, the German Labor Front, Dr. Lye, and myself, was added as a supplement to the decree concerning the formation of the Central Inspection Department, and it stated that where it was a question of conditions in camps the Central Inspection Department had to deal directly with the Reich offices concerned, or with the industrial inspection office in the Reich Labor Ministry, in order to remedy the conditions; whereas cases of shortage or surplus of manpower, et cetera, were to be reported to me.
I consider myself responsible for the directives which I issued regarding the feeding of foreign workers. The actual feeding of these people was not the task and responsibility of the labor authorities. That was the responsibility of the factories, or the camp leaders who had been charged by the factories to look after this.
From Inside The Third Reich, by Albert Speer: In this way Sauckel's operations in France virtually came to an end. Instead of the previous monthly quota of fifty thousand, before long only five thousand workers a month were being taken to Germany." A few months later (on March 1, 1944), Sauckel reported angrily: "I hear from my offices in France that everything is finished there. 'We might as well close down,' they tell me. It's the same story in every prefecture: Minister Bichelonne has made an agreement with Minister Speer. Laval has the nerve to say: 'I won't give you any more men for Germany.'" A short while later I proceeded to apply the same principle to Holland, Belgium, and Italy.October 13, 1943: Pietro Badoglio declares that the Kingdom of Italy is now at war with its former ally, Nazi Germany. Note: Italy has the distinction of being the only nation that ended neither World War on the same side on which it had begun the war.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I wrote that, yes. But I want you to let me give you an explicit explanation: In all my directives I invariably demanded the most considerate treatment for the workers; that has already been proved in the Trial. When I refer here to the ruthless use of all means, I only mean the ruthless use of all technical means and propaganda, because I had been told from different sources that such means were not available there to a sufficient degree. This is an explanation of what led up to this letter.October 4, 1943: From an infamous speech by Reichsführer SS Himmler to a group of SS Generals at Posen (1919-PS, USA-170):
From the IMT testimony of Dr. Franz Hayler: I was an independent business man and merchant and as such first became the head of the "Economic Group Retail Trade" within the organization of industrial economy. In this capacity I had very close contact with the Ministry of Economics. After Minister Funk had been appointed Minister for Economics I reported to him regarding the scope of my work, and on that occasion I made his acquaintance. When I was then put in charge of the "Reich Group Trade," the working relations between the organization directed by me and the Ministry, especially between the then State Secretary Landfried and the Minister himself, became very friendly.
After the separation of the ministries in the autumn of 1943, the main task of the Ministry of Economics was to provide for the German people, that is, the civilian population. As head of the trade organization I was the person responsible for the sale of merchandise, that is, for the procurement of supplies, and during a conference with Minister Funk regarding the co-operation between trade' and the Ministry, Herr Landfried, who was then State Secretary, made the suggestion that Minister Funk call me into his Ministry and make me his deputy. Herr Landfried believed that under the existing conditions he himself was not strong enough to carry out this difficult task since the Ministry had been deprived of its influence on production. Then, when Minister Funk told him in reply to his suggestion that he, Landiried, was the deputy of the Minister, Landiried replied that he could not continue to carry out these tasks and that he asked to be permitted to retire and proposed that I be his successor. About two or three weeks later I was put in charge of the affairs of the State Secretary . . . .
This conference took place in October 1943; my appointment came on 20 November 1943. I became an official with this position of State Secretary on 30 January 1944. I was [Funk's] deputy . . . .
Funk is above all very human, and always has been. Radicalism is quite foreign to his entire character and being. He is more of an artist, a man of very fine artistic feeling and scholarly ideas. I believe one can say that at no time was he a doctrinaire or dogmatic. On the contrary, he was conciliatory and anxious to settle disputes. For this reason, in Party circles in particular, he was considered too soft, too indulgent, in fact he was accused many times of being too weak. He tried to protect domestic economy from political encroachment and from unnecessary severity; and because of his respect and his regard for enterprising endeavor and out of his own responsibility to economy and to the people, he fought against unnecessary intervention in various enterprises even during the war. He protected industry against mergers end closures. This finally led to his being deprived of the responsibility for production in the decisive phase of the war.
I recall from the time of my collaboration with him, when I was still in charge of the trade organization, that Funk on various occasions interceded for men in the industrial world who were in political difficulties. I believe, however, that because of these individual cases, such as his intervention on behalf of Consul General Hollaender or of Herr Pietsch, and because of his attempts to promote peace, he at that time had to expect grave consequences; also because of his intervention in the case of Richard Strauss, as is surely known, and in similar cases. I do not think these individual cases are of such importance as perhaps the following: After the catastrophe of 9 November 1938 the process of Aryanization was to be intensified in the Ministry of Economics; and at that time a few political men were forced upon the Ministry, especially Herr Schmeer. I remember distinctly that at that time Landfried in particular, as well as Funk, slowed down considerably this radicalization of the Ministry; and Funk and the Ministry were blamed for doing so.
After 8 and 9 November I once had a conference regarding the events of that date with Himmler, in which I voiced my complaints. Himmler on that occasion finally reproached both Funk and myself by saying, among other things:
"Finally, you people on the economic side and connected with the economic management are also to blame that things have gone too far. People like Herr Schacht cannot be expected to do anything except go slow ail the time and oppose the will of the Party; but if you and Funk and all you people on the economic side had not slowed things down so much, these excesses would not have happened." I believe two facts must be stated first of all: First, the influence of the Ministry of Economy on the occupied territories was relatively limited. Secondly, during the year in which I was in the Ministry these questions were no longer particularly important.
Generally speaking, the position was as follows: Funk was constantly accused of thinking more of peace than of war. The opinions he proclaimed both in his speeches and in print referred to a European economic policy; and I assume that these talks and publications or articles are before the Court.
Funk looked at the occupied territories from exactly the same point of view. He raised repeated objections to the over-exploitation of the occupied territories and expressed the view that war-time co-operation should form the basis of later co-operation in peace. His view was that confidence and willingness to co-operate should be fostered in the occupied territories during the war. He expressed the view that the black market cannot be combated by the black market and that, since we were responsible for the occupied territories, we must avoid anything likely to disturb the currency and economic system of these territories.
I think I remember that he also discussed the question with the Reich Marshal and defended his own point of view. He also repeatedly opposed unduly heavy occupation expenses, and always favored the reduction of our own expenditure, that is, of German expenditure in the occupied territories. In other words, he regarded the occupied territories in exactly the same way as other European countries; and this attitude is best illustrated by the speech he made in Vienna, I believe, in which he publicly acknowledged as genuine debts the clearing debts, the high totals of which were due mainly to differences in price, that is, inflationary tendencies, in the countries which delivered the goods.
There can be no question of Funk's co-operation in questions regarding the employment of foreign labor at this time, but only within the scope of his responsibility in the Central Planning Board. But it remains to be seen whether the Central Planning Board was at all responsible for the employment of workers or whether the Central Planning Board did nothing more than ascertain the manpower needs of the various production spheres. However, regardless of what the tasks of the Central Planning Board may have been, Funk's position in the Central Planning Board was the following:
Funk, as Minister of Economy, was responsible for the supplies for the civilian population and for export. In the period following the separation of the ministries, no additional foreign worker I believe was employed in the production of supplies for civilians or for export. On the contrary, Funk was constantly confronted with the fact that during that time German and foreign workers were continually being removed from the production of consumer goods and put into armament production. Consequently, I cannot imagine that an accusation of this sort can be made against Funk with reference to this period of time.
On this occasion I should like to emphasize another point which seems important to me. Provisioning the foreign workers was a very serious question. I believe that even Herr Sauckel will corroborate the fact that, when this question came up, Funk was at once ready—even though there—was already a great scarcity of provisions for the German people due to many air raids and destruction’s to release large quantities of supplies and put them at the disposal of the foreign workers. Particularly shoes and clothing; Funk was not the competent authority for food. I have specific knowledge of this. And as a result Funk had considerable difficulty; for the Gauleiter, in view of the great scarcity of goods, did their best to secure supplies for the inhabitants of their own Gau for whom they were responsible, and in so doing used every means which came to hand. Funk constantly had to oppose the arbitrary acts of the Gauleiter, who broke into the supply stores in their Gau and appropriated stocks intended for the general use. I know very well that Funk represented that viewpoint and it is in accordance with his general attitude, for the political disquiet and dissatisfaction which accompany the displacement of such large masses of human beings temporarily uprooted was in opposition to the policy of appeasement and reconstruction which was definitely Funk's goal.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I naturally cannot give you the exact figure here without data or statistics, but on an average I would say that the figure for each group [laborers from the East and West] might be about 30 percent; the percentage of workers from the East was certainly somewhat higher. [The employers of labor] were the Economic Ministry, the Armament Ministry, the Agricultural Ministry, the various trades, the State Railways, the mines, et cetera, all big undertakings. Usually the demand was made simultaneously to the Führer and to me, or to the collecting agencies provided for by the Four Year Plan. The demands were sent in to me, and at the same time they were almost always sent to the Führer, because the Führer had to approve these demands.
The Central Planning Board was an office where above all, as far as I know, the quotas for raw materials were fixed, but where questions of work and manpower were also discussed. The demands which were put to me I had to consider as orders, for the Führer had laid on me the duty of meeting the demands of the war economy. was only called in when there were to be debates on the use of manpower. My office had to meet the demands made by Speer. [Speer had his own machinery for directing labor], he had to have that in his ministry, and he did have it. That was essential.
According to my conviction, yes; for already in 1943—and it was one of the purposes of my manifesto—I pointed out that the economic problems of the occupied countries were very serious and had to be regulated and settled so as to avoid confusion. In Germany after 1943 there were no more really usable reserves of manpower left. Many discussions took place on this problem, but the labor most in demand was skilled labor, miners, and workers for the heavy industries. I must say that from our point of view, and according to our judgment concerning economic and labor questions, there was a great deal of manpower and very extensive reserves in the occupied territories. Perhaps I can show it by a comparison with the first World War. In the first World War, 10 to 12 million Germans were mobilized for labor. In this war about 25 million German men and women were used, and more than half were women. I must add that all the women who did Red Cross or other welfare work Germany were not included in my statistics. They were included in other countries.
I myself and the entire German people were of the opinion, and had to be, that this war was neither willed nor brought about by the German people-and, to be truthful, I must include the Party. Our standpoint was that we had to do our duty to our people. From the point of view of the war situation and of German economy, and as I saw and tried to carry out my allocation of labor, I considered it justified, and, above all, inevitable; for Germany and the countries we occupied were an economic whole that could not be split up. Without such an exchange of eastern and western manpower Germany could not have existed for even 1 day. The German people themselves were working to the extreme limit of their capacity.
From Speer's IMT testimony: The [labor] program was extended to Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. The entire production in these countries was also declared blocked, and the laborers in these blocked industries were given the same protection as in France, even after the meeting with Hitler on 4 January 1944, during which the new program for the West for 1944 was fixed. I adhered to this policy. The result was that during the first half of 1944, 33,000 workers came from France to Germany as compared with 500,000, proposed during that conference; and from other countries, too, only about 10 percent of the proposed workers were taken to Germany.
His [Hitler's] decision was a useless compromise, as was often the case with Hitler. These blocked factories were to be maintained, and for this purpose Sauckel was given the order to obtain 3,500,000 workers from the occupied territories. Hitler gave the strictest instructions through the High Command of the Armed Forces to the military commanders that Sauckel's request should be met by all means. Contrary to the Führer's decision during that meeting, I informed the military commander of the way I wanted it, so that in connection with the expected order from the High Command of the Armed Forces the military commander would have two interpretations of the meeting in his hands. Since the military commander was agreeable to my interpretation, it could be expected that he would follow my line of thought.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: That is a statement, a rather abbreviated statement, probably [originally] made by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers. But I should like to say emphatically that it can be interpreted only in this way: In those areas, which were very numerous at the time, I could not put into effect an administration to deal with manpower until order had been restored through executive forces. This statement, therefore, is not quite correct as presented here. ...
The Foreign Office was connected with this matter in the following way: It had to establish connections with countries where embassies, legations, or German delegations were acting. Negotiations would then take place under the chairmanship of the head of an embassy or delegation. The Foreign Office always made every effort to conduct these negotiations in a suitable way and in a proper manner. In this case it meant that if I had to negotiate with the French or the Italian Government, I would first have to get in touch with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. ...
It is obvious that I myself, in my office, could not do certain things without informing the high-ranking authorities of the Reich. It merely proves that I was attempting to work correctly, and not to interfere wildly within the Reich, or in other administrative departments. For the recruiting of manpower, that is in the registration according to German orders, it was the chief, duly authorized and appointed for this purpose at the time, of a territorial government, a Reich commissariat, or the like, who participated-for I emphasize that I was unable to issue any laws in that field and was not allowed to do so. I could not interfere in any government department; that is impossible in any government system in the world. Not to co-ordinate, but to instruct them: and to ask for their co-operation where the case arose, if it came within their jurisdiction. The distribution and direction of manpower in the Reich was my principal task. It included, with the German workers, 30 million persons. I do not wish to minimize this task, for I did my best to introduce order into this mass of workers, as dictated by my sense of duty. I do not wish to minimize anything. It was my task and my duty towards my people. I knew that the German people were engaged in their most bitter struggle. It was my duty to carry on with my task with all my strength-that is what I meant by "fanatical." I further explained, in another sentence, that I could not accomplish my task that year. As far as I was able to accomplish it in 1944 two-thirds were German workers, not mainly aliens but more than two-thirds Germans; and I was trying my utmost to put all German women to work, as far as they were capable of working, and in 1944 there were over 2 million of them.
From Speer's IMT testimony: I should like to summarize the entire subject and say a few words about it. We had a technique of dealing with inconvenient orders from Hitler that permitted us to by-pass them. Jodl has already said in his testimony that for his part he had developed such a technique too. And so, of course, the letters which are being submitted here are only clear to the expert as to their meaning and the results they would have to have.January 25, 1944: Sauckel writes a letter to Heinrich Otto Abetz, the German ambassador to Vichy France (F-822, RF-1513):
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: It is only an ultimatum insofar as my departure was in question and nothing else. I could not exert any pressure on Laval or use any threats. It is only an ultimatum insofar as I could not wait any longer. I had to leave, because I had orders to leave. I was trying to get a decision, a "yes" or "no," nothing else. I had to leave, and I wanted a decision as to whether the French Premier would sign it or not.
As far as I can remember—I cannot say exactly offhand—there were 700,000 to 800,000 French workers employed in Germany. However, I cannot tell you exactly without documents.
From Sauckel’s IMT Testimony: I established no special police; I explained that yesterday. That was a suggestion put forward by the French units themselves for protection. At a conference I exaggerated and called it "police," but it was not a police force. [A"Committee for Social Peace” and "League for Social Order and Justice”] was talked about. It was proposed, yes, and it was discussed. As far as I remember that was in the spring of 1944.
I already told my attorney yesterday that in agreement with French organizations such a protective corps was set up, so that on the one hand people who wanted to work could be protected, and on the other hand administrative measures could be carried out. Since the Frenchmen themselves declared that they were ready and willing to collaborate, I did not see anything unfavorable in this or anything that was in any way out of order. It was to alleviate the conditions of the indigenous people themselves.
I admit that I suggested this Protective Corps, and that it was set up, but only on a small scale. I did not issue them myself, but rather the French Government did. That is correct; for in every occupied territory—and that is true the whole world over—the authority of the occupying power must be respected. It is true that at a conference with the French Premier Laval, I demanded, by way of negotiations, the death penalty in cases of very serious obstruction; if a serious case of sabotage was in question, according to martial law.
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